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a ®  United State® Arsny Signal Corps Aviation Section 
m s  a weak air service devoted primarily to experimental 
testing prior to World War Z« la March 1916* president
a punitive expedition into Mexico 
to capture the Mexican nationalist, Francisco CPanaho) 
villa* 0n© of the organizations assigned to the ©xpedt- 
tioa was the First Aero Squadrons the Signal corps* only 
operational unit* M » &  study ite H@$siw punitive
expedition, preparedness for World war 1, m &  the develop-* 
meat of united states air poster. It ooneludes that the 
Mexican punitive expedition was a critical point in the 
history of the united States M r  Force*
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GHAPTEB X
The airplane la m  Amerioan invention, but the united 
States was the last ujer power to recognise its value, espe­
cially os an instrument of war. on December ?, 1903, Milbur 
end Orville Wright made the first successful, controlled 
heavier-than-alr flight at Kitty hawk, Berth Carolina. One. 
year later, January 18, 1905, they offered their invention to 
the united states government! only to be rebuffed by the Ord­
nance and Fortification Board* whose members were skeptical 
of the very existence of an air machine. This skepticism 
toward aviation, at first, as to its reality, and later, as 
to its usefulness, caused me united states to fall behind 
the other great powers in me field of aeronautics.1
Congressional conservatism toward aviation, resulting 
from uncertainty over the value of me experimental military 
machines, delayed the development of American air power. It 
was not until August 29, 1918, that the law makers appropriated ^  
the first suitable sub for arny aviation, 13*281,666 dollars,
L^etter, -frank p. bahts, First lieutenant. Signal Corps 
to me Chief signal Officer, War Department, 1907, united 
States Air Force Arohivea, 168.651,6. {Photocopy.)
1
afill* action, tmm **•*■*»•# m® initial m m m  for
tu® GMpmmitm ®t tU® th®n infant
today’s air fom. These funds fulfilled a desperate need: 
to provide trained aviators and operational aircraft for the 
United states* entry into World War I.2
Congressional uncertainty limited the physical growth 
of the army Air Service* Prior to the passage of 'the 
National Defense Act, June %  1916, aviation manpower was 
severely reetrloted. The Act increased the Tables of 
Organisation of the Signal Corps of the united States Army, 
removed 'the age, rank, and marital restrictions on aviation 
officers, and set the stage for the creation of a reserve 
force.3 unfortunately, the provisions for money and nan mere 
too late to fully prepare the Army Air service for its role 
in the Great War* However, these aote did provide a basis
nSr'ahkdWlfe. mi ls~dli iM i am.mua 1^11 m l iw aWwW Wm&
The fledgling Army Air Service was also vastly improved 
by events that transpired in -early 1916* These events cen- 
tered around the employment of the first Aero Squadron during 
the hexioaa punitive expedition. The publicity created by
2u.s., statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX, pt. 1 (December 
1915 to Rareh 1917J, "An Aot Mating Appropriations for the 
Support of the Army for the Piseal Tear Ending June 30, 1917* 
and for Other Purposes,0 August 29, 1916, oh. 618, pp. 619-623
3u.S., statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX. pt. 1 <December 
1915 to Maroff" IVm, "Mr Wit "for Baking Further and hore 
Effectual Provision for the national Defense, and for Other 
Purposes,* June 3, 1916, eh. 136, pp. 166-176*
3tig# sUSSss^- to&iitoi1#* IM&w m  awak#B#S Congr f^f# #?#. the 
American public to toe true plight of army aviation.
®hia period of change* 'the Mexican punitive expedition# 
end. the notions of the First Aero Squadron is the major 
theme of this paper#'
In order to provide the reader with an adequate back- 
ground# the writer will first discuss the beginnings of the 
Ana? Air Service* and the aerial capabilities of the First 
Aero Squadron, a# will then follow m e  course of the 
Mexican punitive expedition* in order to develop its inrpaot 
ffiyi army ©#j*0touti0§# to&i mb to to#
and lessons of the expedition# Finally* toe writer will 
attempt to aseertaia the effect on the American Air service
$his thesis Is net all inolueive. She writer has 
limited his subject to the heavisr»tha»*air Amy Air service# 
1 % id fsosflsai'SeS. to&i toMwiMto aasi stod tig# idpwto
of military aviation. However# the primary purpose of this 
paper is to highlight the importance of the effect of toe 
nextc&n i^anSiSSu#' Bix&BtiiA&M to to# teito# steto# sBSistol. 
defuse sad especially, its aerial preparedness for World
Mstta f wflKT *■#
CftAPfS* IX
*as mm Mimtm s & m o m  1907-19x5
* . • » M M  state#* military and naval aerial 
corps £ t x sot «*!•* . . . • as a viable faro* is 1915.*
St was as air arm is naae M y *  the total operational 
capability of all air gsrvlaos, as of Jane 1915* was eleven 
airplanes, seven aray and four navy, ana their serviceability 
was questionable.2 is*© Arm? Aviation Section, h*spere<4 ty 
inadequate General Staff support had yet to develop an air 
doctrine,3 stifled by iapdseifeie personnel petiole* and low 
funding, M M  States* allitary aviation lagged behind the 
rest of the While bb* saarepeaa belligerents secretly
developed,, tested, and Implemented their air foroes over the 
trench lines* the wlags of the baited States eagle renamed 
It m s  n© wonder then, that in Heroh 1915,
aMsanweMiatawawaiaoiaiwiisaiiwawwsiMiiMiwttawBaawMwtMa^^
as sited fey Aerial one boehly. m  28,
1915, 0*
Jane 88, 19X5, p. 3*1.
^Benjamin 0. Fouloi#, «statement on the seoesalty for 
the Creation of a Department of Aeronautic*,* baited. states 
M r  faro* Archive# lii,68*18, October 1919, p* 8, hereafter 
aited as "Poulois Statement." {'fypewrifctea.)
^Arthur Sweeteer, Tha Aasrleaa.Alr. .Service (sew M s
P# jR^ ps 01»CHEI 4l^3wl * rp.
*
Alan E. Hawley, President of the Aero Club ashed* "If the national
bird cannot Ply -- what sort of bird is
The role placed upon army aviation by United States* military
leaders was primarily reconnaissance* The air service was to provide
a field commander strategic .and tactical warning, thus depriving 'an,
enemy of the capability to deliver*' * • .* unexpected blows and
6surprises * * *M This concept embodied a philosophy that air
power assisted to extend the time honored positions of the cavalry.*
infantry* and artillery* Aircraft could only pinpoint objectives,
and eliminate, some unnecessary and uncertain searching for enemy
armies. Their capability to cover a broad expanse of territory.,
coupled with rapid radio and telegraph communications, provided the
field commander with a scope and depth of operations never before
available* The resultant effect of the ^reconnaissance only” concept
of air power was the establishment of a principle that war strategy
was not changed by the airplane* only certain tactical applications 
7were*1 Therefore, an air doctrine was not necessary*
Iftlitary aviators in the Aviation Section, and others
'’Aerial Age Weekly, March 22, 1915, P- 13
6U, S* War Department, .annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer*.
J M t e d _ ^  fiscal Vear ^ d  .30, 1015 fwaahin^-
ton, D.C.sGovernment Printing 0ffice, l§15}, p.<b. , her^fter cited 
as Annual Report 1915.
^Ibid.* pp. 6-8.
6
is quarters friendly to the promotion of as air doctrine, 
bold more controversial and less accepted roles for air 
power* da earl; as 1907, lieutenant Benjamin D. fouloia, 
then a member of tbe Signal Gorps, wrote os "The faotioal 
sod Strategical Value of Dynamical flying Haehiaes.®8 Xn it 
he predicted future air engagements would occur days before 
hostile ground forces made contact, and that these engage­
ments would affect the final outeome of future conflicts,?
Xa 1993, Rajer George Owen Squier, Signal Corps, united 
States Army, forecast the eventual use of aircraft as a stra­
tegic deterrent to war that could be directed * . . .  at the 
seat of government Itself . . .  .®xo
She majority of secondary air roles considered as fea­
sible were lees strategic and more tactical in nature, the 
successful use of aircraft ia Europe, m  well as aa emerging
fenfifc&iftal many tlyil SSsSftS*
yn^ it^y leaders that ai,y#Pi-irt aouX4 provido a fmMMm of
^■^[©leiwwswsseawawMewwaewweMeMewweeapwsew*^^
®Benja®in o. Pouloia, ®Personnel service report for 
period 1898 to 1919,* United States Air Force irohivee 
163,88-5, October 14, 1919* p* 3, hereafter cited as 
•Foulois Beoord,® (Typewritten.)
9lM4.
lOoeorg© 0. Sqular, *The Present Status of Billtary 
Aeronautics,* (paper presented at the December 1938 
Resting of the American society of Reohanical Engineers, 
lew fork, K.X,, Deoenber 1908}, p. 1615, (Bepriat 
from Journal of American Society of Mechanical 
ssngineers.)
7
teftottMf mixmrlmz #e# froat Sin# combat
support* these predictions were bached by the statements 
and experiences of Europeans. M r  power was seen as being 
useful la idle interdiction of supplies aad personnel, la 
spotting and controlling artillery fire, in preventing enemy 
air reoonnaiseance, aad as a rapid means of transportation 
for Mgs level officers. Zn an attempt to implement some of 
these capabilities, Brigadier General George f* dorivea, 
Chief Signal Officer, United States Army, requested in July 
191$, that the air service be famished *eff«aalve type* and
Wt  Aiksibbwted.itt' SUfc miliis ««aat. _usst^ »ML A . •***.. .au, M m  'adai'Mifcj'flt -Ma MHiiam-aiiiii-aA* (Ik' m*. m. g ^ d t  - * -  * '*I*0pt,Cl nirang Oil *-*
!§{,$ ?#XA on deaf iifi fch& 4§ nSngs fWfttsiM
$1*# size of a panguin»e.
Prior to July 11, Iftft, congress had failed to aafc# 
definite provisions by law to provide for the fuaotional 
duties of the Signal Corps with respect to an air service.12 
Congressional action had been either limited to individual 
attempts by Congressmen to gain military reservations for 
their respective states, or It had been concerned with pro~ 
vlding limited funds, limited personnel, and aviator pay and
1%* Earl KoClea&oa, *fhe Question of autonomy For She 
united States M r  Are, 190?»19b$. * (unpunished paper 
prepared for the Documentary Sesearoh Division, Air 
university, 1950), p. 7* hereafter elted as "McClendon
HOpOFVe w
death benefits.11 it had not sought to delineate how the Army 
would operata, train, supervise* or implement an aviation 
unit.11* When, on July 18, 1914, Congress established on 
Aviation section in the Signal Corps* United States Amy, it 
finally fixed the pay, grades, and numbers of personnel, and 
formulated the rules that would govern them.15 
She Aviation section was
, , . charged with the duty of operating or auper. 
vising the operation of all aircraft, including 
balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances ’pertaining, 
to said eraftj also with the duty of ‘ ‘
officers and enlisted, men in matters 
to military aviation.16
Executive, administrative and scientific services mre
to be provided ty the Signal Corps# while the Sd aviation
officers and students and the add enlisted personnel were to
operata the schools, units# and material areas.1?
The of flow corps was limited hr the dot,’ to a maximum
grade of temporary captain. ' Those officers selected for
aviation duty were considered to ho on a detached duty tour
13compiled from a survey toy author for all sessions of 
Congress, December 0* 1911 to October 20, 191%, from 
Congressional Becord. vol. 48 through Vol. 51.
it
'AM
JJLi* p» 8*
■A
HI
i86*p,"53
i?ihid.
of four years*. At the end of their tour they were to return 
to their regular branoh of service. Officer resources fop 
aviation duty were to he restricted to unmarried lieutenants 
of the line who were less than thirty* upon their selection, 
which caste only after being recommended hy the Chief Signal 
Officer, they were to to designated as aviation students. 
This student duty was act to exceed on year* If the novice 
aviators were found to be unfit for flying service they were 
to be immediately returned to line duty*’ if however, they 
qualified, they would receive an aeronautical rating of 
Junior Hllitary Aviator* as flying experience progressed,. 
but la no case la loss than three years, the Junior Military 
Aviators were to be upgraded to Military Aviators,18 
flying duty was considered hazardous, and the law 
specifically limited it to volunteers except in war tine.
In order to induce military officers to volunteer for flight 
duty, congress .provided financial incentives. AH aviators, 
below the rank of Captain, were to be advanced a m  rank for 
purposes of pay, rank, and allowances. In addition to this 
increase, if their duties required frequent aerial flight, 
Junior Military Aviators would receive an additional 50 
percent pay Increase and Military Aviators a 75 .percent pay 
raise,19
18m a .  pp. 314-515.
igibia. pp, 513-518*
Congress, la creating the Aviation Section, also speci­
fied the str«»ngth and composition of the enlisted ranks. 'She 
authorisation 260 provided 3U2 mssSw
signal electricians, 12 first-class sergeants, 2% sergeants,
78 corporals, 8 cooks, 82 first class privates, and 84 pri­
vates. Of these, a maximum of forty could he trained as avia­
tion aaehaaloa and twelve oould he enlisted pilots.20
The constraints placed by Congress on the Aviation 
Section hampered it primarily in two major areas: personnel
funding.21
The act of July 18* 1914, inoorprated two faulty per-
Bit afrni M lm i' f t  *11 mrMi. l Jfcti “GSl'jfc J b a  dtfNik i m  i H i  *% a l i i  'ijilWi'^liii^ inw'ltrtl.rfmjfi j£k* ©wtslipr® 8 m * v &  E?Sa!H8U1S
of SSp^ SSSrS p M H i
Seaaad, officer resources were to be selected only from the 
ranks of unmarried lieutenants who wore in their twenties.
Both reetrictions served to- create an oxperleaee vacuum, 
especially in the area of command. Oeseral Soriven noted 
this in 1915, When in his annuel report hefought to retain 
Foulois * . . . one of the few off!cert- ?f age and experience 
in the aviation section , , . and one of the beat practical
u
fliers * , . ,*22 Foulois, soon fee be promoted to permanent 
oaptain «ss on the verge of returning to the infantry, She 
thirty-year old age limit served to amplify the laok of ex. 
perlenca by » . . . filling? the aviation section with 
young and inexpertenced officers of a few yesra* servioe, 
the vast majority of whom /were7 second lieutenants.“23 ©f 
the total twenty-nine Aviation Section line officers, only 
five were first lieutenants as of August 16, 1915. the age 
and marriage limit also seriously hampered the availability 
of new aviation candidates, ©my 6.0 percent (65} of the 
line first lieutenants and 64,9 percent {668} of the second 
lieutenants were eligible for aviation selection. Of these, 
at least 20 percent were unable to pass the required physical 
examination* Therefore, only 27 percent of line lieutenants 
were actually eligible for Aviation Section servioe. The 
Chief Signal officer stated, in 1915* if personnel limita­
tion* were not removed it would * . . .  be absolutely Im­
possible to fill satisfactorily the important command or 
administrative positions in the Aviation Section.«a^
Congress also had an unblemished reoord of continual 
failure in providing adequate funds for the promotion of 
military air power. The first nation to fly in 1903, M i
BOPOrt 1915. pp. 3-10.
23ibld.. p. 10.
2% M d .. pp. 9-10.
12
by I9I3, assumed fourteenth place in military air appropriations
among the world's nations. Germany was the world leader with 28
million dollars, and even Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, and Brasil had
25invested more funds in aviation than the United States had* By
the end. of 1913, the ■total United States appropriations for army
05
aviation amounted to a scant 600,000 dollars*** Inspired by a
public opinion of "the United States never was so safe from invasion
as it is today," and by failing to foresee the need for military
27aviation, Congress had continuously withheld needed moneys.
General Scriven, in requesting an aviation appropriation of 1,358,000 
dollars in July 1915, noted " • • • the lack of a sufficient appro­
priation ^ o r aviation? has greatly hampered the equipment and 
operation of the ^ viatioj|7 school and the First Aero- Squadron***^ ®
As a result of these meager appropriations and the great 
secrecy surrounding any aeronautical developments by the European 
belligerents, the United States' technology lagged
^U. s., War Department, Annual Report of the Chief Signal 
-Officer* United States Army, for the Fiscal Year Ended June30> 1917.
' ifcnSriSnt,rFri^^  r J917} f;p7r5^
after cited as Annual Henort 1917*
g T^he Independent. October 25, 1915, P. 120.
Annual Report 1915. pp. 12-13.
that' ©f ■other world Xtt an age wft©** military aircraft
engines ©f up to 160horeepawer ©r imp© were coming into 
favor, the newest addition 6© America's air fleet, ■ the Curtiss 
ja-2» had only a 90 horsepower engine,30 The total heavier* 
than-sir force consisted of twenty-three aircraft aa of 
December 21, 1915.3* This force was quite mixed. as it included 
Martin f*s and ff*s, Curtiss W flying boats, Burgess it*s, 
Curtiss J82»a ana m$*a and on® Burgess-Duane armored sea 
plane,32 Curtiss F flying boats were primary trainers, 
the Martin aircraft advanced trainers, and the CurtigedH's 
■era the front Una reconnaissance foree.33 Bon® of the air* 
craft were equipped with armament, is pusher aircraft had 
bam condemned la 151% {tm feeing Inherently dangerous in 
case of a crash lauding) all the aircraft, except the sea 
Pianos «ere tractor type.3^ sot only were American aviators
% * y y *my Air Ann, 191*^ —1995, 
iers Army Air Forces, 1996J 
pp* 32*33*
(AAF Historical Office: ' 
p* 13| anft sweetser, Air
3S»Ar®y Aviation notes,* Aerial, Age Xeettlv. .Kay 2fe« 1913*
p* 325* -' ■ ■ .■•.■■■■
hereafter cited
aaaMfr - '•
,, *the United States 
?.* (Air University:
32X010.. pp.128.136.
P* %25* ■
^military Aviation Hews,* Aerial AaeHeetav. ymy 19, 1913*
It® ‘ *
3%lfre§ Ooldberg <ed.}, A.,ilatwa’_..afT
t , 1907-195? <Princeton: D. van Noo‘ 
, p, 9, .hereafter cited aa QoMbera,
wwroaiWi
forced to fly second rate machines, the American aviation 
Industry had yet to produce a completely reliable aircraft 
engine.35 in addition, * . . . the Army own/ed7 no suitable 
grounds for an aviation field,*36 this last item, noted by 
the Aerial Asee Weekly. July 15, 1915, pointed out the fact 
that even the Aviation Section's flying school,, located at 
North island, San Diego, California, was not government 
owned, but occupied at the pleasure of John D, Spreckles.3?
In addition to the school, the Aviation section of the 
Signal Corps consisted of an Aeronautical Division in the 
Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Washington,
D.C., several small detachments in Hawaii and the Philippines, 
and the First Aero Squadron.38
the manning of the Aviation section, as of July 1, 1915* 
consisted of thirty officers and 17? enlisted personnel, of 
these, twenty officers were qualified Junior Military Aviators, 
eight additional officers were aviation students, and two 
more were Signal Corps officers. Only twenty of the enlisted
3®Geonge p, Scrlven, "Organisation and Methods of 
Administration of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps,* 
United States Air Force Archives 16?,12-C, May 16, 1916, 
p. 1, hereafter cited as "Organization." (Photocopy of 
typewritten Memo.)
men were aviation mechanics and Just nine enlisted personnel 
had received soma flight instruction,39
' The Aeronautical Division was tuo meHwm ofali air 
activities. Founded August 1, 1907, it toad been originally 
chartered to deal, ulth * * *'* aAlmattere pertaining to mili­
tary ballooning, m i  machines and all Kindred subieots* *60 
It remained the single source of Amy air activities, both 
operational and administrative, until July 18, 1916, when 
Congress passed the efficiency act which created the Aviation 
Section, Proa that tine on, the Aeronautical Division became 
an administrative clearing house for the ■ specification of Mr* 
eraft and equipment, procurement requests, aeronautical data 
a m  personnel movements,61
The operational, training, and research facilities in 
1915 were primarily located at the Aviation School, Worth 
Island, San Diego, California,^2 Established December 1913, 
by General Order -So* 79, War Department, me-'sohool and iis 
location were an outgrowth of a 1910 ■invitation by oienn 
Curtiss to provide fro© instruction for throe.Amy Officers*
6%, Allen, a0ffice Memorandum 80* 6," Waited states 
Air Perce Archives 167, 12*6, August 1, 1907, (Photocopy 
of Original Beffioraaauo, certified by a demo for the Eecord, 
December 22, 1966*}
61 "Organisation, * pp. 1*2#
.#■ P* 9*
16
the southern California location was selected because of its 
ideal olimatio end meteorological conditions. However, the 
school's remoteness from normal supply and administrative 
channels created problems. Because of this, and its exposed 
position to attach from either Mexico or the Pacific ooean, 
there existed a reasonable doubt whether dan Diego would 
always remain m  ideal saheol location.^
Prior to m e  school's creation, air training had been 
conducted In relaxed fashion, flight instruetion followed 
the sun: sooner* in College Parle, Maryland and at the
Wright airplane factory in Dayton, Ohioj and winters at Fort 
Sam Houston, Texas, Augusta, Georgia, and at the Curtiss fac­
tory in san Mega, California.^ The course of instruetion 
was as varied in level as it was in location. Typical of the 
period were the informal handwritten progress reports inform-, 
tag the Chief Signal Officer of lieutenant Henry B. Arnold's 
training progress, Kay to June 1911, at me Wright Factory.^5
* pp. 2-d{ and Glenn H. Curtiss and 
Augustus Poet, "The gurtlas Aylation Book8 {Mew forkt 
PrederioiE A. stokes ^j^,1912y, pp; 122, las, lay.
*%.S*» War Department, 
united states —
    p. 20, hereafter
Henry H. Arnold. Qlo)
1951), p. 2t| and*
if#7pp»‘
s.
-ng 'Office;,
west Chandler and Frank p. 
(Mew fork: The Bonald Press
^Heary h. Arnold, 'tetters Addressed to me Chief signal 
Officer, U.S. Army,» united states Air Perce Archives 
168,655-2, 20 May 1911 to 10 June 1911* (Photocopy*}
Less typical, but true, were the orders given Pouloie in 
January 1910, when he was told to proceed to fort am Houston, 
Texas, and *to teaoh /himself/ to fly.* He succeeded, with 
the aesistaaee of frequent correspondence with Orville and 
Wilbur Wright, although he had to provide 300 dollars, twice 
as much as the government provided, of his own funds to beep 
airborne.1*6
The lech of formal organization did not deter the young 
aviators from attempting to establish aerial standardisation 
or from Military experimentation. Student aviators, by 
July 6, 1911# were required to pass the night test prescribed 
by the Faderatioaal Asronautlque Internationale {FA1). This 
test as modified upward in 1912 and 1913* remained in effect 
as well as provided the basis for the 1914 "acquirement* for 
Military- Aviator dating** enacted October 27, 1913* by Sorlvea.^
United states aerial military experimentation began 
January If, 1913, at a bos Angeles, California air show when 
Lieutenant Paul W* M b  used a erode bembslght to drop dummy 
bombs* A year later, January 15, 1911. Lieutenant Myron 
Crissy, dropped live boobs at an air meet at Tanforaa,
California. This meet also served as a test for airborne
^•Pouloi* accord,* pp» 3-4,
6?eha»ftiar and Lah®, 3£S-313i
Arnold* C-lobal Mlsslon. a. 34* Anrom flCBQrt 1912. p. 25,
radio communications by Book, and aerial photography by 
Lieutenant John 0* walker from an aircraft piloted by 
Walter Brookins* Experiments In air to ground firing occurred 
August 20, 1910, when Lieutenant Jaoob s, Biokei fired a rifle 
at a three foot by fire foot target from m  altitude of 100 
feet* the aircraft was flown by ctieim Curtiss. ' One month 
later, Curtiss and Piokel repeated the experiment using a 
pistol.**8 By July 191a, Brigadier General James Allen, Chief 
Signal Officer, was able to report tests in radio telegraphy,
*. Ap/i rtjtftiAl tmvm&mw j«tt <$# Khlch
* . • * demonstrat/ed/ the possibilities of aeroplanes for
JfejflPMft'AftiMfc Wl.wmk^m s^k JH^nih'sth<;T Arts ft *-*■ •^•-t -ft ’iWh~Mh'ifH]'i^ tWt 1 aw* raniW Ai 'tfto aea.alw.jSfettM.0WW 03510* 00N3l$!|
followed.
In December 1912, the total complement of the temporary 
College Park, Maryland eohool {fourteen flying officers, 
thirty-nine enlisted men, and nine aeroplanes) moved to 
Son Diego, California. The aove marked the birth of formal 
aerial training and the establishment of research facilities.
By July 1915, the aviation school at San Diego was a well- 
established fact sad part of the education system of the United 
States Army.51 ih® school commander was Captain Arthur S. Cowan,
^ Stady 98. pp. 4jM*6,
^Annual Jenort, 1912, p. i%*
50studr 98. p. 73, and Goldberg. p. 7.
^ “organisation,* p. a*
w
a Signal Corps Officer, wl», altoon^t unrated, had been active 
ta aeronautics sine© 1910, when tie relieved Captain Charles 
Del?, Chandler m  Chief of the Aeronautical Divieion.52 ®j© 
school was divided tots tee sa|er departments; one far train* 
tog' and toe other for e^ pariffi^ Qtatlon and maintenance.5?
ft*0. escperitsental sr*& repair 4#pii?te©is^  provided research 
and development, material, and depot maintenance services for 
t o  Aviation Section, Composed of one off iter. Captain 
Townsend P, Dodd, Military Aviator, one aeronautical engineer, 
SBl*02ISIlSSSSlS SBSS»BSSF.i JTt&$ SWSbSSSB
mechEdiicc. $ti& unit sSwlSsiie touted« sw i^ h ss lis i o r rebuilt 
engines, airframes, accessories, fuels, lubricants, and spare 
parts.51* Daring too fiscal year of 1915, its activities in* 
eluded lubricant 'tests, propeller balancing, stabilizer tests, 
'Vfts&s? £%&&& m iiito i sasoise tsoisfe s ss s iiiE te▼ ^*r p jg* <$m sBPfOwtosir t^sp! JE^'Sto torTtor,«Bto -'tor^p'AM^Tsp.w • mpymfl 'sw p 1^  to  ““ ■»■ « » fsm  't 1' n' wmmh^srw? wpr- i ; i r n < [  us*- wfn jo  “ ' ^ ^ “ W  ▼  * r
communications toots to radio telegraphy and avia­
phones, bomb droning, Maoy autopilot tests, and toe location 
of i m I m m A m  xaiw&B* txk sSditioii to H 10 the
group designed and constructed toe epecial type trucks* tois 
fleet provided toe First Aero Squadron with a mobile machine 
shop, several mobile spar© part test cribs, & transportable
leiwswitoitoitoiWitoiWMtoeitotoitototoiwiwoiMtoitototoe^. aiweinwiWBtoiStotowsiwstosiijtotsi^^
5%fcudg 98. p. 19#
fuel capability, and aa aircraft transport system,55
the principal department of the aviation school was 
the training department. Thla was subdivided into, two major 
uaitsj a school for officers and a school for enlisted par* 
soansl.56 courses of instruction, in oil phases, ware mainly 
conducted by civilian instructors, although soma military 
flight instructors were used.5? Professional shills .and 
technical training were the primary subjects as the duties 
of offlcera and enlisted aen ware * . . . approximately 90 
percent * , * technical, mechanical, and industrial, gm&f 
. , . P«mtm strictly military, *50 Candidates
for either aviator or mechanic training were required to pass 
«« examining board of three experienced aviation officers and 
two medical officer* prior to receiving their certificates of 
qualification. Further, any officer found inefficient la his 
aerial duties was immediately returned to line duty.59
SI*, course for officers# covering subjects both thee*
Beport 1915. p. 11* Also see various Aerial 
4*
5d*0rganiaatica,» p. JS, sad Annual Beport 1915. p. u.
»  m .  ^
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retieal and practical, was taught in two phases, ground and 
air* fbe ground phase consisted of aeronautical and mechani­
cal engineering, the theory of flight, the operation, con­
struction and repair of aircraft, accessaries and engines, 
and a course in meteorology, Whenever possible, lessons in 
the practical aspects of these subjects wore conducted in the 
machine and repair shops.The flying phase began in the 
Curtiss ff hydro-aeroplane. Shis aircraft was selected as the 
primary trainer because of its great stability and the accessi­
bility of water landing areas* Under the instruction of 
Francis *doo* Mildman, the student first mastered straight 
and level flights, then turns, and finally landings. The 
course of instruction varied according to ability, but gener­
ally after five flying hours, the student progressed to land 
machines. Gsoar Brindley, another civilian, taught the second 
flight phase by giving flying instruction in the Martin air­
planes* Once the student soloed, he was turned ever to'the 
officer in charge of training, who decided if the student
training* If $t$e wiw&s# M i  found acceptable* 
he continued his solo worh until he could pass the civilian fftl 
pilot test* Matt, I2ie young aviator trained in cross-country 
flying and navigation prior to an examination and flight test 
for a rating as a Junior Military Aviator. This comprehensive
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teat adralnietereft tap throe officers determined beyond question 
the pilot candidate teohaloal capability. If he failed to 
satisfy all these cheese instructors, he was eliminated.6!
fhe flight coarse for the enlisted personnel selected as 
Idiots paralleled the night instruction phase of the officer®. 
m m  majority of enlisted men selected for technical training 
were trained as aviation mechanics, mis course, enter the 
guidance of Oeerg© Malletfc, one of the nation’s expert field 
aviation mechanics, imparted the knowledge necessary to main- 
tain air frames; re-rig aircraft; sake fittings, ribs, spars, 
stmts, shits, and wires; cover fuselage and stag parts with 
canvas and dope; remove, replace, ant repair tires; and clean, 
overhaul, rebuild, m i adjust aircraft engines, fhla course 
was highly practical as it was conducted, in the shops and on 
the Hying field, After completing the mechanic coarse, the 
mechanic candidates m m  given a phase test, if they achieved 
a grade of 75 percent or better, and passed a physical exami­
nation, they received a certificate of Qualification, lav tag 
successfully completed their course of technical instruction, 
the new aviators or mechanics could anticipate possible assign­
ment to the only operational unit of the Aviation Seotion, the 
first Aero Squadron.62
6l*orgsnieatioa,* pp. 5»&l Sfca&y 98. p. ltl| and«%__   » xx*
^Studr M, pp. Itl-lb*; and Jnauai aeporfe ims y XX#
' fhe First Aero Squadron was the aerial reconnaissance 
unit of the Army, Originally formed as a previsions! squad* 
rod at Texas City, Texas, Hareh f# 1913, it had responded to 
the tense Mexican relations that resulted from the February 
St, 1913, Rexiean coup dlsfeat led by Vioteriano Buerta.63 
By June 15, 1913, it- was virtually disbanded when its equip* ■ 
ment and personnel were transferred to and integrated -into me' 
Aviation school at. San Dieg©, California. ^  Approximately two 
years later, July 1, 1915, the' First Aero Squadron was equipped 
with new aircraft sad restructured as a field capable unit.65 
fhe organization of the First Aero Squadron, prior to'
July 1, 191.5#' consisted of a Squadron headquarters, commanded 
by Cowan and manned by an adjutant, lieutenant Boy C. Kirkland, 
and five enlisted personnel, fhe operating sections were two 
companies, the First and the Second. 'fhe latter units commanded 
by Fouloie, and lieutenant Walter a. Taliaferro, respectively, 
had six and seven; officer aviators end thirty-two and twenty- 
five enlisted men. This organizational structure proved inade­
quate because of the reliance it placed upon. Company Commanders,
63*Field Order ho. lt* Headquarters, First Aero Squadron , 
hareft j. 1913, Baited States- Air Force Archives 168.650 fl-7, 
Official Unit Histories. {Typewritten.)
f
* • $£&- CbiSSSSS* SdH '
  ^ , ,
- 65° grief History of theFirst Aero Squadron,® Official 
Histories, United states -Air Force Archives. 168.650 8-7, - 
{^ rpewritten, ); and Jtma 1915, p. 297.
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and the lack of support it gave them,66
On July 1, 1915* Fouloie was given. command of the first 
Aero Squadron* He was exceptionally troll qualified for the 
role as he was one of the first three military aviators in the 
United states* and had been on continual duty with the Aviation 
Service alnoe July 1908» except for a one year "Kanohu law* i/ 
return to the Infantry* Foulois, a graduate of the Amy Signal 
StttMNA* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas* Nlft gev^nte n^ years 
military experience* He was eeomissioned la the field*
February 2* 1901* when he was on duty with the infantry in 
the Philippine Islands* Me had been active in the technical, 
operational* material, and experimental details'of aviation*
He had evaluated foreign aircraft designs at Haney* Prance in 
September 1909. Me had flows the first Baited States dirigible 
balloon in 1908. He had been the only United States aviator 
la 1910. no had designed tiro first set of wheels for the 
Wright airplane* Me had helped construct tiro first aerial 
radio receiving set used in the united States* He had parti* 
o&ps&Aft in inissfNiMS sBlSSSE$f aerial espsyissnSs*
During the eighteen months prior to his assumption of command, 
Foulois had reorganized the training system of the Aviation 
Section, helped outline the new organisation of the First Aero
66*First Aero Squadron** Official Histories, united States 
Archives 168,650 K-f {typewritten organization Chart.}j and 
Study 98. p. 1A6.
Squadron, and participated ia the design of 'the mobile truck 
fleet, machine shop, and field tent hangere.6?
The first Aero Squadron as reorganised consisted of twelve 
sections: headquarters, supply, engineering, transportation,
and sight Hying sections. Besides Poulois, there were four­
teen offloors, eighty-five enlisted men, and one civilian 
mechanic, Jacob Bailey, Its equipment consisted of eight 
Curtiss JH*s, m s  for eaeh crew of two pilots, fourteen trucks 
for fuel, supply, and aircraft transport! two machine shop 
trucks, and six motorcycles.6® All the officers were respon­
sible for the maintenance of their aircraft, and could fly no 
m e  elee's, except in an emergency,Because of the motorised 
nature of the unit, all officers were bought to drive motor 
tjFuoks and as united
the Curtiss JN-2,70
The Curtiss JM-2 was representative .of the latest air. 
craft produced by the United State*. Underpowered in m  era 
when 160 horsepower engines were being adopted, it was barely 
comparable to a European trainer,?! Distinguished by it*
6?*Foulois Becord," pp. 2-5, and Aerial Aga_ Meetely.
June It, 1915, p. 297.
6® Aerial.Axe Weekly. JUn* It, 1915, P* 297*
981 p. 166,
yOAerlal Age weekly, Kay 31, 1915* P* 257.
^•Aroy Aviation Motes,* Aerial Age Meekly, way 26, 1915,
P. 225*
* • « . low rakish lines, m  effect produo«ft Or staggered 
planes,* and a long# narrow and unusually deep fuselage# the 
IS series became an inspiration to msay young ai ttwwu?® She 
aircraft* s wing span meaaured 63 feet 7-5/10 inches and woe 
26 feet 10*1/2 inches in length, it hsd an empty weight of 
11?0 pound* and could carry a useful load of 660 pounds# con­
sisting of 200 pounds of fuel, 35 pounds of water# 30 pounds 
of OH# 150 pooad pilot, and a 265 pound cargo or passenger,^ 
fhe latter was placed or sat oa a wtoJter basket seat*^ 
Powers, by a 99*160 horsepower 0% engine# 
of 80 alias per hour and a stall speed of 60 miles per hours. 
It could climb 6000 feet in ten minutes and could fl? at fall 
throttle for 6 hours sod 26 minutes, oruise for 6 hours and 
It minutes or could maintain a duration night for f hours,
!%• nifeM twmtemmmmtem - M I  iWMMgfrs-
and toH tit# was 7593 dollars P.O.a, the Curtlse faetory.75 
0HXvt&M .sBwsfSSssS tthftfe && %laa * * . . 6^ iibinb11,'F *fca;tartle& as
^ M W t t f  Aviation Saws#* Aerial Age Weekly.
July it# inS# P* 625.
July It# I W ,  p. 625
?6#Biiitary Aviation Hews,* Aerial Age ..weakly.
75
a?
%yi #n aQQOUQt Of Jito y»f.g§*|
11 • fttofati.ttiy im wytflrf* W & & W & & & co&& 11lofts' ito ssss of’-ttv * w  >y»• **▼-■?pw -OWtWStIWr  ^*afr •’ffl!»9Wr -Sf  v^W^Fw^eWSBFTlW ■^ P1*P!*t Ik,p?PMbf ,®|W»v4awiW' wp* ^FA^r P(jP^P#a*WvT<^
fewO.. * +
W m  first as we# delivered to Saa Diego, California,
May 10, 1915 for acceptance te#t«, Theae wore conducted by
toto#*1 tato itCtolk- #f to# CtoPt&M £&iifo?M& 
f«sofew*y*yy ©a done £1, 1915* the remaining seven ^ m «8 
machines arrived at saa Mego,?8 o »  month later, July 26, 
1915, the first Aero Squadron deported s m  Otago* California 
o» tfcs 3:10 p.m. train enroute to fort Sill, GjElaho»a» for 
duty with ttio Artillery School of Fire*79 fha Wit remained 
thera until November if, 1915, Wan it conducted the world* a 
first #ttpt*1i jaov©- to A'tftoft fcha i&ManiM to $&km...... .'W f W  *  *wBP .’■p W W y *W" t^PJjpT d^RpHPHSS^ 'WijBPSPi1 F ir1 ■vPi ^|p AlaP'WPBPljMP- ®^ F!tPf *1WPwPIp
San Antonio, teaas,80
© »  departure from San ©lego* California by the First
JMS3N& S{|tt-aKll'033. H point itolP linr %jy JMMMfNt
y^ otaftlaa, curtlas:
, *s»r, « u u t m  ^ »«ita«
(ASy«i*Si.;stoar 1
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Ferca Archives p • lit
Aviation Sotea,* A W  
May 31, iyi5, W* 257*
7®»Kilitary Aviation he*#,*
M y  19, 1915# p. 425.
79*Hiiitary Aviation lew#,* 
August 9, 1915, p* 5»f I « ®  * aeoora,*p. 5. 
®4*POUloi# Becord,* p. $t Study 98, p, 1491 and
V S t t  ■ « » ' ' < M t  m  —■ - " '  - —    ........... ■JL9Slv|p pm wlktym
The unit '& forthcoming activities, both at Fort Sill and fort Saa 
Houston, and the growing tensions along the iyfexican-tJnited States 
border would soon publicize the activities, the deficienees, and 
the requirements of United States military air power*
The Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, United States tony 
was an energetic,, but small service in 1913®. It bad flown 3^58 flights, 
for a duration of 1269 hours and 50 minutes# In this time it had 
transported 1730 passengers, established two new American altitude 
records of 17,M l  feet for sol© flight and 11,690 ‘feet for dual 
flight* The service had '.set new duration flight records of 8 hours 
and 53 minutes solo and 7 hours and 5 minutes dual. The Aviation 
School, had conducted important tests in bombardment, communications, 
mine detection, emergency equipment, and aircraft improvements* The 
First Aero Squadron had begun to prove its capability to support 
artillery1' fire, make rapid deployments and support front line 
surveillance activities* Despite these, and other lesser achieve­
ments, the Aviation Section remained a crippled unit* It needed
8lexpansion in funds, manning, personnel procedures and equipment.'
Until these deficienees were corrected it would fail to be a
n . * • service commensurate with the needs of the country and
82suitable to the requirements of an army* • • * w
Anarmai Report 1915. p. 12
82
Ibid*, p. 53.
S«Af£t8 III
THS ?IH3£ AttO SQDAMQW IS f»S VXJBUD* 1913-1915
Military aviation was first employed tactically daring 
the Rexican revolution. Both Venustiano Carranaa and 
Francisco (Poncho) Villa maintained air forces for use in 
limited interdiction and reconnai ssanoe roles.1 fhe Mexican 
revolution also provided the reasons for united States Army 
aviation to first see field service,2
fhe first attempt, toy the Army, to employ air power 
occurred as a result of General Victoria*® Huerta's success­
ful 1913 coup d'etat, captain Charles DeP. Chandler, command­
ing offleer, Aviation school, Augusta, Georgia, received 
©rtera from the War Department, February 25, 1913* He, his 
men, and equipment were to proceed to Texas City, Texas, as 
soon, as possible, and commence duty with the Second Division, 
three days later, February 28, 1913, the unit of five officers, 
twenty-one enlisted men, and their aircraft, departed on a
*0.3., Department of the Air Fores, A Chronology of 
American Aerpaaaeo Events (Air Force PampHlW AW 190-2-2, 
Raroh i», I960), p. 13, hereafter cited as Chronologyi and 
Benjamin 0. Fouloie and C. V. Olinea, .. ____
(sew fort: rScoraw-Hiil' aook
eited asla
2chandler and Laho, How Our Amy Grew PP. 253-25*.
special train of eleven ears* Arriving at featae City, Texas, 
Harch 2* 1913* they established a camp, assembled aircraft, 
and commenced flying a few Cays later* 3 Their arrival had been 
preceded by that of Captain Frederics B, Henaeaey, Aviation 
Section* who selected the airfield site; one that was suit* 
able for land and seaplane operation* Hsnnesay remained as 
the squadron adjutant* A few days later* two student flyers, 
Lieutenants Eric L. Ellington and Loren C. Call arrived with 
Airplane 1? from the Palm Beach, Florida, flying school,
•By Harch 5, 1913* the First Provisioned Aero Squadron was 
formed,4
The Squadron organisation consisted of an administrative 
section* and two companies with four and five aircraft respec­
tively* captain Chandler retained command, but, as he was not 
a pilot* Lieutenant Rilling was appointed * * * * Senior Instruc­
tor and M s  orders • . . were to be obeyed without regard to 
ranSs.°5
In preparation for a 'possible invasion into Mexico, the 
men began practice Hying as weather permitted. Their activi­
ties were limited to cross-country flying and maneuvers. The
Sptret Aero Squadron, Held Order H, March 5, 1913, 
United States Air Force Archives 168.650 a-?.
(Photocopy.>
pp. 253-25^ .
3Chandler and taftm* how Our Army Qrew
embryonic aviators proved their ambitions by setting endur­
ance records and spotting •enemy* units* but were not pit to 
a real test as.the invasion of Mexico sever occurred. By 
June it, 1913, the Mexican issue was temporarily settled* and 
the bulk of personnel and aircraft were transferred to 
San Oiego, California.6
fhe next opportunity for the fledgling army air ant to 
prove Itself.in combat support oaae in March 191S. Tense re­
lations over Vera Crus led to a War Oepartaent request for the 
North Xaland, California, school to send five qualified avia­
tors. thirty enlisted men, and three Burgess tractor aircraft 
to Port Crockett, near- Galveston, Texas. captain Pouloie was 
given oenanand, and accompanied by Lieutenants Milling, 
welter B, faliaferro, Joseph E. Garberry, fowmssad F. »odd, 
and a medical of floor, Adna o. Wilde, he departed for Texas, 
April 2d, 1916* On Kay 6, 1916, Lieutenant Joseph C, Marrow 
Joined the detachment. In addition, arrangements were made 
at North Island to increase -flying training in order to pro­
vide for sore aviators. Ones again the flyers failed to see 
ooabat action. While the navy flew at Vera Crux, the aray 
remained in Texas for three months without ever uncrating their 
aircraft. They returned to California, July 13, 191%,?
>, pp. 76-79; and Chandler and Laha,
£2* PP» 256-256.
i P- 2?6| aad Steady fg, pp. 105-106, fMjglg 
.1 23, 26, and 27, 1916 carried articles emphasising 
role of united States* wavy aircraft at Vera Crux, Mexico.
32w9*
The Mexicans, however, did utilize the airplane in actual 
combat as an instrument of war. fin Hay 10, Iflf* two American 
citizens* Didier Kaeson, pilot, and Thomas J* Sean, Bombardier, 
bombed a Mexican Federal Gunboat In Ouaymas Bar* Mexico, from 
a Glenn Martin pusher eiroraft.9 This first in the annuals of 
aviation history', was in support of Pancho Villa's army, Seven 
months later* in Bovember 1914, fhii aader* another American 
flying for Huerta, engaged a Carranziata pilot*'' Sean Ivan lamb, 
also a citizen of the United States* over’ Baoo* Mexico, in the 
first known aerial oombat. A dozen pistol shots were exchanged.?
The Mexican interest in aircraft continued as did the re­
volution. Carranza and Villa each vied with each other to hire 
American fliers, offering as auoh as 300 dollars a week in gold 
for the services of men such as Charles F* Silas and W. Leonard 
Eonney.10 By April 26, 1915, Villa's air fore© consisted of six 
new Wright airplanes* and the Aerial Age Weekly reported that 
” . . , both factions' -have shown much activity of late in the 
acquisition of aeroplanes.*11
On March 13, 1915, in response to a request by Brigadier 
General Frederick Funaton, Commander, Southern Department, a
g8sw fork Times, May 20, 191ft ana Chronology, p* if, 
? m a .
K®i*lco** jgJ^ #..4gg.fMaspy> April 5, 1915p. 64; and "Booney Goes to fflv in Mexico." Aerial asm weaki: 
April 26* 1915* p. 128*
detachment of the Aviation Section was alerted for daty with 
the border patrol at srewasvllle, Texas. aspeeted warnings 
to both Mexican revolutionary factions hah not resulted in a 
decrease .la border incidents. Funston hoped bo use the air­
craft to locate the position of Villa*« artillery in ease it 
became necessary to disable 1t.
(hi April lb, 1915. lieutenants Thomas Dew. Milling end 
Bryon $• donee departed 8m Diego, Californio, by sod-1 with 
ftl£ft&ftfft Biimal &JLtft&ftft# *11* ft detachment
me. Three days later they arrived at Brownsville, Texas, and
V
established a camp at the west- and of a cavalry drill field. 
Stair airplane, a Martin Tv Curtiss, powered by a ?f horse­
power OX engine, m s  assembled and tested by April 19, Iflf* 
On Tuesday afternoon, April 29, Iflf, the first mission was 
flows, with Jones as pilot and Milling as observer* Cruising 
at an altitude of 2600 feet, they Hew along the border easily 
Observing the Mexican trench lines and correotiag plot errors 
on their canvas chart* sepeated machine gun fire from the 
Mexican side was reported by American ground units, bat none 
struck the biplane nor its occupants.^
A later flight, that sane day, grounded Punston's sir 
force. Jones, accompanied by Corporal Arnold Beuf, bit a
12atudv 98. p. 1%S{ for border incidents see foreign 
Halations, pp. ?f#-?9e«
•^"Military Aviation notes,* Aerlel Age weekly.
Hay 1?, 1915, p. 298'« *
ditch mile taxiing in the- -high grass of tbs drill field. m»
'ftisslisyss. crt? t&Mi m s  ftE# the Isii^ stobs
f^tfcrtfiiiliLisiail^if fi art jMLetfb £ p £ m  ftfcftmatfe. *MT jit jfab.Jifc'^ lt ' °t>li ill ij| jBk^l?' §k. giAJlkMi. M^gfc,j(k *Ml £m<4iNfc>PTOftftft t>ftB6&vJl 9pft' ftftvQSP & *M$<%ft0l|tl H jift ffiaa© |Tfti* BXlOtn&T
fuselage, or anew machine, bat Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Bober,
Qff±&&]? im Cfo&2t-M%* Ayiatl&H SftftfeiftB* INPflWtl#- to authorise: ths 
replacement. 9a April 26, 191$, this decision m s  overruled 
by the Adjutant General, tamer H. Bliss, and Airplane .39, 
SUdSliftl1, MftlHsjLii SS14S®y P^SSSHS1' tf&§ Slt|.;|»^ftJl ftftjppftftil 
Diego, California, A fear weeks later, May if, Iflf, lieutenant 
Colonel Sarauel Bober, Chief of the Air Service, requested the 
return of me detachment, as the artillery it ms- to support 
had been withdrawn. On Hay 2?, Iflf, Jones, Milling, and 
their 'mm and equipment returned to -North- Island, California.13 
*fll# ft$#ffi|Eli I lint. $HMMI tWW-m WteZM ttftfll
M s  troops, April 1?, Iflf, three days before the- first
m ission was #¥#1* A ftiisi*. $fftlt$iet* Ainr>lftJie 33* ftp A lro la n ^  i f
m s  equipped with radio equipment, and as the terrain did not 
poroit a sard signaling system, HO WOJf*kftbio IBdthftd ftj* ftftEESSSS-** 
oatlen between spotter and -artillery existed. Finally, insuf- 
fioient field work had been accomplished to determine the
ft# mufummm m&m&m am& *a»ft ml&mnnmvnn.m SMSasSI^ S BSftSftSS^ SI #ftf*
aircraft deployed la taotiottl operations.16
Ifstudy 98. p. i%ff and •Army Aviation -Notes,* 
l ^# ' B. . 16idg. Kay 20, Iflf, p. 22b,
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When, on July 26, 1915, the First Aero Squadron, Foulois 
commanding, departed San Diego, California, for duty with the 
Artillery school, Fort Sill, Oklahoma! It was anticipated 
t l s & t *  m a i n t « n f t n o «  i i f i t - s ^ b s S x n q S  B T O f t s f t w e s
would asm he established,!? The rail caravan consisting of 
sixteen cars, 'left Saa Diego at 3ilf p.m. ” Three days later, 
July 29,-1915, the unit unloaded automobiles, airplanes, 
trucks, motorcycles, -and horses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,1® 
Sl$£%Sto!S ipsSFSSS’S f t f l f t  f f t c i X l & l 08  W&P® S f t f t l d U l g # .  - $ $ i #
aen expended their efforts until August 13, 1915, in oonstruc- 
tion projects* with the completion of messing, storage, -and 
maintenasoe facilities, the aerial activity increased.1?
while at Fort sill, the- First Aero Squadron concentrated 
on artillery observation, field tests of varied reconnaissance 
equipment, and the evaluation of their inadequate airplanes. 
Exigtn&■ malfunctions p$o;p&3? ssssgiisS sSwfwsss '$iiilii^ llf
ilbfc *ta2M k,«aat.^fcjMitka4fedJfc *iw -JBt f t  -‘Mm .jSmni.^.TikfcjaM tfta ilfti 1 0  'ftfc&Xa srim iMIl s ix  f t  dtte A td i^ ttU d 'd d ii a l£ m .SSaBpI m3. tJfl®
Aerial operations oommenoed on August If, Iflf, and «fith­
in three weeks the unit m s  nen-operatienal. f»# first major
paPftW-SB jfftftft*! Wftft $lMK& &f ftllSsSsSBS' W®flUWMWIHH$fe *fyt^  vishiaT Of
!7Annual Report 1,913. p. 12.
l®BKiiitary Aviation sews,*
August 9, 191$, p. 507.
19study 98, pp. 1C6-1A?.
26*Poulots teeerd,* p. §,
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twelve Replacement powerplants, six were immediately condemned, and 
a seventh had to toe joverhauled before it was used* By September 1$ 
1913* three airerafti Airplanes 42, 43, and 48, were out of commission 
for parts, one- was grounded for general maintenanee, mother for*
engine work, two were detached to the Southern Department at Browns*'
• ■ . 21ville, Texas, and the eighth aircraft was lost in an accident.
The crash, which destroyed the eighth aircraft occurred August 12, 
1913* It was attributed to toad weather and poor flying technique.
The aircraft'was .a total loss. Captain. $* H* Knox, the observer,
•** 22 was hilled and R. B. Sutton, the pilot, suffered serious' injury.
The accident amplified. a .growing concern in' the' squadron over the
inadequacies of the new service 'machine, the Jlf-2, to perform a
combat role.
The JM-2, hailed toy %e press as a ’ ’’rakish” addition in July 
1915, was considered by the aviators to toe underpowered, oversensitive 
to control and cheaply constructed. Both Captain Cowan, at the 
Air Service School, and lieutenant Colonel Hetoer were aware of 
the deficienees. Cowan wrote Hetoer that he knew the aircraft were 
unsafe, tout had failed to notify the flyers because ” . . .  there is 
a tendency among the younger officers to get rather panicky when ques-
21Study 98. p. 147.
22’Military Honors for Dead Army Airmen, ” Aerial. Age- Weekly.
August 30, 1915* f»* 569*
felons of safefey are brought out.* Tea of the twelve aviator*
0W twlft JyJiJRftft JfftlPft W^mw mm 'lift w# y3SMfc|f
col. Hilling, fehe two moat experienced aviator*, maintained 
til# Mftttiuift* ft&tetefft 1^ 1% ftofftefe# mis te&teft&ft tilte&t* Muitft* 
tiOJW.1?
Difficulties with the JJi-2 boa been, and were 'being ex­
perienced elsewhere. Carberry, the first military aviator 
to fly the J M ,  June 4, 1915* hod fouai it underpowered, 
teH Ini f e sSSSS swwHMftMwtfWI it# acceptance* Ute 
log aeofelon at the Aviation school bad also noted the inade- 
quaoie* of the J8-2. The engineering ehief. Captain Virginias
’Sa# jftWMt' IfcnwMvft' ''ftl1#  h Qiti -*! ■ —-  ^  MM, ’€\ xik. JMa-atOftkJflt jA ln i e c a ' ftfcfttetAax- f t  - - -  ft'aofc..$!§#■ wlS3nEg fiftol tft ftftlEKaftStft fubft OJPftftli* 3MII
1915* 00 he considered th* airoraft unsafe* He was supported 
in his findings by Mat tunnel teats conducted in August 1915, 
that confirmed longitudinal instability at eagles of 11, it, 
•ad I5*3 degrees* The report of these teste prompted Briga­
dier General soriven, fehe Chief Signal officer, to call Glam 
Curtiss to Washington, B.C. to discuss the situation, Curtiss 
readily agreed fee convert all JH-2*a into JH-3* at the neces­
sary modifications were to be accomplished la the Held, 'this 
required tbs installation of no* upper wings, stabilising fins, 
ruddftr#p teft MgjUift* In te ftftwjr ftftf*
23*Transcript of Court Martial of Lieutenant colonel 
Lends t* Goodier, judge Advocate,* United states Air Force 
Arohives, 168,650316, pp. b?7-480, hereafter cited as 
Goodler Court Martial* (Typewritten,)
the work# Curtiss sent one expert mechanic to Fort Sill, Oklahoma and 
Brownsville, Texas.
While the main unit remained at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, a detachment 
of the First Aero Squadron, consisting of four officers and fifteen 
enlisted me equipped with two aircraft, arrived at Brownsville, Texas, 
on August 18, 1913* The aviators, Lieutenants Morrow, Jones, Arthur E. 
Christie, and Harry Harms, rapidly discovered that the landing field 
used for similar purposes, in April 1919 by the Martin machine was 
too small for the slow climbing, heavy, underpowered JM-2. The new 
service machine required a longer runway. Morrow, the senior officer, 
requested permission from the Chief Signal Officer to prepare and 
use a larger, but rougher field six miles from Brownsville, Texas* 
Permission was granted and the aviators became airborne, only to 
experience severe flight difficulties in rough air. These difficul­
ties were so severe, that on September 9* 1919# Morrow crashed Air­
plane 46. As a result of the injuries he sustained, he was relieved 
of command, and Captain Townsend Dodd was ordered from San Diego, 
California, to replace him. In the interim, lieutenant Jones 
assumed temporary command, and in this capacity, he reported, at 
the direction of the Commanding Office**, Brownsville
Ibid** pp. 477-478; Study 98. pp. 148, 149* Edgar S. Gorrell 
wrote in October 1932 that only two of the First Aero Squadron’s 
JK-2 * b had OXX engines at the time of the Mexican Funitive Expedition.
District, the dangerous characteristics of the JN-2. By 
September 13, 1915* Funs ton. prohibited further .flying of the 
airplane for artillery adjustments unless totally necessary. 25 
The detachment, limited by lie equipment, had accomplished 
little other than aerfiag as * target for Carranza*» soldiers.^ 
®he First loro Squadron, without usable airplanes, can­
celled all operations with the field artillery until October 
It, 1915. it that tioo, with modifed aircraft, 'teste were 
resumed sal continued until the squadron loft Fort -Sill, 
Oklahoma in November 1915.2?
®MI OitiSSSSSS 0jf q fin sS^ SS^ BCS 1;Iff! Ili0
®uis<?©:SS Hi1 $i$# exp«rl£3ent& Hi# fidwMfc ^
Fifth Field Artillery. However, several valuable lessons 
w m  learned. It was clearly demonstrated that trained aerial 
observers, rather than artillery officer*, were needed as 
artillery spotters, tbs value of the automatic aerial camera 
In chotoKrashlmff mosaic overlays for ««>*> m»ki««■ waa explored.
r«sult»d in b&vqv&X valid su&R&BtIona ${* t.ha
Arthur Brack automatic camera.2® Aircraft service tests* after 
the modification of JH-2* s to d®-3*#:, were conducted which
tSltdd,. pp. 197-108.
26ietter, Secretary of State to the Confidential Agent 
of the Constitutionalist Qovernment of Rexleo, September 10,
September 13, 1915, p. 613, 
tfstady 98. p, 19f.
xvxa. p. 819} and *0.3. Aviators 
ladron Needed,* Aerial Ase Weehly.
28ihid.
tm
eventually • , . * save/a/ the M u m  of mem * • • flying 
officers * . * la the faaibiw© Expedition. * * ,*®S>
Finally, the SQuadroa he* an opportunity to test and modify 
its' mobile equipment and maintenance procedures.39
the officers of the Army Air Service haft long desired a 
permanent flying oeater one that would besoms • , . . the 
army aviation oeater * . » as,well as a finishing school for 
army aviation students* . , .<■31 port sam Houston, San 
Antonio, faxes was selected as the alia of the a m  center*
In Hareh 191ft Fouiois bad M m  ordered to Port Sam Houston to 
prepare flans and estimates for the new airfield location.
The site, four miles north of the fort proper contained two 
old hangars* fen new hangars were to bo erected, as m m  
housing, maintenance, and messing facilities,^2 Fouloie had 
submitted an estimate forl83,20O dollars for the project, 
but Congress appropriated only 4f,0OG dollars, The funds 
were not satisfactory, but aa they were all that were avail*, 
able, Colonel Sober directed that * « Feuioia will have 
to got it Into his head that we will have to. get along with 
the money we Have end. not the money m  ought to have, *33
29»Poulois lepert** p» 5* 3°atudv 98. p. iby,.
31 »war froviag Boon to Aero Aotlvity la Texas,0 
lAMrtutobUftaMtts June 21, 1915, p. 321*
33Letter, Sober to Cowan, Harch 29, 1915, la “Goodier
hi
Because of these limited funds, only a machine shop, troop barracks, 
a stable, and two bachelor officer quarters were completed by 
Wovember 1915* Orders were issued November 11, 1915# for permanent 
deployment of the unit to the San Jbitonio, .Texas, area* '
The trip from Fort Sill, Oklahoma to Tessas, began, November 19, • 
1913, Foulois, eager to increase operational experience and advertise 
mobile .military air power, requested and.gained permission to move'' 
by. a i r I n  order to permit the motor caravan and' airplanes to ■ 
reach their destinations simultaneously, five enronte stops were ■ 
planned* The itinerary called for landings at Wichita Falls, Fort 
Worth, Waco, Austin-,'and San Antonio, Texas.^ It was ”• * . the 
first time any organised air unit in any army had undertaken a 
JpeXf^ movement * • • *w and the .move was. a success*^
The aircraft and vehicles travelled the 35® miles in seven 
days. The aerial movement was without serious incident and the 
only damage m s  one bent arch and one broken tail skid*~-eosts 
of repairs fifty Cents J&tc?* The only, flaw
^ Benjamin 0* Foulois, Report on Cross-Country Flight from 
Fort Sill, Oklahoma to Fort Sam Houston, Texas by First Aero 
Squadron, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, November 19 to 26, 1915,” in 
nU.S.A. Aero Squadron's Fort Sill-Fort Sam Houston Might,n 
Flying* January 1916, p. 819, hereafter cited as Cross Country 
Seport5 ^nd Annual Hecort 1915*’p. 13
•^"FauXois Record," p. 5.
Cross Country Report, pp. 8X9, 831-832.
'^"Foulois Record," p. 5*
38Ibid.
was the loss of a Jeffery truck, destroyed during a gas stop, 
Hovamber 21, 1915.
The personnel of the squadron functioned exceptionally 
well* Captain Benjamin D, Foulois sale special comment of 
the *, , .» constant ears and watchfulness • * .* the enlisted 
maintenance a «  provided the aircraft.4*0 They often travelled, 
on one meal a day, all day by truck and motorcycle, only to 
work late at night in order to prepare the .aircraft for the 
nest day's flying.4*1
The impression o» the public was Immense. Crowds swarm­
ed the aircraft at each landing spot* After the first stop 
at Wichita Fails, Texas, where “each aviator was kept con­
stantly on guard over his aeroplane to protect it-from daaage 
by the crowds of people * * **' it became necessary to procure 
police protection and sroped-off landing and work area*.4*2 The 
pilots were entertained at banquets by various oity officials 
enroute, Foulois, speaking on these occasions, sold air power 
and the need for its future growth, he chided * » . . business­
men who /were? interested only in civil affairs * * . and /had/ 
act the time to think of preparedness. * **3
Operationally, the Journey proved the value of the spe-
‘ ..................  P« 831.
^•Army Aviators at Fort Worth, Texas,* Aerial & m  Weekly, 
somber o, 1915# p. 2?6.Decemb
dally designed mater eouipmeat and pointed out some obvious - 
needs fop future cross-country military -dip operations, The 
trucks, carrying loads up to 3000 pounds, stood the test of 
rough roads and deep sands enroute, On occasion, nows had 
broken through the flimsy bridges, hut the self-contained 
wrecker equipment enabled the truoks to continue to desti- 
nation*
Despite the mobility offered by the truoks, and the more 
rapid movement of the mat skilled aircraft mechanics by motor*' 
oyele, the exercise proved beyond any doubt that it was 
* » II ptyr8&0ft& &XSgN9M&$i&it»F #01* ^
system to keep up the pace .set by aeroplanes in flight.
?oulola recommended that suitable landing fields, in the future, 
should he selected, They should, be continued, he located near
0* 635HfcBlw0l%,s 00 ty3*0*s 03HR*iMejP0# iisaW3l0jSfc .JT01r *6-0330 01 £'
wad have facilities to protest the aircraft from the elements
jHk W* si ilih <(h ditk diMi i^NSf#* W00 vlMIJP •
Although the aviators all successfully reached Saa 
Antonio, Texas, it was apparent that adequate aeronautical 
navigation charts did not exist. The maps used, which were 
Geological Survey Sheets, scale Is12500, compiled in the 
list's, were outdated, aid therefore could not be depended on. 
foulois suggested that .possibly the more modem feet Office
maps, if modified by the addition of terrain features, could 
be used by aviator*.^
da the nan facilities were not ready for occupancy until
#taaa^ if la I9li. 4s&# Wk&m% 4#i# erxmt #*¥$%“  w l w i l i p S i  dWT-V tP r  jPrfPrn-^F' S '  ’W wW-xIPf  w. fRM * •0*P W  *#r tIS.^WWIWWw*»S> wPfJt*.*, wjPfrPpt WPm W P P '
December 1915, at Fort fan Houston, Texas.^
M  19X6, rnkm %&& wiSSs vi&v& %& new $uartora* $&$
©OBtosiiEs# &# Ssb Houston &us$4&& th# &lJti&&ji&
would the new airfield facility be a part of Fort Saa Houston, 
Texas? Foulois swiftly docked 'What be 'dewed aa a» attempt 
kr |h« IssSl, tiimffigaaSeF 1# oo&trol Hit aviation ’^fitti H# IMI***t v d  Wff ^ s s ^ B s p y  Wiere!^^^BwdWW>wv^Hr^ y ,»w uipr^pf wy^M1 -.^pfie^w dFW*,'^ '1t ^ '  ** w e p .  ^jsm w o p » w * d e  siw W  s ’s  ^ r*  JBP “  * F  •
Mated the Chief signal Offioer that it wee' bait for the way 
to maintain eeparate local administrative oontrol. As a re« 
suit, the First Aero Squadron became the Aeronautioal section 
of the Southern Department, With its establishment as a 
separate entity, the squadron busied Itself sodas into new 
quarters and building roads, walks, drains, and a landing field.1®* 
On January if, 1916, a request for two aircraft for 
artillery control experiments at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was 
issued by the Adjutant General. Foulois objected on the 
grounds that the alreraft were no longer serviceable after 
the six months of field operations* He argued that tbs fliers
la&Mai. adequate winter tflytftfy ftWI. fetiaatfe
^ibid. ^Stu&v 98. p, 160.
*5
could fee better accomplished at Port Sam Houston, fexaa, 
after the entire squadron had suffiolent time for systematic 
training in the rigors of military flying. Fouloig* opinion 
prevailed and on February 15* 1916# the Chief Signal Officer 
decided that the detachment mould not fee sent until the unit 
mas more adequately prepared for field service*5®
2n September 1915* a reporter commented in the Aerial 
Age Weekly* on the Kexlcan issue and air power* by stating 
*What is needed is a complete air squadron and a firm policy 
. . . .*51
5°ifeia.
51«u.s. Aviators Fired
Seeded,* Aerial Age
On * Complete Air Squadron 
September 13, 1915, P* 613*
chapter if
m m m  immwvst 1915-1916
From 1910 to 1920, Mexioo was gripped by a violent 
social revolution. The revolt generated destruction that 
unsettled and scourged the Mexican countryside, and touohed 
all strata of Mexican society. The ohaos and fury spilled 
across Mexico's northern boundary into the United State*, 
creating incidents of pillage and depredation. By 1915,
Mexico itas considered as " . . .  a thorn la our side.*l 
The Salted States and Mexico share a comma boundary 
of over 1?QQ miles that stretches from the Gulf of Mexico to 
the Pacific Ocean* It follows the Bio Grande for more then 
180© miles through desolate sparsely settled country, turning 
due west at SI .Paso, Texas, toward the Continental Divide.2 
Its hordes security la 1915, wee the responsibility of Briga­
dier General Frederick Puraston, Commander, Southern Department, 
United States Army,3
Icaspar Whitney, "Why Mexico is a Thorn in Our Side,*
The Outlook, Ray 5, 1915# P* 81*
2Harry A, Toulmin, Jr., 
The Military service Publi '
3u.s, war Department
, pp. 17-25.
zoioiiij 'p.' 1, hereafter cited'as Funs ton* (Microfilm.)
H
(Harristourgt
f it *  Southern Department had reacted 'to herder disturbances 
as early as 1910, when In response to growing concern over the 
early activities of fiexioan revolutionaries, troops had been 
dispatched to Del Bio and Eagle Bass, Texas, they were autho­
rised to aid civilian officials in maintaining United States 
neutrality laws, but they were not given permission to cross 
into Mexican territory.^
As the internal situation in Mexioo deteriorated, the 
United States' troop strength along the border increased, 
reaching 20,000 men on July 1, 1915 when Funston reported,
, . the entire border line from the mouth of the Bio Grande 
to San Diego, California was patrolled."5 These troops were 
instructed to provide all possible protection for American 
life and property, to warn Mexican forces along the border to 
refrain from endangering American life and property, and if 
neoessary, to use force to prevent Mexican destruction on the 
American side.6
Repeated United States' warnings had little effect on the 
Mexican commanders, who claimed that the raiders weas deserters. 
On August 28, 1915, Secretary of State, Bobert Dancing, oomment.fed 
on the Mexican indifference to the activities is the Brownsville,
\etter, Secretary of Bar to Secretary of state,
January 26, 1916, U.S., Papers Belatlng to the Foreign 
Halations of the United States 1916 (Washington D.c.:
Government Printing office, 192$), p. 7^3.
I^bid.j and Puneton. p. 1.
Texas area* warned Carranza Iso take corrective action* Other* 
wise* the Secretary of State stated, the situation * « * * 
might easily lead to most serious consequences*
Funston,' anticipating a general outbreak along the border, 
requested from the Secretary of Mar, August 30, 1915, additional, 
troops to be used as a preventive measure because "the time for 
economy had passed . . • and action > , , should be taken at 
once,"®
la the period between duly 1, 1915, and Hareh 7, 1916, 
twenty-seven raids were perpetrated on dotted States* soil*
These raids resulted in f troopers killed, 16 troopers wounded,
6 civilians dead, 1 civilian wounded, 2 civilians captured by 
Mexicans* 21 horses killed or stolen, 110 head of cattle 
rustled, as well as the destruction of farm houses, bridges, 
stores and the theft of ammunition, anas, and saddles.?
^Telegram, Secretary of State to Special 
August 28, 1915, U.S., 2| - -
Government *' p. 8G5, hereafter cited
®Telegram Extract, Funston to Secretary of Mar,
August 30. 1915, Foreign Relations 1915. p. 806*
?U.S,, Mar Department, “Annual Reports of the Fiscal 
fear 1916 by Major General Frederick Funston," AGO File 
2A3231, Box Ikl SB national Archives, Washington, B.C., 
pp. 16-19, hereafter cited as "Funston Beport.” (Photocopy 
of typewritten Beport.) A compilation of all border inci­
dents excluding those that were classed as purely revenge 
or for cattle rustling. The latter were assumed a normal 
occurrence for the area.
In addition to the raids, incidents of goo shots northward 
across the entire border from Brownsville, Texas, westward were 
increasing. A few were truly accidental, a result of dash be­
tween Villa and Carranza: more were planned,*0 Several in­
volved operations up to seventy men with directed fire from 
fortified positions.** On one occasion, a group of hexiean 
soldiers led by Carramsista officer crossed the border and 
attacked a detachment of American soldiers.12 As 1915 pro­
gressed into 1916, the dispatches of the Southern Department 
contained ever-increasing reports of incidents against United 
States troops, citizens, and aircraft.
In order to,discharge the responsibility of border patrol, 
the Southern Department divided the 1700 mile border that 
separated Hexico from the United States, into seven cavalry 
districts, The districts were augmented by camps and garrisons 
at Laredo and Bagle Pass, Texas; and Douglas, Baco, ftogales, 
and luma,. Arizona. The border patrol was almost entirely a 
function of cavalry units. As the raiding increased, greater
^Translation, Private Correspondence of the Official 
in Charge of Foreign Relations and Justice, March 2?, 1915* 
Foreign Delations'1915# p. 795; and Latter, Funston to 
Adjutant General, Bovember 2, 1915, Foreign Relationa,i915. 
p. 819.
. llLetter, Secretary of State to the Confidential’ Agent 
of the Constitutionalist Government, October 6, 1915,
Foreign Relations 1915. p. 815; and Beport, Funston to Secre- 
toryofl^rsepteiber 17, 1915, gorelgnBelatlona 1915. p. 812.
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consideration was being given la military circles, to the use 
of infantry as a means of containment, ^
As the border became mors and more disturbed, the American 
public and Congress became ever more anxious 'to correct the 
Mexican situation* On January 6, 1916, the Senate adopted a 
resolution that initiated an investigation into the Mexican 
Bevolution, its impact on United States* property, the assur­
ances granted by the Mexican government to protect' American 
lives, and the actions and instructions given the United States' 
military to defend the rights of American citizens.1^
Four days later, January 10, 1916, Panoho Villa became 
the chief Mexican antagonist of the United States. In a care­
fully planned act, meant to provoke an international incident, 
viliiata bandits led by fable Lopes stopped a train at San 
Isabel, Mexico. Eighteen united States mining engineers, 
armed only with safe conduct passes issued by the jug, facto 
government, were made to disembark from the train, they were 
stripped of their clothing and then murdered in cold blood.1^ 
the reaction was immediate, the news media of the United 
States, aroused over continual Mexican incidents, demanded;
"if Carranza and hie defects governaent cannot protect 
£Aserlcan§7 • • • the President should send armed forces into
^•Pension deport,* pp. 1-2.
l^Senate Besolution submitted by Mr. Pall,
January 6, 1916, Persian delations 1916. pp. 463-464*
*%hc independent. January 24, 1916, p. 113.
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northern Mexico.*16 Secretary tansing demanded thafc Carranza 
punteh the murderers and the Senate debated the wisdom of armed 
United States* intervention,1? Carranza declared Villa, 
fiafael Castro, and fablo I<opea outside the law, but little 
effort was made to arrest them*16 instead, Fancho Villa and 
his force of 300 men moved at will throughout the Mexican 
State of Chihuahua, well protected: by loyal followers m & »- 
secure knowledge of the rugged countryside,3^  gy mid-February 
1916, Villa was reported to be attacking American-owned mines 
and ranches in hie native state,2® secretary lansing requested 
that Carranza furnish sufficient forces to protect United 
States citizens and. their interest.21 Me was assured that the 
garrisons were -adequate*22
By March 1, 1916, reports began to accumulate that Villa 
and his band sought to .cross the Waited States* border and 
surrender, mad that Villa would then proceed to Washington
F. m i  M J m & J H M *  January 13, 1916, expressed the same sentiment in an editorial, p. 10*
17»ew fork mmea. January 13, 1916, p. 1.
ISTelegram, Special Agent Sillimaa to the Secretary of 
State, January if., 1916, foreign Halations 1916, p. 665? 
and Extract, Consul letcher to the Secretary of State,
February 9, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 668.
i9ama,
2®irhe Independent. February 21, 1916, p. 257,
2lTelegram, Secretary of state to Special Agent Sillitnan, 
February 16, 1916, Foreign BeIationel9l6. p* 669.
22?elegram, Special Agent Sllliman to Secretary of State, 
undated: received March 5, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 678*
to confer with President Wilson,2  ^It was certain however that 
Villa was moving toward 'the herder, and his small army was la*, 
creasing, m e  Carranza government, sow not to the crucial 
test, did not arrest him claiming they had insufficient troops 
la the area,21*
On March 9, 1916, -Villa crossed the herder at Columbus, 
Hew Mexico.2  ^xn© force estimated between 500 and 700 Mexicans 
launched a double thrusbed attaok at 4;00 a.a.- against the 
baited states Army camp on the south side of Columbus, Mew 
Mexico,. The first Indication of an impending engagement to 
the defenders was the sound of the shot that killed the guard 
on the west edge of oamp,2^
The Officer of the Day, Captain daises P. Castleman, 
immediately .called out the guard. The' troopers, although out* 
numbered (330 troopers compared to 500 to 700 Villlstas) and 
handicapped by weapons stored under look sad key, rallied and 
soon broke the Mexican attaok. The Mexicans retreated north* 
ward into the town of Columbus, where they lOoted stores and
23felegra®, Collector Cobb to Secretary of state,
March 3, 1916, Foreign delations 1916. p. 478.
2**S©rl©s of Telgrams, Collector Cobb to Secretary of 
State. March 6. 1916 to March 8. 1916. Foreiizn Halations 
1916. p. 479. n ^  --88
25Telegram, Collector cobb to Secretary of state,
March 9, 1916, Foreign.gelations 1916. p. 4§0.
2^BFunston Beport,* p. 22.
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set fire to the principal buildings and depot.^ This aot 
accomplished, the Villistas moved west of the city, regrouping 
about three-quarters of a mile from the town's edge* there* 
at 6il0 a«m., Villa* waiting on the outskirts of Columbus 
with forty men and the horses, reformed his men and rode south* 
ward* A pursuit by twenty-nine sea of the 13th cavalry* led 
by Major Prank Tompkins, followed the Mexicans as they scurried 
for the border* Tompkins pursued them for an additional 
fifteen miles* carefully avoiding the main force and engaging 
the enemy's stragglers when he oaught then* Be broke off the 
chase when he ran short of ammunition and returned to Columbus, 
Sow Mexico.28
The surprise raid on Columbus, 'lew Mexico* was costly 
for Villa* He sustained eixty-savan casual ties, as opposed 
to American losses of eight dead soldiers* eight dead 
civilians, seven wounded troopers* and three wounded towns*
2?Ibld.. pp. 22-23} and a complete although biased account 
is inTompklns, Chasing Villa. Chapter v m .
28Ibid,. pp. 55*5?* “Funston Heport," p. 23} aid 
Alberto Salinas Carranza, “La Expedioion Punitive," trace* 
hr J. M. Gillespie (unpublished manuscript 1938)* PP« 59-61. 
Carranza launches an attaok at Tompkins in his version of 
the pursuit, stating that if Tompkins had pursued as rapidly 
as he relates, then surely Villa would have out him off with 
his rear guard, especially after Tompkins dismounted to 
better attaok Villa's rear guard. Carranza feels Tompkins 
used up his ammunition, keeping his distance', from Villa's 
superior force, and then returned to Columbus. Eighteen 
years later* September 11* 1939, Tompkins received the 
Distinguished Service Cross for his notion at Columbus,
Hew Mexico,
folk.29 ho had. achieved his mission. Villa's objective, eon- 
firmed by a portion of his private papers found mi the battle* 
field, had been, ever since January 6, 1916, ” to pre­
cipitate aa international conflict by one blow at the orack of 
dawn mod then -to fleo— nothing m o r e *  “3© jg m g  * » • . one of 
those acts of audaolty so frequent in the turbulent life of 
Francisco Villa, /an7 . . . audaolous, decided, impulsive and 
revengeful nan- who did not know how to lose, *3*
the American reaction to the raid.was a ory for .revenge. 
On March 9 and March'10, 1916, Funston. urgently recommended the 
hot pursuit of Villa to the War Department in order to prevent 
further raiding and pit' mi end to Villa's' * • . . policy of 
merciless killing of Americans in M e x i c o . *32 yunston, certain 
of the inability of Carranza to capture Villa, cited examples 
of the past * . . . apathy and gross inefficiency of Mexican 
Government troops . . .* to contain or even press 'Villa.33
29*Punston geport,* p. 23; end Carranza, "la sxpediolon 
Punitive,” pp. 50*51. Funston states in his Annuel Beport 
'that up to 190 Villlstas may have been killed; Carranza 
takes exception to 'this primarily because of his strong 
feelings about Tompkins, who claimed to kill 75 to 100 
during the chase. The value of sixty-seven dead is based 
upon the body count*
3©*Funston Beport,* p. 23, and the .quote from Carranza,
"La Bxpedioion Punitive," p. bp,
31lbld.. p. 63.
32"Funston Beport," p. 2k.
33ibld.. p. 25.
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fhs American press, long weary of Mexican non-action, gave the 
Columbus raid undue importance * . . , thus firing the entire 
public , . « with a spirit of wear and revenge.*^
- C^arranza, *£>e Sxpedicion Punitiva,• pp. 65-66.
“The Independent. March 20, 1916, p. 404, ran an editorial 
entitled "we San no Longer wait.* St traced relations 
back to Vera Crus and then called for invasion as • . . . 
our present duty . . .  peace and good order oust be 
established in Northern Mexico.0
CHAPTBB V
THE EXPBDITXOK OHIGIUATES
Paaoho Villa's attaok on Columbus, Now Mexico, convinced 
the authorities of the United States that the time for diplo­
macy alone .had passed: punitive motion was needed. On
Maroh 10, 1910, Genera! Henry P« McCain forwarded President 
Wilson* a reply to Funston*s request to " . . . relentlessly 
pursue and . . .  scatter . . .» Villa*s forces.* She Command­
er of the Southern Department resolved the following instruc­
tions.
President has directed that an armed force be sent 
Into Mexico with the sole object of capturing Villa 
and preventing any further raids by his band, and 
with scrupulous regard to sovereignty of Mexico*
Secretary of War directs you to telegraph exactly 
what you need in order to carry out foregoing 
general instructions, tat you will not take any 
overt steps until receipt definite orders from 
war Department**
The field command of the expedition fell to Brigadier 
General John J» Pershing. His selection, March 10, 1916, by 
President Wilson and Secretary of war Baker, was based solely 
upon the recommendations of General Hugh 1. Scott, Chief of
^Telegram, General funston to Adjutant General, Maroh 10, 
1916; and Telegram, The Adjutant General to General funston, 
March 10, 1916, foreign Belations 1916. p. 983.
2Ibld.
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Staff, and Major General Tasker H. Bliss. Pershing, stationed 
at fort Bliss, Texas, was one of the few officers la the Army 
-who possessed extensive field command experience, he had 
served in the Indian campaigns in Arizona and the hakotas as 
well as the campaigns against the Monos in the Philippines,
In recognition of his command ability, President Theodore 
Boosevelt had promoted him in 1906, over 862 more senior offi­
cers, directly from Captain to Brigadier General.3
The basic plan of the expedition had been, conceived by 
General. Funston, On March 10, 1916, the Commander of the 
Southern Department proposed a southern pursuit by two columns 
of cavalry, one originating at Columbus, ami the other from 
Baohlta, Mew Mexico. The force, of four regiments of cavalry, 
one battery of field artillery, assorted support troops, and 
one aeroplane squadron, would merge sixty miles south of 
Columbus at Ascension, Mexico. In order to assure the safe 
return of the penetrating force, if the Mexican population rose 
in mass, Funston, recommended a reinforcement brigade of cavalry 
as well as infantry to protect the lines of communication and 
supply.**
%iohard O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc.,'1961), p. 85, 117? and 
Bobert S. Thomas and Inez V. Alien, "The Mexican Punitive 
Expedition Under Brigadier General John J. Pershing, United 
States Army 1916-191? Chapters I thru V." (unpublished 
monograph, War Histories Division Office of the chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.,
1954), p. II-4, hereafter cited as "Monograph,*
^•Funston Beport,* pp. 25-26.
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fhe proposed supply routes were to be initially supported 
by truck and peek train from advanced supply depots at Columbus 
and Hachita, Mew Mexico, fhey would eventually branch south* 
ward from £1 Paso, fexas. When the troops reached Casas Grandee, 
Mexico, supplies oould be shipped via the hoped-for primary mode 
of transportationi the Northwestern Railroad. In order to se­
cure the border, troops from Douglas, Arizona were to be shifted 
to H  Paso, Texas.5
On March 11, 1918, the plan was approved, except for any 
'pre-planned use of the Mexican railroad. The latter was view­
ing as unadvisable due to the railroad*a availability being 
contingent upon existing conditions and the attitude of the 
de facto government. ’ Funston was cautioned to instruct his sub­
ordinates that the occupation of any Mexican city or tom was 
forbidden.^ Further, his orders directed that
. . .  the work of these troops will be regarded as 
finished as soon as villa's band or bands are known 
to be broken up . . .  . /and the expedition/ will 
be withdrawn to Ameriosoi territory as soon as the_ 
de facto government is able to relieve them * . .»
5lbld.
Enclosure, MoCain to Commanding General Southern 
Department, March 11, 1918, in U.S., Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, Record oroup Ro. 9b, "General Pershing*s 
Report of the Punitive Expedition to June 50, 1916,* AGO 
2980591, Box 191 National Archives, Washington, D.C., p. 3, 
hereafter cited as *Pershing Beport." (Photocopy of type­
written report.)
?2nelosure, MoOain to Commanding General Southern 
Department, March iO, 1916, in "Pershing Beport,* p. 3.
In addition to other directives, Funston, was instructed 
* . . .  to make all possible use of aeroplanes at San Antonio 
for observation*"®
The arrival of Special Orders 61, Southern Department, 
March 12, 1916, designating the First Aero Squadron a part of 
the expedition, were completely unexpected. They arrived in 
the midst of an inspection by the Inspector General. However, 
the aviators and their technicians were swift to deploy, leav­
ing San Antonio, Texas, March 13, 1916, in a truck automobile 
train with the aircraft crated.9 All the. aircraft were taken,. 
as it was anticipated 50 percent would be unserviceable under 
constant use. By Marsh 16, 1916, the squadron commander, 
Captain Foulois, and Captain Dodd conducted the first flight 
from Columbus, in Airplane 94.10
The deployed unit to Columbus consisted of twelve officers} 
Captains Foulois and Townsend F. Dodd; lieutenants Carleton G. 
Chapman, Joseph S. Carberry, Herbert A. Dargue, Thomas s. Bowen,
®2nslosure, McCain to Commanding General Southern 
Department, March 10, 1916, in "Pershing Beport,” p. 3.
^Benjamin D, Foulois, "Beport of Operations of the First 
Aero Squadron, Signal corps, with Punitive Expedition, U.S.A., 
for Period March 15 to August 15, 1916* United States Air 
Fores Archives, 168.650 1I-?A, August 28, 1916, p. I, here­
after olted as "First Aero Beport." (Typewritten.) and 
Edgar s. Cornell, "why Biding Boots Sometimes Irritate an 
Aviator's Feet," U.S. Air-Services. Ootoher 1932, p. 29., 
hereafter cited as
10»Pirst Aero Beport," p. 1, and
pp. 125-126.
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loberb Mm- lilllii M* &* Elinor, Edgar $*. 0orrell , Arthur B. 
Christie, Ira Am Ea&er, and a* $*■ Warren, a medical corps offi­
cer; $2 eallabe& men; a civilian mechanic, Jacob Bailey; and 3 
Hospital Corps men*2^
th e  o p e ra tio n a l s ta tu s  o f the a ir  u n it was fa r  from- s a tis ­
fa c to ry * th e  e ig h t JH-21 a considered inadequate when new, were 
dangerous a fte r  spending tb s  summer, f a l l ,  and w in te r in  the 
open* th e  u n it possessed no machine guns, bombs, o r o the r 
armament, and o n ly  a few o f the e ig h t p ilo ts  c a rrie d  s ide  anas 
o r 22 c a lib e r r if le s  fo r  s e lf p ro te c tio n * th e ir  g re a te s t asset 
was th e ir  y o u th fu l eagerness and com plete b e lie f in  the value 
o f an a ir  se rv ice  to  the anay*3^
P ershing, meanwhile, went about the  ta sk o f o rgan ising ' h is  
command o f 10,000 men* He bad been n o tifie d  o f h is  s e le c tio n , 
March 11, 1916, by fu n s to n , who le f t  him. * . * * fre e  to  make 
such assignm ents o f the  troops under /h is /  command as /h e  
th o u g h t/ * * . best in  o rder to  accom plish the purpose in  
hand.1*2'3 the  task fo rc e  m s  to  c o n s is t o f the  Seventh, fem th 
(C o lo red ), E leventh , and th irte e n th  C avalry Begiments; the  S ix th  
and S ix teen th  In fa n try  aagim ents; B a tte rie s  £ and a , s ix th  F ie ld  
A r t ille r y ;  F ir s t Ambulance, Company lumber Seven; F ie ld  H o s p ita l,
F ir s t Aero B e p o rt,* p . 1* 
i % o r r# ll* p . 2b.
!3 k e tte r, Department A d ju ta n t to  B rig a d ie r aeneral John 2T* 
ParalbUigt la rc h  11, 1916, in  •P ershing B ep o rt,* p . 2*
Humber Seven; various Signal Corps detachment; Wagon Companies One
14and Two'| and the First Aero Squadron* As the plans took shape and 
units were placed,: operational difficulties became more apparent*
One of the most immediate and obvious of' problems was'how to main- 
tain the continuity of supply and communication lines.
Hie expeditions area of operation was the State ’ of CMbuahua, ■ 
Mexico* About -three times the si&e of Hew York State, it consisted - 
of four^fifths eastern plateau region and one-fifth western Sierra 
Mhdre mountains. Hie plateau area,-a series of'plains divided by 
low barren mountains, gravel ravines, and dry lakes, represented a 
serious obstacle' to military movement* ; Hie mountain region' rose' 
from a low elevation of 3,000 feet' to a high- of 10,000 feet, it too 
was almost inaccessible. 1 The remote canyons offering plentiful
16water, food, forage and fuel were a favorite haunt of fugitives*
The climate of Chihuahua was as harsh as the topography* the 
area., cold in winter, hot in simmer, was extremely dry, except 
for a mid-summer rainy season. As a result of the harsh climate, 
the plateau region boasted little vegetation, other than thorns, - 
cactus,- mesquite, and yuccas* The little grass athat appearedddaring 
duly and August soon dried up, making-
^"Pershing Report," pp. 4*3 * 
^"Punstcm Report,n p. 28. 
^".Monograph," pp. 11-14, 13*
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forage for horses scarce.1?
These topographies*, and climatic conditions made logis­
tics* support difficult even if suitable transportation mas 
available. It was not, and this laok of capability was *the 
moat critical situation which confronted the entire expedition 
at the outset.*1®
funston*s staff had completed the immediate steps of 
accumulating .supplies* ammunition, and troops at Columbus,
New Mexico, and Pershing had developed deployment plans, but, 
as * . . . practically no motor trucks were available . . .* 
logistical support did not exist.1? The fifty-four trucks 
ordered by the War Dapartment for the expedition were not ex­
pected until March 19, 1916, four -days after the expedition's 
scheduled deployment*2®
fortunately, the ten trucks possessed by the First Aero 
Squadron arrived in sufficient time to provide a partial 
solution to the transportation problem.21
The expedition*s Instructions were to depart no later
1?Ibid.. p. 11-15*
18«Foulois Record,* p. 6,
19*Funston Report,* p. 26; and The Outlook. March 29, 1916, 
P. 732.
20Ibld,. “Foulois Record,* p. 6; and Report of the 
Quartermaster General, Annual Report 1916. p. 376.
21*Foulois Record,* p. 6.
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than 6:00 a.nu, Marsh 15* 1916.22 However, this was delayed 
until the arrival of the First Aero squadron on the morning of 
Harsh 15, 1916. At noon, Harsh 15, within' an hour after the 
squadron's arrival at Columbus, Hew Mexico, the southward march 
began, 'this expedition marked the first experience that the 
army had with motor vehicles, mod an aviator, lieutenant 
Edgar S, Gorrell was la charge Of the truck train. Oorrell, •' 
later President of the Stuz Motor Car Company of America, had 
been selected for the duty because he and his ground crew had 
been first to uaerahe their airplane, and he had no other 
Immediate duty. As he travelled toward Mexico, he felt a hit 
uneasy, knowing that the airplane mechanics serving as guards 
were totally unfamiliar with the rifles they carried. They had 
rarely if ever fired them.*3 The young officer's apprehension 
was further intensified by thoughts of the threats of the 
Carranza commander at the border gate at las Polomas, south 
of Columbus, Hew Mexico, who had promised to resist American 
entry. Fortunately, neither the Mexican nor his command were 
encountered when the eastern column crossed the border.21*'
The western column consisted of the Second and Tenth 
Cavalry. Its departure point was Hachlta, Mew Mexico. Desig­
nated as the Second Provisional Cavalry Brigade, it was commanded
22nFunston Report,'8 p. 28.
23oorrell. p. 25.
2^*Pershing lepert,8 p. 7*
by Colonel George A. Dodd, A late intelligence report revealed 
that Villa's bazxl, estimated between 500 and 1000 men, had 
passed Casas Grandee, Mexico. Pershing# is hopes of cutting 
off Villa, directed this all cavalry column to by-pass the pre­
planned Aacenciaa rendezvous and to make a forced march toward 
Casas Grandes. Relishing action, Pershing decided to load the 
forward thrust himself, and ordered Dodd to delay departure 
from the Culbertson Sanch until ho arrived. Pershing's decision 
delayed the planned departure as ho was Involved in an auto­
mobile accident. It was after midnight before the column got 
under way.23
A day later, March 17, 1916, Dodd's flying column arrived 
at Colonia Dublaa, Mexico. They had covered the 125 miles of 
rough terrain from the Culbertson Sanch in less than twenty 
hours with only two halts. A temporary advanced base of 
operations was established a mile north of Colonia Dublaa.
The eastern eoluma, commanded by Colonel James Lockett, 
Eleventh Cavalry, .paced itself more slowly, stopping at Las 
Polamoo, Boca Grande, Ascension and Corral!too, Mexico. It 
arrived at colonia Dublaa .'Shortly after noon, March 20, 1916, 
bringing the expedition's strength in Mexico to 192 offleers, 
0800 troopers, and 6175 horses.2^
23%bid., pp. 5—7.
^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 77-78, and ‘Monograph, •
p. 11-18. '
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Pershing’s first task was tea locate Villa, This task 
continued 'to perplex him the entire campaign* Villa* at home 
in Chihuahua and six days ahead of M s  pursuers* was able to 
evade the American troops at will* (local reports indicated 
that Villa was In the vicinity of San Kiguel de Bableora, 
forty-five miles south of the expedition*s camp*} In an 
attempt to prevent Villa from moving Into Sonora, and hoping 
to out the bandit’s trail before he could move into, the moun­
tains near Guerrero* Pershing executed, his first attacks 
three separate but parallel cavalry columns*2?
With the campaign Initiated, Pershing ordered the First 
Aero Squadron to Casas Grandes for immediate service.2® 
fh® orders to proceed to Casas Grandee, Mexico, were 
received by Foulois late Sunday afternoon, larch 19, 1916* 
Acknowledging receipt of the order, Foulois asked Pershing to 
have landing fires set around the field at the destination*
A lack of squadron truck transporfcation. existed, so only 50 
percent of the enlisted personnel'were ordered to move for­
ward * The men who remained at Columbus, New Mexico* were 
expected to provide technical support for the Quartermaster 
truck operation. The available squadron trucks had been packed 
previously, the aircraft were soon fueled' and readied. Both 
the ground and air elements departed Columbus, New Mexico at
2?0Pershing Beport,” p* 7. 
28*First Aero Beport,” p. 1.
5(10 p.m., Rarch 19, 1916.
She deployment mission, a flight of 110 miles, was not 
normal* §!$$ Isi# dejiarfcur© made a ni^i% Sandiag a certainty* 
the only pilot in the unit who had flown at night was. Captain 
Dodd who had previously logged one night sortie* She aircrews 
had only a vague idea where Casas Grandes, the intended desti- 
nation, mss. Their maps wees inaccurate blueprints that 
barely portrayed a rough representation of the locale, the 
aircraft were not equipped with instruments, nor lighted for 
night operations* Saoh JW»2 had a different compass system, 
all of whioh were commonly unreliable, the aviators, eager 
to respond to the urgent oall, east their cares to the wind, 
but at the same time, each " . . . wondered what the country 
beyond Columbus had in store for him."3°
The first aircraft to abort was piloted, by lieutenant 
Kilner. Barely clearing ground, due to the low power of his
OX engine, he flew a dosed pattern and landed. 
He wisely chose to remain until the ground smews installed a 
new OXX engine. He departed Columbus the next morning, flew 
non-stop to Casas Grandes, and was first aviator to arrive at 
the intended destination, harsh 20, 1916.31
Foulois, in the lead aircraft Airplane Vi, anticipated
z%ereH 19, 1916, Ibid.. and Sorrell, p. 25*
30lbld.
31lbli,, p. 26., and harsh 20, 1916, "Pirst Aero Beport,"
p. 1.
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the hazards of night flight* noticing a dust aloud., created 
by cavalry of unimown origin, and aware of the rapidly de* 
creasing daylight, he decided continued travel was futile.
He landed at ABcencion, Mexico, and was followed in by Air* 
planes 45, 48, and 53.32
Willis in Airplane 41, and Gorrell, in Airplane 52, 
initially experienced little difficulty. Each had *a good 
propeller,8 and they flaw on, Gorrell trailing Willis. Even* 
tually, they lost sight of the other machines in the sky. 
noticing that the ground had grown rough and had a higher 
elevation they each climbed an additional 1060 feet. Dark* 
ness earns, but they pressed on. Gorrell soon lost sight of 
Willis.33
two hours later he saw him again, when Airplane 52 and 
Airplane 41 almost had a midair collision, loth aviators had 
seen a lighted area and headed for it, almost meeting one 
another in the process. The light, however, turned out to be 
a forest fire in a hlgh*walled canyon. Gorrell, in Airplane 
52, looking for a suitable lending area, applied power and 
climbed out of the canyon area. He saw only four things, 
mountains below, a full mooa, the north star, and darkness.
He was completely lost.3^
3%322§1I* P* 26.
33xbia.. and Mew fork Times. Maroh 28, 1916, p. 3.
3**0orrsll. p. 26, The iiew fork Times article stated that 
Willis landed at the location of the fire.
¥11118* luck was not sear better* He waa forced to make 
a night landing near Pearson, Mexico. As he rounded out, the 
aircraft hit a low knoll, and was destroyed. Willis, somehow 
uninjured, climbed out of the smashed cockpit, consulted his 
blueprint map, and headed in the direction in which he hoped 
Casas Grandes lay. He walked all night and hid in the under­
brush the next day. assuming M s  journey the following evening, 
he narrowly missed being captured by three armed Mexicans whose 
fore attracted him* He succeeded in evading them by .hiding 
in the mesqulte, emerging only after they had departed* Willis 
finally reached the base camp at Colonia Oublan, 2:00 a*®.,
March 21, 1916.^  Salvage .parties were dispatched to the orach 
scene the next day, bat due to hostile fire they withdrew, A 
second attempt, Marsh 23, 1916, was successful.^
Gorrell had even less fortune. Assuming he had flown 
too far .south, unable to see his compass for direction, and 
totally lest, he turned toward the north star in hopes of 
trying * . . .  to reach my comrades and obtain assistance,*
Plying between the mountain peaks, the only sign of civili­
zation he noticed wees a few small lighted shacks* He con­
tinued on. In a short time his oil supply was consumed.
He contemplated shutting the engine down before it seised,
35»Government•b Aeros hot Suitable for Mexico,*
Aerial Age weekly. April 3, 1916, p. 86} and Hew York .glass.
&aroh 25V 1 9 1 6, pp. 1-2.
36fiarch 22, 1916, March 23, 1916, “First Aero Beport,* pp. 2-3.
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but a lack gf fuel, soon stopped hie ‘good p r o p e l l e r . *37
Stair-stepping the aircraft down, he loaded In a field 
filled with hunch grass. Nearby were a few lighted adobe touts. 
Some dogs sensed his presence in the blackness and began bark­
ing. Gorrell, trail briefed on the good possibility of un­
friendly Besieans, rapidly gathered his gear and departed, the 
aircraft*3®
The young aviator spent the neat several days surviving* 
Sressed- in blue overalls and leather flying coat over a khaki 
service uniform with a football like Hying helmet on his head, 
he set out across the desert. His equipment, a pistol, can­
teen of water, emergency rations, and the blueprint map, was 
meager at best. Evading a herd of horses and cattle, which 
chased him into a stream of water:, Gorrell pressed forward 
until As 00 a.m., when he paused for a rest. Two hours later, 
he awoke, to find himself on the crest of a hill in the middle 
of a desert,3®
Hoping to cross either the lines of communication or 
supply, he set off across the barren soil* By mid-afternoon, 
with half of his water already consumed, he realised the
37oorrell, p. 26. The Aerial Age Weekly. April 3, 1916, 
p. 86, Mid, Gorrell had a fuel leak, but Gorrell states in 
his article he never talked to any reporters.
3 8 x b i d . . p p .  2 6 - 2 7 .
39ibld., p. 27,
70
futility of his journey. He retraced his steps, barely 
reaching the stream he h#d easily forded the night before. 
Unused to the desert conditions, he had fainted twice and ex­
perienced a fit of convulsions and vomiting. Me drank his 
fill of water and fell asleep, Upon awakening, he returned 
to his aircraft and found It intact except for a Mexican name 
recently- writtenf.oa it in pencil.^
Gorrell decided hie only hope of survival was to steal a 
horse, and ride to safety* In the midst of procuring an 
animal, he was surprised by a Mexican. This fortunate cir­
cumstance probably saved his life, the native knew where 
the Americans were, and Gorrell, in no position to argue, 
succeeded in purchasing the guide's services for four silver 
dollars* The return trip, about thirty miles, to Ascension, 
Mexico, was uneventful, Gorrell rode behind; his service 
pistol was constantly cocked, as he feared treachery. The 
Mexican, already nervous, half expecting to see villistas at 
any moment, became steadily more frightened as they approached 
Ascension* By the time the duo reached the town, a crowd of 
curious people had gathered. Under this exposure the Mexican 
desired little of the young American's company. When a cloud
*»°lbld.. pp. 27 
p. 86, fabricated
tacked a note, giving his location, on a stick near a wagon 
trail, and then returned to guard his aircraft until rescued. 
The correct account appeared in the hew fork Timas. March 28, 
1916, p. 3.
-28. The Aerial... Age Weekly. April 3, 1916,
a story that Gorrell creased the desert,
of dust of an approaching troop appeared, he collected his pay 
and rapidly departed, leaving Gorrell, horse, and all* Sorrell's 
ragged appearnaoe caused the American troop to first suspect 
him of being a Mexican bandit, but fortunately the detachment 
of the Sixth infantry did not fire, and he was saved.
The following morning, March 22, 1916, Sorrell scoured 
a ford automobile, eight gallons of gasoline, one quart of 
oil, and a new guide* Beturning to his aircraft, with the 
guide and a chauffeur, he filled the radiator with stream 
water, refueled and serviced the engine, and cranked his "good 
propeller** Before he was ready to depart a strong wind oaae 
up, and rain began to fall. Be had never flown in a rainstorm, 
nor had he flown without his goggles. These he had lost the 
previous day. instructing the guide and chauffeur to'hang- on 
the wings, he applied .full power and * . . .  by luok . * * * 
managed to take off without nosing over in the bunch grass.^
He flew to Ojo Fre&erieo, a point along the supply route, 
where he landed, later in the day he flawed down a truck 
train, refueled, and attempted to fly to Casas Grandes. After 
being airborne for only five minutes, a huge part of the air-
wk 1— "  ®  wbA. • ^ bw itawik -win a a  s S  wk state Jbfe am vfc ■.**« M ^  A  ttsta .wiia £kaa .iSi diflfr Mia AUie Aw eta, a$ T&&& BpBT u©paFSeu. t*n$ i&rfc w lngf ana wmi&& aaaea 
strain the linen fabric began to rip* Me executed, an immediate 
return to Ojo frederieo, where after a night’s stay, he obtained
^Gorrall. pp. 2S-29. 
*»2lbld.. pp. 29-30.
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« ride da another truck convoy and returned to hie command, 
March 23# 1916, *»3
©a March 15, 1916, Gorrell and hie meohanlas returned to 
Ojo Prederioo. they aade emergency repairs and on March 26, 
1916, Airplane 52 joined the force.^
Squally disastrous was the trip of Lieutenant Bowen. 
Plying la Airplane 68, he nade a successful landing at 
Asoeneion, Mexico, behind Foulole, March 19, 1916. Depart* 
lug the following day for Colonla Dublan, he encountered en- 
route fuel problems and landed at cases Grandes. aefueled, 
he resumed his Jouaaey that afternoon. Ones in the Colonla 
Dublan area, he flew Into "puffy alr« and whirlwinds during 
his landing approach. At only sixty-five feet absolute 
altitude the aircraft was caught by a " . , . sudden puff of 
wind /It/ »side-slipped,* crashing Into the ground.*^ me 
entire air frame burned leaving only the engine intact. Bowen, 
who was knocked unconscious, was rescued and luckily suffered 
only a broken nose and minor Injuries.
The First Aero Squadron had finally joined the punitive 
expedition in the field. Their aircraft, definitely under­
powered, had barely managed to traverse the plateau area of
»3lbld. *% M d .
^"Government* s Acres hot Suitable for Mexico,"
Aerial Age weekly. April 3, 1916, p. 86.
I*%areh 2®, 1916, First Aero Beoort. p. 2,
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Chihuahua. The aviators, although eager to serve, were capable 
of flying only when navigation over the .area m s  easy* Fortu­
nately, however, to ease some of the unit's deficiencies,
■* . . « the prairie . . . offered numerous good places to 
land.*^ 7 fhe short deployment from Colu&bus to Colonia Ouhlan 
had resulted in the loss of two aircraft, only six JN-2's 
remained and eaoh according to Henry woodhouse, * . . , m s  
worth one thousand men in the Mexican campaign."^®
^7«oovernment•s Acres Not Suitable For Ktsxico," Aerial 
Age Weekly, April 3, 1916, p. 86. The statement Is attributed 
to lieutenant Bowen.
^Henry Woodhouse, "Wo Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign!" 
giving. April 1916, p. 101. hr. woodhouse*s estimate of a 
jS-z's value was probably high considering the low capability 
of the machine# However, British General lord Kitchener, 
speaking of European war airplanes stated, "an aviator is 
worth an army corps." See U.S., Congress, House of Bepresenta- 
tives, Bepresentative William S. Bennet speaking on Aeroplanes, 
June 9, 1916, 64th Cong*. 1st sees.. Appendix, Congressional 
Beeord. Vol. LIXI, p. 1140.
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On Hereto 20, 1916, the pace of pursuit increased. Pershing, 
foreseeing the 'need for additional units organized four more 
detachments. Each one m s  held in readiness against any oircura- 
stance that might 'arise* these new thrusts, commanded toy 
lieutenant Colonel Henry f* Allen, semi Razors Elmer lindsley, 
Frank Tompkins a m  fiotoert to. Howze, were dispatched between 
Harch 20 and 29, 1916. As all units would eventually converge 
in the Hamiqaipa area, Pershing relocated bis advanced field 
headquarters near that Hexiean village.1
the Second Squadron and troop to, Thirteenth Cavalry, were 
the first detachment to depart, toindsley, and his command of 
eleven officers and seventy-five troopers, were ordered to 
guard trails mat of Chuhulchupa, in the event that Villa 
turned in that direction* However, 91110*8 forces appeared 
to be headed due south, mad tolndsley*s orders were altered 
Hereto 24, 1916. Be was redirected toward San Jose de Babicora.2
On Harch 21, 1916, Tompkins left Colonle Dublaa at the 
head of eleven officers and 160 troopers of Troops K and It,
l*pershing Beport," pp. 11-12.
2Ibld.. p. 11.
?6
and nm&him Gaa plgtooa* fMrfceemfcb Cavalry, and troops I and 
I* tenth Cavalry, Mia missions to proceed up the Santa Maria 
liver* thence to Mtoi^uipa where lie was to * * * , he on hand 
should his services he needed later in the pursuit * # * • of 
Villa* 3 fnis he accomplished, arriving at Maaiouipa* larch 
29, 1916.*
Ment* on March 2%* i f  Id *  louse le d  a com posite command o f 
10 o ffic e rs .a n d  225  tro o p e rs  southward a long the lin e s  o f 
CGHsmimication between C olonia Duhlan and H«n&gtiip&* He a lso  
arrived at Baraiquipa March 29, 1916.5
Three days later, March 2?, 1916, Alien left the camp at 
Colonia Dublan. Moving southward toward fiamiquipa, this 
composite unit of 19 officers and 282 troopers was as unsuc­
cessful as all the other columns and detachment* in locating 
Pancho Villa.*
The cavalry oolumns of Brown, Erwin, and Evans also met 
an equal amount of failure. Brown, his forces 'bolstered by 
those of Ivans, who had joined him March 23, 1916, received con­
firmed reports, Harch 25, 1916, that Villa had been defeated 
by the Gsrransistas of Colonel Upeleaio Cano at Namiquipa.
The Villistas were said to be hiding in the vicinity of either
3ibid.. and for a full account, Tompkins, Chasing Villa, 
pp. llSCTlQ.
^•Pershing seport,* p. 12.
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SI Oao or Santa Clara.?
Brown decided M s  Best alternative was to join forces with 
Cano, who promised that his Mexican scouts would find the ban­
dits. Brown dispatched the plan to Pershing, the division 
oommander, and Colonel George A. Dodd, the brigade commander. 
Brown's optimism for possible success was shortlived, however. 
Cano, possibly preferring Villa's escape more than his capture 
through cooperative action with the Americans, never intended 
nor attempted to flush Villa. Brown, in disgust, disbanded 
the pirn, March 2?, 1916, aid moved his column to La Quema&a 
for the remainder of March, 1916.®
On March 21, 1916, Colonel Dodd was instructed by Pershing 
to join Erwin* a detachment, and from that vantage point to 
assume command of field operations. He was directed to 
establish communications with the other columns and to attempt 
to secure the cooperation of the Mexican forces. Dodd and his 
forces arrived at si Valle, March 22, 1916. A conference was 
held with Colonel Salas, Commanding General of the SI Valle 
Mexican forces. Salas confirmed that Villa had defeated him 
at Namlquipa, March 19, 1916. Dodd, too, headed for Namiquipa, 
on the assumption he could catch Villa. On March 20, Dodd, 
apprised of the battle between Cano's Federales and the
?Tompkins, Chasing villa, pp. 91-92; and Carranza,
"La Expedlcion Pimltlva," pp. 90-91.
^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 92; and "Pershing fieport," 
pp. 8-9*
V illis ta s ,  changed h is  d e s tin a tio n  to- Santa, Ana. 8© hoped to  
cross v i l la 1a path, a n t cu t him o ff*®
f i t ©  s w ift ly -s h ift in g  movement o f the campaign, d riv e n  more 
by rumor than v a lid  in te llig e n c e , created a se rious problem o f 
command c o n tro l fo r  Pershing# The s tra te g y  o f the  search .Had 
more shadow than lig h t .  P ershing1® tro o p s , u n fa m ilia r w ith  the  
te r r ito r y ,  r id in g  mounts unused to  the rig o rs  o f the Ksxioan 
p la teau  la n d s , and u n ce rta in  o f the assistance o r a ttitu d e  o f 
a ll n a tiv e s , stumbled a fte r  every w isp o f Poncho1s t r a il*  To 
General Pershing f e l l  the  task o f c o n tro llin g  and d ire c tin g  the  
chase in  some semblance o f o rd e r.*0
th e  General recognised the  n e ce ss ity  fo r  a f le x ib le , 
responsive , and tim e ly  f ie ld  command dem ent* He mounted h is  
command post in  an open to u rin g  autom obile and chased between 
h is  fo rce s  in  the  fie ld # * *  Whenever p o ss ib le , te leg raph  and 
ra d io  communtcations were estab lished* te leg ra p h  was ve ry un­
c e rta in  due to  the constan t sabotaging o f the lin e s *  The enemy 
insu rgen ts  snapped te leg raph  p o les, an t o fte n  c u t and c a rrie d  
o f f  100 yard lin e  se c tio n s**2 la d le  to o , was fa r  from s a tis fa c ­
to ry . -the p la teau  area had extensive  iro n  ore d e p o s its . T h e ir
^Tompkins, Chaainx V illa , p . 92; and "P ershing le p c r t,*  
pp. 8-9#
*0 $ o u ln !n t W ith Pershing in  Mexico, pp. 4?-51* 
l * ib id #
^ Fershlng to  Punston^ A p r il 18, 191#,
effect on the weak and In e ffic ie n t ra d io  systems was re fle c te d  
as a constant h i- le v e l o f s ta tic  th a t isade ra d io  communication 
d if f ic u lt  i f  n o t Im poss ib le .3 3
Pershing1 s rem aining a lte rn a tive .,, in  o rd e r to  m a in ta in  the 
control of h is  fo rce s  and campaign, was an aerial c o u rie r serv­
ic e . th e  inherently weak F ir s t aero Squadron was o fte n  h is  
o n ly  means o f d ire c t, ra p id  communication w ith  h is  subordinate 
f ie ld  commanders.3*^
As the  fin g e rs  o f the  American e xp e d itio n a ry  fo rce s  spread 
sporadically southward, the  a v ia to rs  o f the  F ir s t Aero Squadron 
v a in ly  attem pted to  f u l f i l l  the  dua l ro le s  of c o u rie rs  and 
scouts. Pershing needed them, and from  the day o f th e ir  a r r iv a l 
to  th e ir  f in a l d e p a rtu re , they were u t ilis e d ,3^
A t noon, March 20, 1916, s h o rtly  a fte r  a rr iv in g  in  the 
f ie ld ,  the  f i r s t  combat m ission  went a lo f t .  C aptain P ou lo ia , 
f ly in g  in  h is  normal, p o s itio n  o f observer, and ca p ta in  Dodd, 
as p ilo t ,  departed Casas Cran&es in  A irp la n e  fh e ir  in s tru c ­
tio n s  were to  lo c a te  Brown1 a column., thought a t the  tim e to  be 
loca ted  in  the  la ke  Babicora area, the  a v ia to rs  proceeded 
southward about tw e n ty -fiv e  m iles  from  the base, they soon, en­
countered 10,000 foot m ountains, whirlwinds, and treacherous 
v e r tic a l cu rre n ts  o f a ir ,  The low  powered JM2 was incapable  o f 
c lim b in g  high enough to evade the a ir  cu rre n ts  over the fo o th ills ,
13statem ent by newton B, Baker, A p r il 8 , 1916, as c ite d  
by A e ria l Am W eekly. A p r il 1?, 1916, p . l4 l .
^ I b ld . persh ing  B ep o rt," p . A3*
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much less traverse the mountains. therefore, the disillusioned 
aviators sere fereed too return to the station without completing 
their mission.1^
the following day, fiarch 21, 1916, a second mission was 
dispatched. Once again Foulois and Oodd were airborne and 
heated toward the Galena Valley where the Brigade Commander, 
Colonel Dodd, and Irwin's forces were operating* fbe column 
was located, dispatches were delivered, and a request by Bruin - 
for supplies was delivered hash to Pershing’s headquarters.
As a result, six truoKe of supplies war® dispatched, arriving 
late that same evening.1?
On March '22, 1916, the squadron received two missions! 
communicate with ©vans* troops moving southward along the Sorth*. 
western Bailroad, and reeonfcact Dodd* Airplane 62, crewed toy 
lieutenants Kilnsr and Bader, and Airplane 65, piloted toy 
Carberry, flew Into the Galeiaa Valley, the crews reported to 
Cedd, obtained M s  reports and returned to Colonia Duhlan*1® 
Captain Dodd and J»leuteaant Christie in Airplane 66 and 
lieutenant Chapman in Airplane 53 had .less fortune* flying 
south into the sierra Madras they attempted to find Stans* troops 
along the railroad* Again, the low powered aircraft failed to
l?Samuel P. Ballam,’»fhe Punitive Expedition of 1916,® 
fhe. Cavdlry Journal, duly 192?* p. 38?; and March 21, 1916* 
wPi'rSt" 'Aero Heport, * p* 2.
ISKaroh 22, 1916, "First Aero Beport,® p* 2*
so
overcome toe whirlwinds and stiff currents of toe mountainous 
area* The aviators flew as far as the northern end of toe 
Cumbre Bass tunnel, toe air currents driving them at times 
* ♦ * . within twenty feet of toe tree tops,1 hut their were 
unable to cross toe mountains and were compelled to abort 
their mission*^
M arried fey toe  fa ilu re s  encountered, F o u lo ls  subm itted a 
request to  F ersh lng, March 22, 1916*. fo r  am immediate remedy: 
new a irc ra ft*  The memorandum fo r  Pershing s ta te d  in  p a rt:
1 . in  view  o f toe fa c t th a t toe present 
aeroplane equipment o f to#  F ir s t aero Squadron 
Is  n o t capable o f m eeting toe present m ilita ry  
se rv ice  c o n d itio n s , i t  is  u rg e n tly  requested 
th a t the fo llo w in g  number o f a ir c ra ft  * * . be 
purchased /w ith 7  * * , Immediate d e liv e ry  by 
express * * • 720
2* Aeroplanes
(a) Two (2 ) M a rtin  aeroplanes, Model S, 
w ith  army standard, la n d in g  gear, H a ll^S c o tt 125 
h* p* 6 c y l*  m otors*
(b ) Two (2 ) C u rtis s  aeroplanes, Model 
32, C u rtis s  160 h* p . s te e l c y lin d e r m otors*
Co) Two s tu rte v a n t aeroplanes* 160 ti*p* 
S tu rte va n t m otors*
(d ) Two C2) Thomas aeroplanes* 135 h*p*
Thomas m otors*
(e) Two (2) Sloane aeroplanes, 125 h .p* 
M a ll-S c o tt 6 c y l*  m otors.2*
th e  fo llo w in g  day* March 23* 1916* th re e  separate s o rtie s
l% iareh 22* 1916* * F ir s t Aero B eport** p* 2*
2®mmo For toe commanding General P u n itiv e  E xped ition* 
O'* S* Aror» A t Casas Grandee* Mexico, March 22* 1916* in  
“F ir s t Aero B eport** P« 2*
2I Ib ld .
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were d ispatched w ith  communications for C olonel Dodd from  
General Pershing* the  a irc ra ft*  A irp lanes kkt <*5# and 53# 
f ly in g  in  extrem ely tu rb u le n t a ir *  reached the  Brigade Head* 
q u a rte rs  a t a  V a lle . T h e ir d e s tin a tio n  was confirm ed by a 
s o ld ie r waving a b la nke t in  re c o g n itio n . The a v ia to rs  landed 
w ith  g re a t d if f ic u lty  in . the  s trong  winds* As they parked 
th e ir  a ir c ra ft*  one was n e a rly  overturned by the wind which 
pushed i t  tw enty to  th ir ty  fe e t. The fly e rs *  forewarned* so* 
cured th e ir  machines w ith  la r ia ts  and te n t po les. Because o f 
the  w inds* s le e t*  and snow* they were fo rced  to  rem ain two 
days* D uring th is  p e rio d * the  i l l  equipped a v ia to rs  had to  
sleep in  the open w ith o u t b lanke ts* On Harch 25* 1916# a fte r  
two to  fo u r' hours o f han&eraaking th e ir  *cold~soaked* engines* 
the a v ia to rs  were, once again a irb o rn e  fo r  home*22
C olonel Dodd* the Brigade Commander, had been pursu ing 
¥1110*0 movements s ince  jo in in g  the  column.- On March 26* 1916* 
w ith  no in d ic a tio n s  o f V illa  a t Santa Ana* Dodd in  re a c tio n  to  
a re p o rt rece ived  from  Brown* moved h is  column toward Bachiniva. 
The march was conducted under freezing conditions. Enroute*
* . • . men and animals had icicles hanging from their whiskers* 
and canteens were frozen solid.*23 The column reached laehlnlva 
early March 28* 1916.
22Kew York Times. Maroh 28* 1916* p . 1 | and harch 23* 1916# 
• F ir s t Aero B eport** p . 3.
23i>aliam# •The P u n itiv e  E xped ition  o f 1916** p . 388.
2^Tompkins* Chasing V illa , p . 82.
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On the same day, lieutenant Chapman achieved too firsts* 
Dispatched os a 110 mile round robin from El Valle* he crossed 
the Continental Divide for the first time* Bis reconnaissance 
sortie was also a success. As he penetrated the mountains, he 
spotted a group of suspected finishes* He immediately re* 
turned to Si Valle* and delivered his report.25 Dodd*s command 
at Sachinlva was the closest column to the insurgents* position, 
the valuable information was rapidly delivered to Dodd by 
lieutenant Dargue, in Airplane b>*2$
Colonel Dodd received the report. It confirmed rumors of 
500 to bOO Vllllsfcas in the Querrero area. He alerted his 
column for battle, and began a forced march through the 
mountains.2?’
By 8:00 a.m., Baroh 89, 1916, Dodd reached the outskirts 
of Querrero* the town, located in the lower plains of a valley, 
was surrounded by high bluffs* the eastern approach to the 
town was blocked by nearly impassable arroyos, but the western 
access through the foothills was less difficult. To prevent 
the. esaape of the enemy, Dodd placed the Second Squadron across 
the river west of town. With his main body of troops hidden by 
the eastern bluffs, Dodd ordered the attach. In the short battle
25Harch 28, 1916, “First Aero Beport,0 p. 5l And "Bore 
Aeros and larger Engines for the Rexioan Campaign,” Aerial.
Age Weekly. April 10, 1916, p. 116.
26harch 28, 1916, “First Aero Beport,0 p. Si 
Carranza, “La Expedleion Funitiva,0 p. 86.
2?”Pershing Beport,® pp. 13»lA.
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that followed thirty Mexicans were killed, one of whoa was 
suspected 'to he General Elielo Hernandez, two machine guns 
were captured, as mil as a number of horses, saddles, and 
assorted arms, Xa addition, several Carranzlsta prisoners, 
scheduled for exeoution, were saved. Dodd's fores suffered 
only four easualtles, all wounded,2®
Dodd had however missed catching villa. He had followed 
a route into Guerrero preferred, by hie civilian guide, Mr.
Baker, foreman of the Bavlcera Banch, rather than that 
recommended by his advance guard. As Dodd marched toward 
Guerrero on the recommended road, Paneho Villa followed the 
other route out of town.2^
the expedition not knowing Villa's true location continued 
to search, and the First Aero Squadron continued to try to pro­
vide it aerial support. Between March 26 and April h, 1916, 
the unit flew seventy-nine mail and dispatch sorties.3° these 
flights, between Columbus, Mew Mexico and points within Mexico, 
were a constant battle for survival. The aviators, exposed in
2®Colonel Dodd's Beport on the Plghtt Guerrero, Chihuahua,
Mexico, 29 March 1916, In "Pershing Beport," pp. la-16.
29pailam, "The Punitive Expedition of 1916," pp. 390-391. 
Villa had previously been wounded while observing a battle 
with Carranslsta troops. As a result of this and increased
Carranzlsta activity, he hid in the mountains in a cave until
6 July 1916 when he rejoined his followers at San Juan Bautista. 
See Carransa "la Expedleion Punitive,' pp. 85-86, and pp. 
289-296.
3®Kareh 26, 1916 to April 5, 1916, "First Aero Beport," 
p. 5*
open, oookpits to the extremes of cola, thin air, unstable air 
currents, and an oooaaional bullet, provided a sketchy, but 
valuable reconnaissance and oourier service for the expedition. 
The frequency of their flints Is borne testimony by the re­
currence of the dateline: ‘Field Headquarters, United States
Army is Mexico . . .  (by aeroplane to Columbus, hew Mexico)."32 
However, the inadequacies of the small unit, so highlighted 
by its Frees notices, were undergoing serious consideration.
The limitations of the Aviation Section quite evident 
to its members, were finally being exposed to the general 
publio and Congress*
Concurrent with the journalistic coverage of the First 
Aero Squadron, the organisational problems of the Air Service 
were also being reviewed in the oourt martial of lieutenant 
Colonel lewis £. Coodier, Judge Advocate of the Western 
Department, aoodier, father of Captain lewis S* ooedler, Jr., 
Aviation Section, had become incensed by the poor operating 
procedures that directly resulted in his son's injuries. 
Therefore, he had launched an unofficial investigation of the 
aviation sehool. In order to gather evidence, he had allied 
himself with his son's friends. Captain Dodd and lieutenant 
Taliaferro, The trio's Investigation had resulted in charges
318Government's Aeros Hot Suitable For Mexico," Aerial 
Age Weekly. April 3, 1916, pp. 86, 95.
32i8suea of Hew fork Times for late harch and early April, 
1916.
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calling for the removal of captain Cowan as the aviation School 
head, She charges of illegally receiving flight pay were 
filed by Goodier against cowan and Captain W, L. Patterson,
An Investigation of bheee charges by the Judge Advocate General 
revealed that the complaint could not be sustained. In addition, 
Goodier was courtmartialed for soliciting evidence, The re­
sultant proceedings aired the organisational problems, as 
well as capabilities, of the Air Service to the Congress, the 
President, and the nation. As a direct result, Goodier, on 
April 1?, 1916, received a reprimand from President Milsent 
Colonel Sober and Captain Cowan were subsequently removed 
from aviation service; and Secretary of War Baker began con­
sidering a complete reorganization of the air servioe.33
The Mexican Punitive Expedition further advertised the 
Air Services lack of capability. On March 11, 1916, in re­
action to the Columbus raid, the Aero Club of American had 
offered to provide men and aircraft for active service in 
Mexico,3** Their offer was immediately rebuffed by the Secretary 
of War, Baker, who though appreciating their patriotism, was 
certain the expedition had “ . . . all the planes neces-
33*aoodier Court Martial,* (no page}) “The Mews of the 
Week,* Aerial Age Weekly. April 10, 1916, p. Ill; “Plying 
Corps to be Separated from the Signal Corps?" Aerial Age 
Weekly, April 2b, 1916, p. 173} add stijdy.flS, pp. 153-15b.
3bfelegram, Aero Club of .America, to Kewton D. Baker, 
in "First Aero Squadron to Mexico," Aerial Age Weekly.
March 20, 1916, p. 26.
m
sapy,*35. several days later whoa the First Aero squadron was"
ordered to Mexico* Beber, still the Chief of the Aviation
Section, under the direction of Chief of Staff Scott, assured
all concerned that the * « « # short time . , ,* expedition
had ® ♦ . . all the aeroplanes n ecessary.*36 The A e ria l Asa
Weekly expressed a deep concern over the nation*a capability
to wage war. Commenting that ’comment is unnecessary,*1 it
compared four headlines;
’Preach Alrmaa Brings Bom His Eighth German 
Aeroplane,* ’Entire 8. s. Aero Squadron Con­
sisting of Bight Aeroplanes to Go to Mexico,0 
*12,000 0. 3* Troops Beady for Mexican 
Expedition,0 sand “Carranxa Orders 25,000 
Troops to the Border."37
The Aero Club of America and its president, Alan 8. Hawley, 
on March 14, 1916, demanded ’an immediate appropriation of one 
million dollars . . •* for aircraft and equipment. 3® In an air- 
preparednoas campaign that had begun previous to the expedition, 
the air enthusiasts noted that European air forces possessed
SSfelegram, Hewton B. Baker to Aero Club of America, 
in *0.S. Forces Utterly Unprepared - and Possibilities 
Underestimated,* Elvina. April 1916, p. 101.
36felegram, S. Sober to Aero Club of America, in ®A 
Million Dollars Asked to Save lives of 10,000 American 
Soldiers,® Aerial Age .Weekly. Harch 27, 1916, p» 54.
3?®The irony of It,® Aerial Age Weekly. March 20, 1916, 
p. 9.
38felegrs®, Aero dub of America to President Wilson, 
Secretary Baker, Bepreeentatlve John J. Fitagerald, 
Bepresentative James Hay, Senator George B. Chamberlain, 
and other officials, March 14, 1916, in "Aero dub Aske 
®1,00G,OOO for Aeronautical Equipment,® Plying. April 1916,
p. 101.
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three aircraft for ©very aviator ami the United states aerial, 
force could barely furnish one aircraft per “ « . * aviator 
now at the Mexican border. • • .*39 Hawley and hie associates 
felt that at least four aero squadrons Mare the minimum Mexican 
campaign requirement. Shay volunteered to furnish fifty civi­
lian aviators especially trained for the harder conditions by 
Carranza's former chief pilot. Bonney. These men and 100 high 
performance aircraft would in Hawley's words. • . . . round up 
Villa and his band in a very short time. • •
Hawley's campaign was not reoeived favorably by the War 
Department, the telegram to the President, secretary of War. 
and the Congressional leaders proffering an augmentation of 
the military air arm by civilians created numerous memoranda. 
Brigadier General Soriven, Chief signal Officer, rebuffed the 
patriotic offer by stating that military service could only 
be furnished by regulars, militia, or volunteers who 'may be 
called out by the President* under the existing laws. This 
statement was not totally correct as the First Aero Squadron 
had a civilian mechanic, the expedition had hired civilian 
drivers, and funston, on March 83, 1918, in recognition of the 
pilot shortage had, at the time, suggested the immediate employ­
ment of civilian aviators.1®-
*®Wesiey Phillips Hewton, "Aviation in the delations of the 
United States and Latin America 1918-1929* (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Alabama, 1964}, p. 45.
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Tim uncomfortable pressures, brought by the Aero Club of 
America on the Mar Department continued. On March 23, 1916, 
Hawley wired President Wilson that "every aeroplane is worth 
1000 soldiers , . and therefore "t* protect the lives of 
thousands * ♦ »» the Club offered two high powered maohines 
as well as nineteen trained aviators.In addition, the Club 
had arranged for the training of militia officers in thirteen 
states all * . . . available for service in a short time, 
forming a valuable reserve.
Secretary of Mar Baker acknowledged the deficiencies of 
the Aviation section and the need for aerial reserves to the 
Club on March 23, 1916. He stated his appreciation of the 
Club's intense interest in improving the army effectiveness; 
however, -with due consideration by both himself and General 
Sorlven, the proffered aircraft were refused. Baker further 
stated that the creating of the Air Service had been *. » » 
as rapid and effective as the provisions of Congress have 
permitted.
The hue and ory for an effective aerial service spread 
across the nations through the newspapers of the United States.
^2Telegram, Alan 8. Hawley to President Wilson, Harch 23, 
1916, in "Club Offers Two 110,000 Aeroplanes to Government," 
Firing. April 1916, p. 103.
^Telegram, Baker to Hawley, March 23, 1916, in Hewten, 
"Aviation in the Halations of the United states and Latin 
America 1916-1929," P. 66.
Editorials promoting military flying appeared in Mew Xork, 
Chicago, Savannah, Boston, Philadelphia and other cities.
They denounced the "neglect* and "national shame" of aerial 
readiness. Some editorials openly stated that positive oorreo- 
tive action could he achieved by "new faces in Congress.
Congress was slow to reset to changes, especially when it 
came to appropriating funds for new military toys still con­
sidered experimental. They had a continuous record of pro­
viding only minimum appropriations for the dir service* The 
psu£ lack of funds was due in part to an isolationist attitude, 
in part to War Department tradition and in part to the Con­
gressional ignorance of the real value of air power. Begardless 
of the onset ratio of each cause the damaging effect of in- 
sufflcient funds had become obvious to the nation.^
On March 27, 1916, Congress began to react to the pressures 
of the press, the Aero dub and the situation in Mexico. Al­
though the legislatures considered Hawley and his associates 
" . . . high-minded, honest, patriotic, Intelligent /aerial/ 
faddists . . .  extreme in their eriiieiest and looking in infor­
mation," it could no longer brush aside the severe need for
^5«a Pew of the Many Editorials That Have Appeared in 
the Press Condemning Aerial anpreparedness," giving.
April, 1916, pp. 106, 107, 137, 136.
^Mew fork.Times. April A, 1916, p. 12, o.s,, Congress, 
House, Representative Bonnet speaking for Bill H.l. 13768, 
6Ath Cong., 1st seas., March 28, 1916, Congressional 
Beogrd. Vol. bill, p. 5018, and goulot
preparedness funds.47 The United states Army was In Mexico, 
out of funds and oat of equipment, the expedition had begun 
to flounder and the American public was beginning to realise 
the nation's lack of military capability. United States' 
private investments wore at risk, and there was still a sin­
cere desire to punish Villa for his villainy* In reaction to 
these, and other' causes, an urgent Deficiency Mil was intro­
duced, Harch 27, 1916. The Bill m s  rapidly debated and passed 
through the House of Bepresentatives by March 28, 1916.48
Secretary of War Baker, well aware of the mediate needs 
of Pershing, authorised an expenditure of 80,000 dollars for 
the purchase of eight new aircraft, Pour steel 'battleplanes 
were ordered from the sturtevant Aeroplane company, Jamaica 
Plains, Massachusetts! and four Curtiss B-2 aircraft were 
ordered from the Curtiss Corporation at Buffalo, Mew fork. All 
aircraft were to be equipped with 140 to 150 horsepower engines 
and be adopted for Mexican use. The machines, to be delivered 
in thirty days, would undergo suitability tests prior to their 
delivery to the bonder,^
4?y.s.. Congress, Mouse, Representative Fitzgerald reported 
the bill to supply urgent deficiencies for the Military Estab­
lishment (H.R. 13768), 64th Cong., 1st seas., March 27, 191?, 
Congressional Beoord. Vol. bill, p. 4933{ Representative 
Fitzgerald discussing H.a. 13768, 64th Cong., 1st sees*, March 
28, 1916, Congressional Record. Vol. bill, p. 5019, and a 
survey of Congressional Actios 1912 to 1916 in Congressional 
Record.
48lbld., pp. 4933. 5017-5023, The House voted 374 to 1, 
with 59 members absent in favor of the Bill M. B. 13768.
49*sturtevant Aeroplanes for General Pershing,* Aerial
On March 31, 1916, in response to the country's needs 
Congress passed the urgent Deficiencies Bill for the Military 
Establishment. The Bill appropriated 609,000 dollars of which 
500,000 dollars were allocated for • , , , the purchase, main­
tenance, operation and re p a ir of air ships and other aerial 
machines and accessories of the aviation section. * , ,*50 
This sum, an emergency fund, was the largest even appropriated, 
at the time, for the Army Air service.51
Immediate steps were initiated by the Chief Signal Officer 
to transform the funds into military materials. A war Depart­
ment Aviation Section Advisory and inspection Board was formed 
'to test aircraft and inspect factories. Consisting of 
lieutenants Milling and Byron Q. Jones, Captain Clark, and 
supporting civilian consultants, it met to select a suitable 
aircraft for the Mexican campaign. One of its first actions 
was to dispatch a telegram to Foulois requesting his recommen­
dations for aircraft specifications.52
Atce Weekly. April 24, 1916, p. 193} and "Mere Acres and 
larger 'Engines for the Mexican Campaign.” Aerial Axe weekly. 
April 10, 1916, p. 116. '  *******
5°u.S., Statutes at Large. Vol. XXXIX, pt. 1 (December 1915 
- March 1917), "Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations for the 
Military Establishment,* March 31, 1916, eh. 56, p. 45,
5lsep©rt of the secretary of War, la U.S., War Department, 
Annual Reportb I916. Vol. l (Washington B.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1916), p. 26, hereafter cited as 
Reports 1916.
521bid.. and 'Baker Talks," Aerial Age Weekly. April 1?, 1916, 
p. 14IT
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Secretary of Mar Baker, with Congress* deficiency Bill 
passed, an aviation board, appointed, and new aircraft ordered} 
happily informed Hawley and his associates that their services 
were not really needed. He wrote "the Department . . .  appre. 
ciatlve/neas7 of your kind /past/ offer /Tor aircraft/, tot 
. . .  Congress has appropriated the sum of 1500,000 for avia* 
tion purposed, which makes it unnecessary . . . to take ad*
■*** **.*■«. -—— —u. -w-^ - -jc ...... &as<2 ^aa j a  ate IS 1 3or four Kinu-noss* - ^
As the long awaited Congressional action fomented, and 
began to he implemented, a realistic reappraisal of the First 
Aero Squadron* e capabilities was being formulated by Foulois.
He realized that with his present equipment it was impossible 
to continue all operations. A suitable support plan had to 
be developed presented to Pershing and if accepted, followed, 
Foulois developed four alternative sohemes, each * , . . for 
the most effective use of the 1st Aero Squadron, with its pre­
sent equipment of six low powered airplanes.o5^
Flan 1 had a stated objective of " . . . maintain/Ing/ aero 
communications between Columbus, New Mexico, Casas Grandee,
El Valle and Namiquipa.•55 Foulois proposed to statical two 
JH2* a at El Valle with support personnel and equipment. She
53*The Ksxiean situation," Aerial Asa Meekly. April 17, 1916,
p. 161*
5%enoraadutt Fori Chief of Staff, Punitive Expedition, 
u, s. Army, Harsh 30, 1916, "First Aero Beport," p. 3.
55ibld.
93
remaining aircraft wer© to stay at Casas Grandee. Routes would 
be operated daily by single flights, with overnight stops be­
tween SI Valle and Basniquipa; Casas Grandes and Columbus; and 
Casas Grandee and Kamiquipa, She * * * * plan contemplat/ed/ 
the maximum use of all aviators and all aeroplanes . . tout, 
it did not provide a communications network, east, south or 
west of Hamiquipa, 36
Plan IX was designed to provide General Pershing aerial 
communications between Casas Grandee, El vsile, tfessiqulpa and 
points south of 8amiquipa, By utilising available radio­
telegraph, motorcycles, and other surface transportation for 
the Casas Grandes, El Valle Hah, foulois surmised the entire 
squadron could be transferred to the forward headquarters at 
Hamiqulpa, Refueling points would be established at all bases, 
including a forward station somewhere -south of Kaffiiquipa.57
Han 1X1 relied upon an effective radio sad telegraph link ' 
between saaiquipa and Casas Grandee, dll aircraft would be 
concentrated at Eamlquipa to provide forward, communications 
between Pershing and his advancing troops; only in an emer­
gency would aircraft too used for support communications, this 
plan provided the maximum support for field operations and the 
minimum communications support for logistical and support , 
facilities.^8
Plan XV, the final plan, was to toe employed in case a tao- 
56ibld. 5?xbld.. p. 4. 58lMd,
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tleal contingency arose. It employed the JM2,a for their 
original purpose: observation, and reconnalssanoe of the enemy.
Is it. Foulois recommended that if contact with Pancho Villa 
was established by the expedition's forces, all aircraft 
should be concentrated at the front for Immediate service*59 
In proposing the alternative available. Foulois reminded 
General Pershing that all plans depended entirely on aircraft 
that • » • * at any day /oould7 be placed out of commission 
as unfit and too dangerous for further field service.*^® He 
urged that at least ten new. high powered, machines be pur­
chased and with these the Squadron would increase its * * . . 
effectiveness to this expedition at least five hundred per­
cent.*^
On April 1, 1916. Pershing approved Plan III, and ordered 
that it be implemented.
the Mexican punitive expedition was colly fifteen days old 
as March 1916, ended. Over 4000 American troops had penetrated 
nearly 500 miles into Mexico. None had seen Villa, and less 
than 10 peroent had identified a Villieta, and this only on 
one oecaslon. The men's rations were low, end most were foraging 
off the earth or dipping into personal funds to support their
59ibid.
60ibld.
6*xbia.
First Aero deport,* p. 5,
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needs.®3
the aviation activity, only in the field ten days, had 
been folly taxed and Its equipment ton paying the price. Out 
of eight original aircraft, six remained. At times only 'too 
of these were operative* Pershing, unable to control his. 
forces by radio, telegraph, or car had resorted 'to- an aerial 
communication lints, but it too tats -rapidly failing*®4
Congress and the nation had cheered when the pursuit of 
the villain Villa was first announced, but both failed to 
recognise the inability of America*s military to capture even 
one Mexican hostile. However, less than sixteen days had 
elapsed before the weaknesses of the military establishment 
"be&sB© &ppa2P«3ntj fcte® reacted* iti#
first solid proof of this, the urgent Deficiency Bill of 
March 31, 1916.
63orlan&o c. Troxel, •’The Tenth Cavalry in Mexico," She 
Cavalry.Journal. October 1919, pp. 201*203* Captain' Troxel 
states that his unit ate their last issued rations on the 
day they deployed to the field, March 20, 1916* Each 
officer used his personal funis to support the expedition 
as it foraged off the countryside* Colonel Brown issued 
his own personal cheeks for a total sum of 1,680 dollars 
in order to purchase food and forage for his command*
6%ew fork Times. March 28, 1916, p. 2* Secretary of Mar 
Baker announced, March 27, 1916, that only two aircraft 
were serviceable as of that .date*
CHAPTSB VII
STALEMATE in MEXICO
General Pershing*s expedition halted, then stagnated in 
April 1916. Although Villa** hiding plaoe was net unoovered, 
Pershing was forced to order a partial withdrawal and con­
solidation of the expedition. By the- end of the aonth, the 
operations in Mexico resembled a gigantic field maneuver aore 
than an active pursuit. *■ April 1916 was also a decisive month 
for the First Aero Squadron: it collapsed completely and
ceased all operational support.2
After the tattle at Guerrero, March 29, 1916, Villa*e 
army scattered. Stories aad rumors were widespread as to his 
actual location, aad at times he was reported to be in several 
places simultaneously.3
Pershing, acting on reliable information, ordered Major 
Tompkins, at Mamiquipa, to search the arse west of Santa Ana 
for villa while Major Howse, at Geronlmo, scouted the mountains 
to hie east. Pershing, meanwhile, relocated his headquarters 
to Bachinva. On April 1, 1916, both offieers reported to
iToultnln, With Pershing in Mexico, p. 113.
2*Pershing Report,* p. 23; and *Fouloia Report,* p. 8.
3«Pershing Heport,* p. 17.
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Pershing with completely negative reports. Villa had apparently 
vanished} Pershing resumed his first strategy! the campaign, 
of parallel columns toward the south.^
Hajor Tompkins* column in the center served as the point, 
colonel Brown was placed the furthest east* Having a day*a 
march behind Tompkins, he and hie men provided a left rear 
guard. Hajor Howze furnished a similar role as the right rear 
guard to the west* All three forces were expected to converge 
near the Chlhuahua-Durango border.5
Colonel Allen*a forces, three days to the rear, formed 
the rear guard. He was directed, April 8, 1916, to move from 
Kamiqulpa, southwest via SI Osa, in an attempt to out Villa* a 
path before h® crossed into Durango, Although Allen*s men 
encountered sniper fire, they uncovered no real Information.
By April 12, 1916, they rejoined Pershing at Satevo.6
Colonel Doflfl was given the task of sealing off the western 
mountain trails. Dodd*B patrols deployed on a line from 
Provideneia and Hlnaea watched the mountain passes carefully 
and recorded frequent clashes with the Insurgents, to April 3, 
1916, Dodd decided to move hie headquarters to Hinaca in order 
to extend his operations nearer to Guerrero. The local Mexican 
commander, General Xaiis Herrera, protested that the American
*» m a .
SitoMU. Tompkins 
i Pershing In Hex:
Villa, p. 120: and Toulmin.
SfSfSfc.
Pershing aeport," p. 20.
9®
patrols would interfere with Carranaista plans, eodd appealed 
to Pershing for diplomatic assistance. The appeal was success­
ful, and Dodd continued his operations from the new location,?
the first Aero Squadron* a activities the first six days 
of April were quite normal. Between April 1 and April A, 1916, 
forty-three mail or dispatch flights were flown through rain, 
hail-and snow storms. Several times, when the weather was 
too severe for visual flight, the aireraft were foroed to 
land and wait out the storms.®
On April 5, 1916, the Squadron moved to San Garonlao.
The tracks and maintenance personnel went direct, while the 
aviators flew sorties intransit. 'Typical was the -mission 
flown hy Lieutenant Bargee and Captain Foulois. Tasked with 
locating Brown's column for Pershing, the fliers headed toward 
San .Antonio de los Arenalea. En route they spotted a paok 
train 'returning to San Geronimo. A landing was accomplished, 
and the officers inquired If the members of the peek train 
knew where Brown was. Fortunately they did, and Airplane A3 
was soon airborne and proceeding toward Cuoihulrioohlo Canyon.
A short time later, the aviators reported to Brown, secured 
the column commander's report for Pershing, and returned to 
the 01vision Headquarters,?
?lbld.. pp. 17, 20-21.
®April 1, 191® to April 5, 191®, "first Aero Beport,* p. 5. 
?April 5, 191®, "first Aero deport,* p. 5.
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On April 6, 1916, four such missions ware flown. One 
deliveredmovement orders 60 Brown* s column, who was ordered 
to protest the eastern edge of the search area# this mission 
resulted in the destruction of Airplane 44. the craft was 
totally destroyed in a landing: those pants still usable
were salvaged, the remaining air frame was condemned and 
destroyed— only five airplanes remained.10
Along with the hasards of flying, the first Aero Squadron 
was also encountering the ill-will of the Mexican populace.
On April ?, 1916, Dargue and Fouloia, in Airplane 43, flew 
from San oeronimo to Chihuahua City carrying dispatches to 
Marion H. Letcher, the American counsel, from General Pershing. 
The papers obviously had a greater than normal urgency, as 
Captain Dodd and Lieutenant Car berry, in Airplane 45, departed 
at the same time with a duplicate set of dispatches and an 
identical mission, in addition to serving as a courier 
fouloia was detailed to arrange for the local purchase and 
transportation of nssessary supplies for those troopers 
operating north of farfal#11
Both aircraft arrived at Chihuahua City concurrently*
By pre-arrangement, Airplane 43 landed on the south side of 
the city, aad Airplane 45 on the north side* ■ Poulois gathered
l®Aprll 6, 1916, “First Aero Seport,■ p. 6,
^Aprll 7, 1916, “First Aero Eeport,* p. 6,
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his documents, climbed out of the rear cockpit, and instructed 
Bargue to fly to the north side of town, Join Barberry, and 
'wait for his return* Poulois then departed for the Consulate. 
As Dodd began his take-off roll, four mounted ruralos. a half 
mile distant, began to fire at M m  and the -aircraft* Fouleis, 
still within earshot, heard the gunfire. He reversed his 
direction, quickly located the ruralea and attempted to stop 
their activity. - Hie ruralee. distracted by Poulois* actions 
did stop shooting, but in the process, they arrested Poulois 
and marched hist to the local jail. 4 crowd of several hun­
dred m m  and hoys, attracted by the disturbance, soon gathered 
and formed an escort for the Jail hound procession* In the 
confusion enroute to detention, Poulois successfully attracted 
the attention of an American bystander* Hie aviator requested 
the m m  to inform Consul Letcher of his plight, as well as the 
possibility of a similar precarious situation on the north 
side of town where Dodd, Barberry and Dargue wore with the
aircraft.12
Once at the Jail, Captain Poulois succeeded, after con­
siderable delay, in contacting Colonel Miranda, Chief of staff 
to General Gutierrez, Me Military’ Governor of Chihuahua. 
Miranda, when appraised of the situation, took Poulois to 
Gutierrez, who swiftly ordered the aviator's release. Poulois 
was still apprehensive about the real possibility of the two
101.
aircraft toeing damaged* Me requested the services of some 
Hexican soldiers as aircraft security guards. Gutlerre2 agreed 
to arrange this. Poulois, accompanied toy Miranda, then de­
parted to locate the other aviators, tips® reaching the north 
landing site,.only Dargue and Airplane **3 were in sight.13 
Dargue reported that he had landed along side Airplane 
as directed. Captain Dodd left shortly after that, hound 
for the Consulate with the duplicate dispatches. The aircraft 
rapidly became the focal point for first a curious .gathering, 
which soon transformed into a menacing crowd of peasants, 
soldiers, and Mexican army officers. As the mob increased 
in size, it became more antagonistic and began to make aggres­
sive moves. Insults, at first, were the crowd's only weapons, 
tout in a short time the aviators found members of the angry 
mob extracting bolts and nuts, or turning teles in the linen 
fabric with cigarettes* Airplane 03 was slashed in several 
places. Under the circumstances, it did not take Dargue nor 
Cartoorry a great about of time to realise that if they re­
mained they would soon have two wrecked JM2*s.^
The safest, and therefore best decision, was to fly the 
aircraft to the smelter location of the American Smelter and 
Refining Company six miles away, Carberry fired up and departed 
without further difficulty. The crowd, seeing their prey about 
to vanish, showered Dargue with stones aa he taxied out and
13lbid. Iblbld.
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made hi® ta k e -o ff r o l l .  He was soon a irb o rn e , b u t had. flow n  
o n ly  a sh o rt d is tance  when the  top se c tio n  o f t ils  c r a f t1® 
fuse lage , o b v iou s ly  m issing a few b o lt® , fle w  o f f  and h it  the 
v e r tic a l s ta b iliz e r . He was fo rced  to  make an emergency land ­
in g  s t i l l  w ith in  s ig h t o f the  mob. Be fo rtu n a te ly  was ab le  
to  stand o f f  the crowd, and n e ith e r he nor A irp la n e  kj su ffe re d  
fu rth e r damage#
th e  day*® excitem ent was ove r, b u t work remained to  be 
done. For the rem ainder o f the  day. Captains P ou lo is and Dodd 
and Consul ba tche r arranged fo r  the tro o p  su pp lies  w h ile  
Carberry and Dargue repaired tee damaged Airplane
On A p r il 8 , 1918, the  av ia to r®  were again a irb o rn e * They 
a rriv e d  back a t San Oeronimo lu s t in  tim e to  re ce ive  the n o ti­
f ic a tio n  o f another move, to  San A nton io  de le a  A renales. 
P ershing1 s army was pushing south , and the headquarters and 
it s  so le  ra p id  source o f communications had to  tra v e l w ith  i t .  
On A p r il 10, 1918, two reconnaissance f lig h ts  scoured the area 
f i f t y  m iles south o f the  home base. Sot a s in g le  V lllis ta  
was seen.l?
Pershing moved hi® headquarter® aga in , fh ls  tim e to  
Satevo* The A ir  S e rv ice , h is  autom obile and h is  personal s ta ff 
a lso  made the move, A p r il 10, 1916,*®
*5ibia. l^iMd.
l? A p r il 8, 1918 to  A p r il 11, 1918, • F ir s t Aero B eport,*  p. 8.
l® A p ril ID , 1918, • F ir s t Aero B e p o rt,1* pp. 6 -? .
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The next toy's flying activities, the first from satevo, 
resulted la ten sorties, almost all courier missions between 
the eolumns and rear depot areas. On one of these, lieutenants 
Dargue and Gorrell established an unofficial distance record, 
in Airplane 43, they flew from the front (San Antonio de los 
Arenales) to Columbus, Mew Mexico, a distance of 315 miles, 
with just a single fueling stop.1?
lieutenant Chapman, on a reconnaissance mission to Santa 
Rosalia, had a more ominous experience. Upon landing Airplane 
53 at Santa Rosalia, Chapman disembarked from the aircraft.
He was Immediately placed under arrest by Carranzista troops 
and escorted to the local garrison commander. During his 
very short internment, the Mexicans stripped his aircraft of 
his field glasses, flying goggles, and *considerable" ammuni­
tion.®®
Chapman was not the only member of the Squadron to have 
trouble with the 3*ocal people, April 11, 1916. The Squadron 
truck train arrived at Satevo at 11:00 p.m. They reported 
encountering villista sniping fifteen miles north of Satevo. 
Fortunately, there were no casualties.2^
Major Hawse, camped near San Jose del Sltlo, was also ex­
periencing difficulties with the Mexican population. On
l^April 11, 1916, "First Aero Report,» p. ?: and "The 
Mexican Situation," Aerial Age Weekly. April 20, 1916, p. 193.
®®April 11, 1916, "First Aero Report," p. 7.
21Ibld.
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April 10, 1916# he sent a detachment to Santa Cruz de Herrera. 
The troop was under fire several times during the day* At 
about 5*30 p.m. they case under an active attack near la Joya 
do Herrera. The troopers easily contained their adversary, 
ate soon dispensed the bandit force# killing its commander 
in the process. Before daylight, April 11, 1916* Howze'e 
detachment 'had arrived ate surrounded Santa Cruz do Herrera.
The Mexicans within sensed an ambush* ate attempted to escape* 
In tee darkness it was impossible to tell who was fleeing* 
bat tee Americans fired anyway* A Carranzista lieutenant ate 
sdidier wore the only possible enemy deate* and Hows©, although 
he tried, was unable to identify the force that had fled*22 
Howze* a main column, weary from two days rapid march, 
was given a rest ate a detachment was seat into tows to se­
cure supplies* On tea way they passed a ranch house abustlo 
teth unusual activity. The detachment, intent on its task, 
passed by without investigating. It was later thought Villa 
m s  hiding there. He was not, but he was in tee mountain above, 
secure in his oave ate within earshot of camping troopers.
Hows©'s actios in this area was probably tee closest Villa 
earn® to being captured by the expedition.2?
Bowse*a attack had killed only Carranzlstaa. He, as well 
as tee other field commanders, was finding more ate more
22*Porshlng Report,® p. 19; ate Tompkins, Chasing Villa. 
p. 160.
&3ltold*. ate Carranza, *&a Expedieion Punitive,® pp. 291-294.
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hostility as the expedition advanced. The re a l feeling o f 
antagonism of the Carranza government toward the  U nited S tates* 
in va s io n  o f Mexico was gradually coming o u t in  the opea*^
Instead  o f h e lp , the .natives p e rs is te d  In  a s s is tin g  Villa 
by fu rn is h in g  Fershing*a men m islead ing  in te lllg e n o e . Further, 
it became q u ite  e v iden t th a t the Mexican peasants, a lthough 
awed by American methods, thorough ly resented th e ir  presence# 
m m  those opposed to  V illa  had no sympathy fo r  the •Gringos,* 
th e re fo re  a id  from  tee Carranxiebas was unlikely*^
The expedition was approaching tee  end o f i t s  te th e r* 
Pershing* a lin e s  o f communication and supply were ve ry nearly 
over-extended• The tro op e rs  were fo rag in g ' o f f  o f tee country. 26 
I t  was q u ite  apparent th a t te e  so le  purpose of Carranza and 
h is  army was to  d e to u r, hamper, and eventually fo rc e  tee with­
drawal o f tee American army* Eventual n o rth e rn  re tre a t was a 
c e rta in ty , all th a t was needed was an incident to fo rc e  i t *  
fa rm ! fu rn ish e d  tee in c id e n t.
On A p r il 7 , 1916, M ajor Tompkins, camped a t Santa E o ss lia , 
considered h is  s itu a tio n . E ls fla n k s  and re a r were blocked by 
2000 to  3000 C arraaz la tas. S cattered 50 to  100 m iles  south ,
Z^ Telegraun, Pershing to Funston, May 1, 1916, Foreign 
Relations 1916. p. 539.
25Telegram, Pershing to  Funston, April 1?, 1916, Foreign 
Relations 1916. pp. 521-522.
26Telegram, Pershing to Funston, April 15, 1916, Foreign
I^ latlohd-.-ili8* P. 526*
on his front, were at least 300 Vililstas. He needed forage 
for hie horeee, ration* for hie sen, and hie nlselon required 
that he never the .area to the- south, as well as offset a 
reteesvoua with Colonel Brown* Tompkins considered the alter­
natives, aad decided to head for Parrel, purchase supplies, 
and then move thirty miles further southwest of farrai and 
await orders.2?
On April 12, 1916, at 11:45 p.m. the command arrived at 
Farrali a large town with a population of 20,000, and a "good 
club.* Tompkins and his offleers assumed they could get 
• . . . hot baths . . . , long cool drinks and . . . good 
food,* as well as replenish troop supplies, ate obtain rail­
road transportation for movement further south.*® however, no 
officials awaited to welcome the Americans, instate, Tompkins 
ted to gala permission from the city guard to enter* Accom­
panied by a Carranaista soldier, Tompkins ate his men were 
guided to General Ismael ioxaao's headquarters, a two-story 
building note the center of town* Tompkins entered, ate the 
troopers formed ranks outside tho building*2?
Hie Mexican .general was not pleased to have American cav­
alry in his city. He asked Tompkins to leave Parral, but pro­
mised to arrange for the purchase of fodder ate. provisions for
2?fowpkins, Chasing Villa, p. 133* 
SSltold*. p. 139.
the purchase of fodder and provisions for the Americans through 
a local merchant, Hr* Scott. Scott, described by Lozano as 
American, appeared to be a Mexican and spoke English with a 
heavy accent* After the business was completed, Lozano delayed 
an hour before he was ready to take Tompkins to a designated 
camp site.3® ,
While the two officers conferred an angry crowd had 
gathered in the street* By the time the conference ended 
cries of 8Viva Villa." "Viva Mexico.* and "Baertan lea Orlaaoel” 
were being shouted. Tompkins ordered an immediate withdrawal 
aai the column moved out.31
The populace was spurred on by a "Qerman* looking man with 
a "Van Dyke beard," later identified as the German Counsel, 
Edward Cook, Eliza Griense, a member of one of the leading 
families in Parrai, was in the front of the mass that followed 
the troop's hasty march, when they reached the edge of town. 
Hiss Grlensa raised a Hauser rifle she had borrowed from a 
Head can soldier, and begun to fire it. The crowd surged 
through and around the troopers* ranks, an! succeeded in_ 
cutting off Tompkins, who was riding at the rear, and 
threatened him. Tompkins in an attempt to humor the riled 
citizens shouted "Viva V i l l a . *32
3°Ibld.
311bid., and "Attack on Our Cavalry at farral,* The 
CavalryJournal. Hovember, December 1916, p. 231*
32carranza, "ha Escpedioion funitiva," p. 115} Tompkins,
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General Lozano had been at the head of the column. Me 
was at first ignorant of the situation at the rear. Once the 
gun fire began he must have heard the report* hut he did not 
Investigate*' Instead he continued to lead the column across 
the railroad track and through a gap between two knolls into 
a hollow** Tompkins, afraid of an ambush established a rear 
guard a kilometer outside of tom* under lieutenant Clarence 
lininger, covered his flank by placing a troop on the western 
knoll* and notified Insane that the townspeople were shooting 
at him and his men* losano disclaimed ail responsibility for 
the situation* but had his staff return to tom. to try to calm 
the populace* Tompkins* certain bozano had treachery in his 
head, considered shooting the Mexican general on the spot* but 
* . . • let hi® go as his pistol was still in his bolt***33 
Tompkins* generosity was probably influenced by the large group 
of Mexican soldiers* displaying a Mexican flag* that had gathered 
on a hill 800 yards to the south* losano quickly returned to 
tom* aad sent a message to Tompkins requesting his immediate 
withdrawal as " • , « he could control 'neither the soldiers nor 
the people.*3^ Tompkins agreed to move north after the supplies
Chasing Villa, p. 135} Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
April l|, l5l|, forMiBB, 8elaMoai_..|.m% P. 520} "Pershing 
Beport.-* pp. 21-23} and Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
April 16, 1916, Foreign Relations 1916. p. 526.
33ibld.. and Tompkins, Chasing 9111a, p. 138,
3% bid., and "The Attack on (Ah* Cavalry at Parral,® 
p. 251*
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he had ordered were delivered.35
Tompkins seem changed his mind. In the fees of hostile 
action, 20,000 enraged Mexicans, BQQ Mexican soldiers, and gun­
fire, a retreat northward was the only prudent course. A 
group of Mexican soldiers attempted to flank the Americans on 
the left, Tompkins stood, up, the Mexicans fired missing the 
Major, hut killed Sergeant Jay Biokley and wounded a corporal 
and private. At 1*30 p.m., Tompkins ordered a hasty with­
drawal to Santa Crus de Villegas, a small village, that could 
he easily defended by the American cavalry unit.36
The fifteen mile ride to the north was characterized by 
sporadic fire fights and the continual effort by mounted 
Mexicans to out flank the retreating cavalry men. The able 
troopers suecesafully negated every move, and by 9:00 p.m. 
arrived safely in the small village. Defensive positions were 
secured, and the wait for reinforcements began.3?
During the retreat, Tompkins had dispatched couriers to 
Colonel Brown informing his senior officer of his precarious 
position. By ?$06 p.m., members of Brown's column begem 
arriving at Santa Cruz de Villegas. The next day, April 13, 
1916, Allen arrived. Two days later Major Howze, also aware
35Tempklns, Chasing Villa, p. 138.
36rdegram, Pershing to funston, April 15, 1916, foreign 
Halations l916. p. 520; "Pershing Beport,* pp. 22-23;" 
and Tompkins, h^asJ^ ngi_BVi3L^ ja, p. 139.
37ibld.. pp. 139-182; Carranza, “La Kxpedieion Punitive,* 
p. Il6; and "Pershing Beport," p. 23.
of the sKlrmish, reported to Brown, and the troop strength at 
Santa Cam® swelled to 680 men.38 Howee, himself, had very 
nearly had a "Parral" five days earlier, April 8, 1916, when 
150 Carranzistas commanded by General Colvaeao had changed 
hie unit. Only by Major Howsse'e 8 . . . coolness « . • and 
splendid discipline fofj command was battle averted,839
The encounter at Parral resulted in two Americans dead, 
six wounded including Tompkins, and one man missing. Over 
forty Carranzistas were assumed dead and an unknown number 
wounded,86 The American expedition had reached its furthest 
point south.
While Tompkins, Brown* and Allen were advancing on Parral, 
Pershing had lost all contact with them. Me ordered the First 
Aero Squadron to contact them, but the reconnaissance missions 
on April 10 through April 13, 1916 failed to reveal the where­
abouts of the columns. On April 19, 1916, Pershing received 
the first news of the Parrel fight from Captain Foulois.81
38?elegram, Pershing to Funston, April 15, 1916,
Foreign delations 1916. p. 52; and Tompkins, Chasing 
Villa. P. 193.
39Telegram, Pershing to Funston, April 25, 1916,
Foreign Relational916. p. 530.
88fospkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 183-188, *Aita«k on 
Our Cavalry at Parral,* p. 253;- aad * Pershing Beport,*. 
p. 23*
8lfelegrams, Collector Cobb to the Secretary of state,
April 15, 1916, Foreign,Halations ,1916. pp. 519-520; 
and April 12, 1916, toApril lo,191c, "First Aero 
Beport,* p. 7,
Foulois and Lieutenant Carberry had been dispatched,
April 131 1916, to Chihuahua City with messages far the 
Consul* Pershing also detailed Poulois to query Marion h« 
Letcher for any late intelligence on developments in the 
field* She aviators landed on the outskirts of town, and 
Poulois walked to the Consulate* Upon his arrival he learned 
of the fight at Parral. Consul Letcher told him .ell the 
Mexican newspapers in. Chihuahua City had been shut down and 
that there was a great animosity for all foreigners in the 
city* fhe Mexicans had warned them all tfc leave.
the Consul gave Foulols an ultimatum for deliver to 
Pershing from General Gutierrez, the Miliary Governor of 
Chihuahu&--bh© American forces must withdraw at once I As it 
was unsafe for any foreigners to travel through the city,
Poulois remained at the consul until early the following 
morning* In the early darkness of April l*f, 1916, he returned 
to his aircraft, flew hack to Satevo, and delivered Gutierrez1 
ultimatum and the news of the Parral fight to General Pershing.^3 
Pershing immediately re-ordered Foulols hack to Chihuahua 
City, only this time by automobile, as all the aircraft were 
either airborne or grounded for maintenance* Foulols, accom­
panied by fourteen enlisted men in a one truck, one auto 
caravan, made his way to Chihuahua City* Once on the outskirts,
82app11 13, 1916, "First Aero Beport," p. ?j and 
"Foulols Record," p. 7.
H i
the vehicles asd the enlisted personnel Here hidden, and 
Poulois and M s  chauffeur, Corporal Arthur Weetermark, pro* 
seeded to the Consulate, delivered the dispatches and. without 
any difficulty returned to the waiting escort* She entire 
group returned to satevo, late 'that same evening. ****
fhe airborne portions of the First Aero Squadron were 
hating less success* Lieutenants Dargue and Gorrell, in Air­
plane A3, attempted to establish contact with Carranziota 
forces reported to he moving eastward along the lines of commu­
nications. the two aviators departed Columbus, dew Mexico, 
m &  flew the entire 315 mile route non-stop, fhey set a new 
record, hut failed to locate any hostile troop®. Lieutenant 
Bader, on a similar mission, flew southward toward Parral.
As well as locating Carranzistas, ho was directed to establish 
contact with Bowse*s column and inform M m  of the Parral en­
counter. Me succeeded in reaching the cavalrymen in the vici­
nity of QJltio, near the Durango State line, fhe terrain was 
extremely rough, and the aircraft, Airplane 52, was damaged upon 
landing, enable to make repairs, and in hostile country 100 
miles from the nearest aircraft maintenance facilities, Bader 
Joined Bowse and Airplane $2 m m  abandoned.45 onfortunafcely, 
the "news* Bader had was already possessed by Jiowse*^
AAjbiS.., and April 14, 1916, *First Aero Beport,» p. 7.
»5ibia.
**%o®pM»s, Chasing 9111a. p. 167.
Between April 15 April 20, 1916, th© eellvltlea ©f the 
first Aero Squadron degenerated# On April 14, 1916, few 
flights ifere mades One, hy Lieutenants Dargue and Oerrell 
was of 415 miles with only two enroute steps#' But, on the 
same day. Airplane 42 was cannibalized of Its lower wings in 
order to put Airplane 45 into flyahie condition* tfeui remainder 
of Airplane 42 was condemned and destroyed. **7 on April 16,
17, aid 18, 1916, the squadron was able to support only two 
courier flights per day. During this period, on April 16,
1916, the1 Division Headquarters aade its first move northward, 
back to Haniquipa. The following day, the first Aero Squadron 
followed it.**®
April 19, 1916, marked the squadron's last day of aotivity. 
Lieutenants Dargue and Willis were sent aloft in Airplane 43, 
on a reoonnaissanoe mission. They were briefed to soout the 
area between San Antonio de los Arenales and Chihuahua City 
as well as photograph all the approaches to Chihuahua City. 
Engine failure ended their photography. Dargue landed the 
aircraft in an area of rolling hills west of the city. In the
ensuing emergency crash landing, the machine was totally
destroyed, Willis was pinned under the wreckage, and sustained 
a severe scalp wound as well as bruises on his legs and ankles.
^April 15, 1915, "First Aero Beport,0 p. 8*
4®April 16, 1916, thru April 20, 1916,
"First Aero Report," p. 8.
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Dargue, in the front cockpit was uninjured, tie assisted his 
observer from the wreck, the two aviators gathered -their 
personal gear; burned the, airframe sod began the sixty-five 
mile walk to the nearest base, -San Antonio de las Arenales. 
Their only provisions for the walk across the desert were a 
days rations of cake, chocolate, bread, hardtack, and a pressed 
meat bar. Forty-five hours .and two mountain ranges later,- on 
April 21, 1916, they arrived in a weak, tot alive condition,
On April 23, 193-6, they proceeded by automobile to ftamiquipa, 
whore they delivered their reeonnalssanoe report to General 
Fershlng.69
During Dargue*s and Willis* ordeal, the First Aero 
Squadron had been ordered back to Columbus, dee Mexico. Of 
the- eight aircraft flown south- into old Mexico, only two, 
Airplanes 45 and 53, remained; and they were condemned as 
unsafe for further field service. These two old JK2*e were 
flown to- Columbus, and eventually destroyed* By April 22, 1916, 
all personnel of the First Aero Squadron were relocated in the 
United States; their service as the eyes, ears, and mouths of 
the expedition at an en&.^°
The entire character of the campaign changed after Faroe! •- 
the southern most advance of 'Pershing's forces m m  to a halt 
and a slow withdrawal northward was Initiated, the relations
J-
69fiew lark Times. April 26, 1916, p. 4 and April 19# 1916, 
"First Aero Heport,» p. 8.
S®Aprii 20, 1916, “first Aero asport,® p. 8.
between the Mexican government ana U e  government of the Unitea 
States had reached the point where the positioning of troops 
as far south as Parral was no longer practical. Although 
Colonel Brown, the Senior Qffloer at the Immediate front, was 
fully capable of controlling the local situation tactically, 
he m s  In no position to secure logistical support for the 
four columns. Their rapid, push southward had resulted in a 
thinly stretched line of communication and supply If© miles 
long, which reached bach to San Antonio de les Arenales.
These if used, could be subject to attach at any time.
Parahlng, well aware of the situation, dispatched M s  Chief 
of Staff, Colonel, DoHosey 0. Cabell, to Brown*s headquarters 
with orders to effect a northern withdrawal, if an investiga­
tion of existing conditions warranted it, Pershing had ended 
his campaign of columns,51
On April SI, 1916, the cavalry began the movement north­
ward. By hay 3, 1916, almost M l  the units of the Mexican 
punitive expedition were assembled in the area around San
51°Pershing Beport,* p. 23; ’Honograph,** p. IV-10;
TompMns, ■ Chasing Villa, pp. 1?0«1?1; and Extract, Pershing
to Puneton, April 15, 1916, foreign delations 1916. Although
Brown felt he had the situation in order, the Commander of 
Mexican forces at Parral Issued him an ultimatum, in writing, 
forbidding the further southward penetration of American 
troops. Circular Telegram, Secretary of State to all American 
Counsels in Mexico except those at Chihuahua City send Mexico 
City, April 18, 1916, mmAsm..JMMlpas tmi, p. §26, 
Indicators also began to arise, foretelling of future Mexican 
troop concentrations to force American withdrawal. Telegram,. 
Consul Letcher to the Secretary of State, April 17, 1916,
Antonio a® los Aramloa.32
Tompkins summed the results of the pursuit as:
It was a hot little campaign of loss than two 
weeks, essentially cavalry and typical of our 
cavalry campaigns against the Indians immedi­
ately following the Civil War. /no/ » « , 
will never see ^ another? one like Oils ■ » . . 
the airplane and the raio .have changed all 
that . . . . It was the last appearance of 
the Old Cavalry.53
cmmrn m u
mm mms a m  i m  m  cqwkbus
The return of the First Aero Squadron to Soluobua, Met#
Mexico, marked the end of mm adventure la the early history
of the Air Service, the squadron* 0 aocompli absents hod been
few, hut the experience gained was invaluable, the squadron*e
service to the expedition was filled with failures, hut the
message of failure was ultimately of greater importance than
success itself would have been.1'
The efforts of the aerial unit ware aptly described in
the June 1916, issue of flying:
... « "the little old last year's aeroplanes at 
Columbus Army base, have folded up their tired, wings 
and passed on to the land Where the Woodbine Twinetft, 
and from whence no traveler returns.0 At any rate 
these eight diminutive and. tattered flyers which did 
their damdest— and it was no slouch of « job— to 
locate the elusive Villa over the' dreary wastes of 
northern Mexico, have been dismantled and tenderly 
laid away ia their figurative coffins, the work of 
dismantling was not a prodigious task, for owing to 
a War Department's faith in methods pursued by our 
forefathers, these dinky planes, ultra modem in 
their day, had long ago outlived their usefulness, 
and it required test a few well-directed taps with a
lu.S,, War Department, historical Section, The Army War 
College, The Signal Corps and Air Jterylee * «*••»*» «** «»**
G0V&ragB8l%% r n 3 l « M &  vIT3,C®f pm
as Slgnal Cogps and Air service.. ~
.Washington, D.C.: 
hereafter cited
11?
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mallet and a turn or two with a acraw-driver to 
reduce thorn to a pile of junk.
But they had. done their work: bravely had they
the task set before them, a task beyond their puny,
-80 horsepower rated strength. They breasted the 
capricious winds, they dropped Into the numerous air 
pockets of the Chihuahua deserts; they drooped under 
the torrential rains of this district* and they 
soared late the arfctc air of the mountains* but 
never once did they say *1 quit* until physical 
disabilities forced them to* It was a noble work 
they did.*
their noble work had ended with the loss of all service* 
able aircraft and on April 88, 1918* the First Aero Squadron 
returned to Columbus, Hew Kexlco* to secure new airplanes.3 
three days earlier, April 19* 1918* four new Curtiss H8 
<JNt) aircraft had been delivered to the baae*^ these airplanes 
were not the ideal military machine for Rexiean border use* but 
they were the only aircraft immediately available from any menu* 
facturer, , Although the engine* an CHS# was rated as more effi­
cient than the older OX engine by lieutenant Byron H, Jones, a 
member of the Aircraft Advisory Board* It still produced only 
'90 horsepower. Captain Foulols did not consider the aircraft 
suitable for field use*5
'The four aircraft, Airplanes 8© through 63, were given 
rigorous practical field tests April 23, through April 29* 1916.
2«ho Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign) «X.# aa-lSE. 
June 19I6»: p* 196,
3April 20* 1916* “First Aero Beport," p, 8.
XblO «
98. p. 172{ and Hew forte times. April 26, 1916* p. 5
The aircraft were soon found inadequate for Mexican service, 
and declared unusable. The seven aviators Mho flew in the tests 
Mere unanimous In .stating that the aircraft should he used 
only if an extreme military emergency existed,^ On April 2?, 
1916, General Puneton declared to the War ©apartment that the 
aircraft were unsuitable far military service*? On Ray 9, 1916, 
a hoard consisting of Captain Dodd end lieutenants Dargue, 
Carberry, and Chapman recommended 'the. condemnation, of the re* 
eently purchased machines* They listed deficiencies of con­
trol, climbing ability, inadequate power, slow speed# Meat 
landing gear, and defective manufacture as the reasons for re­
jection. Captain Foulols agreed with the board's recommenda­
tion, but condemnation never occurred. The machines were 
shipped to San Diego, California, for alteration and additional 
service.^
On Kay 1, 1916, the squadron finally received aircraft 
more nearly suited, to the region, and the bash at hand: The
Curtiss B-2. The first shipment of two aircraft was rapidly 
followed by more, a d  by Hay 25, 1916, twelve* 160 horsepower, 
Curtiss B-2 aircraft sat on the flight line at Columbus, Hew 
Kexico,?
6#First Aero Beport,* p. 8; Hew forte Timas* April 26,
1916* p. 5j a d  jfalilgf, p. l?3#
?New Tortt Times* April 28, 1916, p. 5.
Qstudy 96. p. 1?3,
9*First Aero Beport,* p. 8.
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these airplanes were a bigger version of the M 2  aid A, 
and were “ . » . adapted to military purposes calling for fast 
scouting and endurance flights.. . »#1® Capable of carrying 
a pilot, observer, and 209 pounds of cargo, the machines had 
a maximum spaed of 90 miles per hour, and a seven hour curiae 
capacity,11
Although the fi-2 aircraft were a definite improvement, 
and passed the Aircraft Advisory and Inspection Boards* cri­
teria, the First Aero Squadron found them less than satisfac­
tory, Fedots noted in tils monthly report numerous and con­
stant aircraft problems. Curing hay, dime, and July, 1916, 
he called attention to defective construction, motor parts and 
propellers, the aircraft were delivered with shortages ranging 
from missing touch up paint to non-instailed compasses, brace 
wires and toll skids, the Curtiss Corporation products had 
a marked lack of craftsmanship, and each aircraft required a 
careful process of inspection, adjustment, modification, and 
repair prior to being placed in service.12
Jm total, on the twelve aircraft, eight-seven shortages, 
forty-four line defects, and twelve general deficiencies were 
noted by Captain Foulois. these Included the requirement for 
bigger radiators, modified breaker cams, new magneto switches,
IQcurtlas 1916. p. 6. Hlbld.
12*First Aero deport,* p. 6; and "Exhibit A, Shortages 
and Defective Equipment R-2 Aeroplanes,0 in "First Aero 
Seport,* /5 pages tot numbered?, hereafter cited as 
"Exhibit A." (typewritten.)
m
stronger ana safer truss wires, footbara for tetter ©iroraft 
oontr-ol, ana a complete replacement of all landing wheels*
®»e wheel replacement win A«a to too landing gear failures on 
separate «irplaaes;*3
Of Oil maintenance difficulties encountered by the First 
aero squadron, 'both la the Held ana at Columbus, sow iloxleo, 
the propeller probls® was the greatest, the excessively dry 
air along the Mexican border aggravated a propallor problem that 
feed initially appeared in April 1915*^
Oa April 8, 1913* Captain 0©dd had experienced one of the 
earliest propeller aalfuiiofeiona oa a flight froa son eiago to 
San Francisco, California, the propeller 0 . . . broke near 
the tip and snapped the propeller shaft just la frost of the 
eraakoase.*i5 Several mates later, June 26, 1915, Lieutenant 
Oorroll lost another propel!®** after a sovore engine vibration 
on a trip froa Sana Oiego to long Sooth, California. Both of 
these failures were considered isolated occurrences, until the 
unit arrived la Bexico.16 M r s ,  tender the harsh field caMl» 
tions, propellers that noroally could withstand hours of test 
stand operations, failed# shattering to pieces In almtm la
13lbld.
l^*First Aero Report#* p. 8; Aooaal «epogt,...191£, p. 26,
«>* gouiois.-AutoblogaaiaiV, p» W
15i,etter, Captain »odd to lieutenant Colonel 0©odi©r#
April 16, 1915* la ‘Coodier Court Partial.*
16SiSaLS« F» 139.
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the dry all** it was assumed by fflalntenan.ee experts that the 
glue was drying oat between the wood laminations*1? Therefore, 
a new squadron policy was instituted5 propellers were re* 
moved from the aircraft between flights and stored in a humidor 
in order to preserve the binding glue's viscosity*1®
la order to find a more practical solution, a propeller 
test site was established at Columbus, dew Mexico in late 
April 1916, Propellers were procured from aircraft manufac­
turers throughout the baited States and then subjected to 
rigorous testing* This procedure, although understandably 
slow due to makeshift test facilities, produced uniform re­
states practically all the propellers received were unserv­
iceable.1?
On June 29* 19X6, the Gurtise Aeroplane Company sent three 
propeller experts to Columbus, Sew Mexico, to establish a pro­
peller production shop* utilizing various types of wood, and 
a special toot stand created by first Aoro Squadron maintenance 
personnel, & more elaborate series of tests wore conducted. As 
a result, extensive data on propeller durability was gathered 
by the joint efforts of the contractor and military* The work 
progressed to a point that satisfactory propellers were being
^first Aero Report,* pp. 8-9; and "Foulole Beoord»B 
PP. 7-8* •
l?*0ifficulties of the Mexican Campaign," Aerial-
produced within a month,20
fbe mechanical and maintenance difficulties highlighted 
by such experiences of ih© First Aero Squadron pointed out 
immediate national need to develop manufacturing standards and 
minimum specifications in the m m  science of aeronautics*2* As 
a direct result of the inadequacies of the Mexican expedition, 
underscored by the growing awareness of the probability of the 
felted States*’ entry Into World War X* the first step toward 
the standardization of aircraft manufacture was taken. Worts- 
- lag arrangements, under the auspices of the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, were established between the Bureau 
of Standards, the American .Society of Aeronautic Engineers, 
aid the Society of Automobile Sngineers. She first meeting 
was held July IS, 1916, at the Bureau of standards, the 
failure of propellers m m  & major subject,22
fhe following day, July 19, 1916, a similar conference 
between manufacturers and military representatives set to 
discuss the standardization if aircraft manufacture, this
ftfrtWfrOir r|-n-HMrriflr^ttiinltrifr'T?rT,iu‘"l1f^r>*‘‘l>,‘^
20ibid, s pp. 26-27, *first Aero-
Bepori;,* p* f § ana * « m w  *!*
2iAnnual Beaort 1916* p. gf$ and "Foulois Becord,* p. 7.
First Steps in Standardization taken Under the 
Auspices of the War Department,” Aortal Age Weekly«
August 7, 1916, pp. 632-636; Howard S. Coffin, "baying 
the corner stone for a Great Industry," jftying. August 1916, 
p. 262; Annual Aepprt 191.6, p, 27; “War Department Anxious 
to Co-operate with Hanufaeiurera to increase standard 6f 
American Aeroplanes, Engines and Accessories,® Flying.
August 1916, pp. 283-28?; and Annual Heoort 1917. p p . 3-7*
meeting was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel George 0* Squier, 
the new chief of the Aviation Section who had replaced 
Colonel Sober, Kay 5. 1916* ieber had been reassigned as a 
result of the Goodier Court Martial Board findings. Aside 
from the general subject of standardization, the group con­
sidered motor overheat in the new 160 horsepower vx engine and 
propeller problems. It was suggested as an iterlm fix on the 
latter, that all wooden propellers be shipped and stored in 
metal boxes with felt seels; that propellers on parked air­
craft be covered with heavy canvas jackets lined with flannel; 
and, in the case of unscheduled landings, a woolen sock 
saturated with oil should be pulled over the blades. She 
ultimate solution, a metal propeller, was advocated. In a 
step toward that direction, a consulting engineer was author­
ised to assist any manufacturers who were attempting to produce 
the ultimate propellers.23 Prom these meager beginnings, which 
resulted from the aerial support furnished along the Mexican 
border, the Air service first began the application of field 
experience to manufacturer standardisation*
In addition to the purely engineering tests, the squadron 
performed operational testing of new equipment and techniques. 
The Brock automatic camera project was renewed. Photo flight 
lines were flown, and mosaic maps ” . . .  superior to the road
23*First Steps in Standardization Taken Under the 
Auspices of the war Department,* pp. 633-636.
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map » . were eonstruefced.21* The fine details of the terrain,
available on the photos, were transferred to standard maps in '
an early attempt to oreat© aeronautical navigational charts*25
By the end of May 1916, the squadron received its first
armament, hm%m machine guns, heaths, m &  bomhslghts,2^
lieutenant Gorrell, the Squadron Supply Officer, procured
twelve Lew is machine guns, mess represented nearly 50 per*
cent of the Army*a total lewis gun arsenal, The guns, each
weighing twenfcy*B©ven pounds, were to he hand held and fired
from the shoulder. She squadron also received 100, 3*inch
artillery shells, converted to bombs, The aircraft lacked
the means to lift, carry, or-.aim the projectiles, and it was
suggested that they could tea band dropped.Cornell later
wrote of this armamentj
They were sent not for use, but so that certain 
authorities in Washington could tell the nows* 
papers that we were equipped with bombs.2u
While the bulk of the squadron busied itself around Columbus* 
Hew Mexico, two sections, of aircraft were detached to Pershing* s 
headquarters- in Mexico, She first element returned bo Mexico, 
June 2*$, 1916, six. weeks after the entire squadron toad returned
26«p$,rgt Aero Report,1* p. 9* a%M&« '
26*lfo Aeroplanes for Mexican Campaign! 1X1,* p. 196.
2?Gorr«Il, pp. 26-25; and ‘aeeoHaaesa&ationa,0 ‘First Aero
8% @ s B *  p.,25. _
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to Columbus# The delay In returning to the field was mainly 
attributed 'to the .propeller shortage, although the processes 
of assembling and testing the sew aircraft certainly tots a 
factor.29 these two sections, plus an additional two, ordered 
to the field September 29, 1916, remained with General Pershing's 
forces until the expedition's final, withdrawal.3°
The difficulties that the squadron experienced in support­
ing General Pershing were a result of the unexpected environ­
ment encountered in Mexico, the .poor equipment possessed, and 
a lack of operational experience.
Early in 1915, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Beber, Chief of 
the Air Service, had contemplated the problems that the First 
Aero Squadron might encounter at San Antonio, Texas, a much 
sore satisfactory locale -of operations than the plateaus and 
mountains of northern Mexico. Beber wrote, * . . . there is 
no cover for the squadron /aireraft7, there are not enough 
officer/87 f°r the squadron, there are not enough men for the 
squadron, . . .  /aad7 there is not enough transportation . . .8 31 
The JN2 aircraft of the squadron were known to be overly 
dangerous. The serious lack of power of the OX engine and the 
control difficulties were correctly analyzed in the Fall of 
1915, but proper corrective actions were not taken before the
fork Times. June 25, 1916, p. 2.
30study 98, p. 176.
3lLetter, Lieutenant Colonel Beber to Captain Cowan 
January 7, 1915, in •Ooodier Court Martial.*
squadron n m  needed in the field*
The aircrew personal flying equipment was found equally 
inadequate. Reports of the expedition's progress frequently 
cited the numbed fingers and hands endured toy pilots in open 
cockpits, Captain Poulols made a special note of this in his 
final report.32 The flying uniform consisted normally of a foot* 
hall type helmet, gauntlets, a leather eoat, and goggles over 
a service uniform.33 it provided little protection from the 
elements. In Hay 1915* a hoard had been convened to consider 
aircraft instrumentation and personal equipment in order to 
achieve * . * « greater convenience and comfort . . .  £aa& totf 
Increase flying efficiency.*3** their findings .however were too 
late for the aviators of the Mexican expedition who ° .. . 
were constantly exposed to personal risk and. physical suffer­
ing . . .  .•33 zn addition, the cramped cockpits did not afford 
sufficient room for the survival equipment the aviator should 
have carried.36
These intrepid individuals found themselves and their air­
craft deployed in an environment they did not anticipate* In 
the one month of operation they faced a combination of the
■"Recommendations,» "First Aero Report," p. 10.
p. 27} and "Army Aviation Motes,* 
»klv. May 31, 1915, p. 257.
3%  bid.
35*Recommendations,“ ‘First Aero Beport,* p. 10.
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temperature extremes of a normal summer and winter# Sheir air* 
craft were buffeted by the severe air circulations over the 
desert and la the mountains. Shey were forced to operate from 
bases of the moment* their frail craft constantly exposed to 
sand* grit, snow, rain, and aj.eefc.37
She extreme heat of the desert areas made the mechanic’s 
tools too hot to handle. It caused the mall, an&er#»degigne& 
aircraft radiators to preheat to 16® Degrees Fahrenheit before 
engine start# Shi a situation increased the incident rate of 
cooling system problems and overheated engines#
fho sand of the desert areas was insufficiently packed, 
and did not provide adequate support for the wheel loading 
capacity of the aircraft# fh© airplanes* on take off* their 
wheels gripped in & furrow of sand, and totally underpowered, 
ran » . . • along the ground like quail for a quarter of a 
mile before getting enough purchase on the air to lift. *39 
the air currents* fierce whirlwinds and constant near 
ceiling operating altitudes presented the aviators a continuous 
hazard* On the ground, the winds peppered the aircraft with 
sand and Hung them like toys. She Ayers resorted to tying
3?*@owarasaahb*s Acres sot suitable for Kexico,® Aerial
95? and *aeco«mea&afclons*® "firofdera
38»Difficulfcies of the Hexiean Campaign,0 Aerial Age 
m m z *  * 0 9  3,1916, p. m *
39ibid* ? and Gregory Raeon, »She aough-Boy and the Sraek/i/
Some Eesibns of ©or ffexloan Expedition,0 She .Quttoafc#
hay 31, 1916, p. 282,
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their machines dona with teat peg© and rope to prevent damage. 
In the air, the same whirlwinds could prove almost fatal# as 
evidenced by Lieutenant Bowen1 s crash on March 20# 1916. The 
treacherous air currents of the mountains were more the real 
enemy of the aviators than the Villistas, and rarely were they 
conquered.^
In the period March 15, 1916, to August 15# 1916# the
First Aero Squadron flew 5^0 sorties# logged 3^ 5 hours and 3^
minutes, and traversed 19,553 miles.1*1 Nearly every experience
was a first, and the squadron personnel rose to the occasion.
The flyers recognised the inherent dangers they faced and
performed * . • • their service with the Punitive Expedition
as a part of the day1 a work and simply in line of duty.
The enlisted personnel provided the expedition with a rare
technical skill, often performing double duty as aircraft
technicians and motor transportation experts# Captain Foulois
commended these men when he stated in his report;
Without the willing and efficient cooperation of 
the enlisted mem of this command the flying service 
of the Punitive Expedition would have ended at 
Columbus# New Mexico#^
The ablators of the First Aero Squadron had worked under
Government*s Aeros Not Suitable for Mexico#1 
Aerial Amo Weekly# April 3, 1916# p. 95*
**1*First Aero Report,a p. 9*
***• Recommendations # * Ibid.. p. 11.
**3lbia.
serious handicaps of inexperience, poor equipment, and inade­
quate support, their failings were in no nay attributable to 
mismanagement by Captain Pouloia. this first oomtoat air 
commander recognised the deficiencies of his unit and its equip­
ment. He made a sincere effort to analyse the problems faced 
by General Pershing, and to seek effective alternative solu­
tions to them. These he offered to his commander, who made a 
decision, thereby transferring toe primary role of his air 
support to a courier role rather than one of reconnaissance, 
Poulois' able leadership and loyal service are evidenced by 
his rapid promotion to Brigadier General and subsequent 
appointment,' September 5, 191?, as Chief of the Air Service.^4* 
Captain Poulois, in his final report, tried to see beyond 
the moment and attempted to provide solutions to improve toe 
Air Service based upon toe limited field experience he had 
encountered. Be recommended that centrally located logistical 
and repair depots be established at various central locations 
to provide support for.tactical squadrons. These centers were 
to be independent in operation and fully equipped for repair, 
assembly, test, and modification of operational aircraft.
****!?.S., Congress, House, Committee on Rilitary Affairs, 
Pioneer Aviators. Hearings, before the Committee on Rilitary 
Affairs, House of Bepresehtatives on B.B. 11273 (statement 
of Horn. John J. McSwain, Brig. Gen. Benj. D. Poulois,
Raj, Herbert A. Dargue, Maj Thos. Be w. Killing), ?Oth Cong.,
1st sees., 1928, p. 1?.
65“Recommendations,* "First Aero Beport,* p. 9.
Bis experiences led him to believe tost a tactical squad­
ron should confine its duties to toe military employment of 
aircraft, Therefore, all aircraft received should be delivered 
in fighting shape and not require extensive overhauls before 
totng' put into service.^
As a result of too inadequate aircraft of his unit,
Pouloia suggested toot the airplanes of the future should to 
tested in other than -perfect or optimum conditions* Me called 
for acceptable environmental service toots before an airplane 
was put into service, further, to recommended tost the altera­
tions necessary * . , , to made by too manufacturer.tt4*7 jn 
order to accomplish these tests, to felt too government should 
create a flight tost center.**®
Captain Fouloia also .ado raeocasendafeions in regard to 
squadron reorganization, the impact of toe first Aero Squadron's 
failure, however, had greater effect than just squadron re­
organization. Its collapse helped emphasize too cancer un­
covered by too almost concurrent Count partial of lieutenant 
Colonel Goodiar, The public airing of too Aviation Section's 
difficulties, coupled with its lack of capability forced to© 
reorganisation of toe Air Service as initiated by the Secretary 
Of Mar, towtoa D. Baker in April 1916.^
. p. 10. WfMd.
**9*®!© tows of toe Week,* Aerial Age Weekly.
April 10, 1916, p. Ill,
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Although the First Aero Squadron did not provide total, 
air support to the Mexican punitive expedition,. it did intro­
duce the United States Army and the leaders of the nation to 
the possibilities of air power In a tactical r o l e *  50 A e  such 
it was recognised by General Pershing in his Report of 
Operations*. June 30* If16* who called "particular attention 
to the words of the First Aero Squadron Commander.
The experience gained by the commissioned and 
enlisted personnel of this command while on active 
duty with the Punitive Expedition* has been of the 
greatest value#and it is believed that the knowledge 
' gained by all concerned should result in more rapid 
and efficient development of the aviation service in 
the United States Army.^l
31*pershing Report** p. %3*
c m m m  m
t i i  mwm if io i m >s
The military fora# of the United States found itself 
unable to trap Villa* They had exhausted their capability for 
further pursuit In a hostile environment* Incapable of going 
forward and faced with untenable supply lines# General Pershing 
switched to a defensive force position rather than face a 
total withdrawal to the United States* The boundaries of the 
garrison were marked by the outposts of Oarransista soldiers 
that blocked further American movement toward the east# west* 
or soaih*^
The expedition remained, ostensively to patrol the State 
of Chihuahua in order to pacify those scattered villistas it 
could locate* Pershing# on April 29# 1916, divided the area 
around his headquarters into five districts; Namiquipa, 
Guerrero, Busbilies* Save to, and San Francisco de .Soria* Each 
district was patrolled by the regiment of cavalry that had 
seen the most action within It* These regiments were organised 
as separate entities with their own Intelligence service and a 
capability for Independent command* It was assumed by Pershing 
that this arrangement offered the maximum initiative and flexl-
*€arransa, *La Expe&iclon Punitive# * pp. 131# 139*
bllity for the search and destruction of the scattered Villistaa. 
Pershing cautioned eaoh district commander to remember he was
* « * • operating within the boundaries of a friendly ration
* * * * hut* if an unprovoked attach should occur they should 
not hesitate to administer severe punishment on the offenders,2
Throughout Ray rad June, 1916, Pershing continued'' to con­
centrate his command around Colonla Dublan, as well as pursue 
bandits and observe Carranzista capability. By mid-June 1916,
It was obvious that the Mexican army could cut the expedition*# 
supply rad communication lines whenever they desired* Rex!can 
troop strength was massive: 22,000 at Chihuahua City, 10,000
at 9111a Ahuma&a, and smaller Concentrations positioned at 
strategic points along the railroad east and west of Colonla 
Dublan,3
As Pershing lacked aircraft for accessary reconnaissance 
activities, he was forced to use cavalry sweeps for the collec­
tion of intelligence. These sweeps were viewed with disfavor 
by the da facto Government. On Jura 16, 1916, General 
J. 8, Trevino, Commander of Chihuahua, informed Pershing that 
he had orders * . . .  to prevent* by use of arms . . . American 
forces « » « from moving to the south* east or west of the 
Places they now occupy,Pershing replied, » . . .  my govern­
ment has placed no restrictions upon th® movements of American
2«perefeing 8eport,» pp. 20-28* ‘ 3lMd*, p. 29.
foroes. z shall • * . use ay owa Judgement as to when and in 
what direction 1 shall move ®y forces. . . ."5 Pershing did 
however brief his officers to avoid any conflicts with the 
Carranzistaa when scouting the territory.®
President Wilson* faced with the growing threat of a 
herder war* issued activation orders to the organised militia 
and national guard on June 18* 1916, The militia of each state 
was ordered to report its loom base oamp, Instructed to get 
into shape, and to recruit to full strength.7 Mexican President 
Carranza alerted by Wilson's mobilization orders, ordered a 
further concentration of Mexican forces and warned Mexican 
citizens to a m  themselves.8 As each side armed, any spark of 
ignition could cause war. On June 21, 1916, a cavalry sweep 
of Pershing's command very nearly did at carrizal, Mexico.7
Two reconnaissance detachments. Troop C* Tenth Cavalry, 
Captain Charles f, Boyd* commanding} and Troop K, Tenth Cavalry, 
Captain Lewis S. Morey* commanding, Joined forces at Oto Santo 
earning©, 5:30 p.m., June 20, 1916. Boyd being senior, assumed
5*Pershing Beport," pp. 29-30; and Telegram, Pershing to 
j, s. Trevino, June 16, 1916, Foreign Belations 1916, p. 577.
6Beport of investigation of Encounter between Americans
de facto Government Forces, AGO files 2377632, Punitive 
Expedition,National Archives* Washington, D.C. (Microfilm.)
7aeport of the Chief of Staff, AnnualReports 1916. 
pp. 189, 193.
®°Mobllizlng the Militia,” The Outlook. June 28, 1916, 
p. 603.
Monograph," p. IV-21.
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command. Barly the following morning, the tee troope departed 
for Carriaal, well aware that 9@6 Carranxlsta cavalrymen oceu- 
pled the village, they reached an open field, southeast of 
the town at 6:30 0,0,, Jim© 21, 1916. aoyd, intent upon 
passing through C a m  sal, sent a message to the tows Sate 
Polltine requesting permission to So so.10
She Mexicans, alerted by the approaehing dust cloud, had 
evacuated the village of women and children. She defenders 
quickly established a defensive line in an irrigation ditch • 
and behind cottonwood trees, Their position, which separated 
the Americans tmm the town. Included a machine gun emplace­
ment. As the Mexican soldiers waited, lieutenant Colonel divas 
and two other Mexican officers rode out to meet the intruders. 
They informed 80yd that he could not traverse the village.
Boyd was not satisfied with the decree and insisted upon speak., 
ing to the military commander, General Felix Gosses:, who was 
still in bed.ll
Twenty minutes later, General Gomee arrived; he too re­
fused to give Boyd permission to pass through the town. The 
Mexican General's orders were to stop American intrusion east, 
west, or south of the garrison at Colonia Nubian. Me informed 
Boyd, in no uncertain tome, that he would fight if necessary
10®Perahing deport,® pp. 30-31; and Lewis S. Rorey,
•The Cavalry Fight at Carrizal,® f 
January 1917, pp* 999-952,^
ilcarransa* "La Sxpedicion Funitlva,®
PP. 253-259. ■ ■
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to obey bio directives.!2
Captain Boyd returned to his waiting troop©, dismounted 
them, and moved them up to a skirmish line 300 yards from the 
Mexican line* the trooper© had their carbines loaded and at 
port. General Gomes and hi© officers were still mounted and 
at. conference location as Boyd began forming his men. The 
Mexican officers viewed the entire maneuver with shock and 
astonishment, barely moving back to their left flank before 
the Americans passed the place where Gomes and Boyd had con­
versed. 13
General Gomes acted stunned by the entire situation, but 
under questioning by his Officers, he ordered M s  bugler to 
"Blow commence firing. *1** Both sides fired almost simultaneously. 
Among the first killed were Gomes and Boyd, the firefighb 
lasted nearly an hour*, The Mexicans, superior in force and 
arms, and possessing a machine .gun, succeeded in enveloping 
the American positions.1^
The .American negro troopers wisely retreated. They faced 
a disaster, two of their three officers were killed, the third
1% M & .» p. 255* and Telegram, Parching to Funston,
June 137*916, Foreign Halations 1916. p. 59**.
13Morey, »The Cavalry Fight at Carr Isa!,* pp. 
and Carranza, *Ba Expedicion Funltiva,* pp#. 256*257*
l^Xbid., p. 258.,
XSTelegrap, Pershing to Funston, June 25. 19X6, gggglgB. 
Halations 1916. p. 596} Carranza, “La Expedicion Punitlva," 
pp. 258*261; and Moray, "The Cavalry Fight at Carrizal,"
PP. 959-955.
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wounded, and their horses had been scattered. They fled, some 
on foot and some on horseback, to the American owned Santo 
Domingo Ranch where they had spent the previous night.16
The Mexicans, who won the field, suffered the greatest 
battle casualties; seventy-two wounded and killed.17 The 
American casualty list totaled forty-three; nine killed, ten 
wounded and twenty-four captured.18
The officials in Washington, D. c. were the first Americans 
to receive news of the battle, at 9:00 p.m., June 21, 1916, 
via Mexican diplomatic channels.19 secretary Lansing, .earlier 
that same day concerned over the tenseness of the Mexican situa­
tion, had relayed a message of united states intentions to 
Argentina. He stated that the United States desired to avoid 
war as, “hostilities, in short, would be simply a state of
i6ibld.. p. 955} and Telegram, Pershing to Funston,
June 23," 1916, Foreign gelations. ,191.6. p. 599.
ITCarranza, "La Expedicion Punitlva,* p. 270. Estimates 
of the dead and wounded at Carrisal vary. Morey states the 
Mexicans * . . . lost according to their own statement 
twelve officers and thirty-three men killed, and fifty- 
three wounded**
ISgeport of the Adjutant General, Annual Reports 1916.
pp. 279-280. Here again estimates vary; Tompkins,
Chasing Villa, p. 209, states twelve killed, eleven wounded 
and twehty-ibree captured; the deport of Investigation shows 
twelve killed or missing, twelve wounded and twenty-four oaptured.
19felegram, special Bepresentative Badgers to the 
Secretary of state, June 21, 1916, Foreign.gelations , 
p. 592} and Telegram, The Adjutant General 'to General 
Funston, June 22, 1916, Foreign Halations 1916. p. 593
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International war without purpose. * . ."20 Following this 
premise, President "Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing dis­
regarded the opinion of the American representatives in Mexico 
City, that the notification by the Mexican war Office was 
* » . . generally interpreted as announcement beginning 
hostilities,Instead, orders were issued to delay all 
noses until General Pershing*s official -report arrived.22
fh@ initial reports of the clash at Carrisal indicated 
the Americans had been lured into a trap. A full report, fur­
nished by Captain Morey, fortunately clarified this, ana clear­
ly revealed the American intent of aifreasive action* Boyd 
had directly disobeyed his orders, and had thereby precipitated 
the affair* Corrective diplomatic actions were taken, and the 
situation was eased.23
the news of the incident at Carrisal increased the pressure 
of public opinion on the admlnistratlon* An immediate settle-
20Letier, The secretary of State.to the. Argentine 
Ambassador, June 31, 191#.. Foreign Beiatlono 1916, p, 593,
Slfelegra®, Special Representative aodgers to the Secretary 
of State, June 31, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916« p. 592*
2%eXegram, The Adjutant General to General Puaoton,
June 22, 1916. goreim ..Relations..1916. p. 593,
! * ' *
23»Perehing Report,® p. 3Xj Telegrams, The Secretary of 
State to Special Representative hedgers, June 32, 1916,
Foreign Relations Iflif and.Telegram, Pershing to Punston 
Juno 25, 1916, I^ ^^.8^tiima....l9||» p. 596. Pershing* s 
summary shows he felt the responsibility was two-sided at 
Carrisal* He names Boyd*a indiscretion, and the de facto 
Government's insistence upon forcing an incident by armed 
opposition. .
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menfc of the Mexican problem was demanded by the public, betters 
to President Wilson arrived from all parts of the nation de­
manding solutions. Wilson redoubled hie efforts to find one.24 
The de facto Government in Hexioo was just as eagerly 
seeking a read to compromise. It promptly, upon demand, re­
leased the prisoners taken at Carrizal to show its « » . . 
sincerity . . .  to reaoh a peaceful and satisfactory settle­
ment. • • ."25 xt then suggested, July 4, 1916, that a joint 
Latin American commission be established to find remedies to 
ours the slek relations between the United states and Mexico.2® 
President Wilson replied through Secretary Lansing,
July 7, 1914, He aeespted the suggestion of a joint commission 
as a means to a just and peaceful end.2?
Meanwhile, the United states troop buildup along the border 
continued. By June 27, 1914, the first militia and national 
guard units were ready. Pour days later, these units began 
movement to the border bases* By July 31, 1916, 112,000 State 
militiamen were in Texas, Arisona, and Hew Mexico.2®
^•Monograph,* p. IV-33.
^Translation, Mr. Arredondo to the Secretary of state,
July 4, 1916, Persian. Belatlona 1916. p. 399.
2®Ibld.
2?Letter, The Secretary of state to Mr. Arredondo,
July 7, 1910, Foreign Relatione. 1916. p. 400.
2®Heport of the Chief of Staff, Annual Reports 1916.
P. 193.
the Bavy too, In the possibility that wan could happen, 
sent sixteen warships to the coastal cities of Mexico, as a 
shoe of fo*>ee in late fua@.®9 f^e Aero Club of America, in an 
effort to bolster the weak Air Service, advocated the immediate 
training of 500 men as aviators end' observers.. Sn a burst of 
patriotism the Club, .on July 3, lfl6, offered to pay the boat- 
fare home of any member of the Franeo-Amerlcan flying dorps,, 
so that they could lend their combat experience to the bolted 
States, the French government, who had paid for-their avia­
tion training, refused to release 'the fly©rs»30 me prepara­
tion for war activities across the nation caused the Outlook 
to not© • . . there were sp@etacA.es in the cities of the 
United States not seen since 18f8»*3i
While awaiting the diplomatic settlement,. the American 
expedition already in Mexico trained and maneuvered in the 
Colonia Dublaa area,, lessons in musketry and tactics were 
practiced,, and the men,.forced to improvise in the field,.cul-■ 
tivsted their professional skills to new high levels of pro­
ficiency. _ For most of the officers, this was their first oppor­
tunity to participate and lead largo scale field maneuvers.
29»MobillElng the Militia,* the Outlook, 
dime 28, 1916, p. 993,
3®»Aer© Club Invites American Airmen in France 
to fieturn for Mexican Service,0 AgriA^Ake Jfeekiy. 
dirty 3, 1916, p. 970,
31*i9obllizinc the Militia.* the Outlook, 
dune 28, 1916, p, 993.
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First lieutenant George Patton wrote, because of the training 
receive * . , * almost unimagined benefits- have resulted,*3a 
on January 18, 191?, tbea# braining activities case to 
an ««8. Based upon the netHxmrwi^ttoae of the Amerlean members 
of the Joint commission, and in view of the growing probability 
of involvement in the European War, General Passion was directed, 
iy the order of the President, 'to lnstruot General Pershing to 
prepare to withdrew from goalee. Hovsmanfc began immediately,.
She 'last column departed. Golonla Bublan, January 31, 191?, By 
3s0O p.m., February 5, 1917, Oil of the American forces had 
crossed the border.33
On April 8, 191?, only two months after the expedition re. 
burned to the Baited states* congress deelated, a stats of war 
existed between the united states and Germany, She American 
nation entered the great confliot, not unexpectedly sad not 
totally unprepared. Xta flabby army* weak air aervlee* and 
wm^msAm^ & y^ esr
of field aotivltles* Brigadier General Henry J. Beilly later
Si  fi  f t  ll" ill iV *
Without the Hexioan Border Service it is extremely
3%eorge S. Fatten, Jr., * Cavalier Work of the Punitive 
Expedition,* »^,. ^ v ^ ry .JournfO.. January 1917, pp. 426-433} 
•Ronograph,* pp. iv-35-iv-35j seport of the Chief of Staff,
 ...... P* 189} and foopkiaa, a ' *
33Beport of the Adjutant General, in U.S., War Department, 
arts 1917. vol. 1 {Washington, B.C. t Government 
trice* lylS), p. l9o«
m
doubtful if General Pershing Mould have bad the 
300,000 with Mhioh he intervened la the Second 
Settle of the Heme; the $00,000 . . . /afc7 
Salat ftihlel « • .jraft the 1,200,000 weed la 
the Argoane. . * ,J*
0&§lQ9$ft3l urote In hi* memoirs;
, , * while ®p command In Kexieo wee taught the
tiChltitilEi & £  I f A R O h  f'SfilltiSlllEe i t  tfjj# ISIUESm:.
ttoularly trained la the Mar ef movement. with- 
ioit ||i0 *t>iqX i 0&t>i.©& #1? opts iMunflsM &MMM-
could have been onljr open stalemate on the Western
Soofainry ef Mar Sewrtoa u. Baker aleo appreciated the fall- 
eat of experience received tar tooth the militia and Mae regular 
element* few the large acale training, He wrote, the Mexican 
expeditions
* ’* * toy the ffiotoilieatioa ef the tegular Army aad 
the National Guard, . . * gave on excellent oppor­
tunity tooth to the men la the Guard and to the' 
swssNtl- S#psi*to#iiSs ®f $$10 oovftsrajenfc* ■
that afforded a moat serviceable foundation upon 
trtilah to hi*cni^«nI with iM&wefip sziMuxslon ##* th«
upon to undertake*^
1% 4ft &l*o irefy plausl&l& to te&&09ft that fotifttf^ ifT ##*#
hie appointment as the Pomander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force to hia previous command of the Mexican punitive expedition,
®ierefore, It oaa toe seen the total effect of the expedition
o» the army, aad lie preparedness aad mobilization wee great.
V  ‘ja»iw»[«h|iMw»M!MiwiuM)!Msii*wWA*MWM~fe>wM*^ ^
Smeary J* Seiliy, »®h* National Guard on the Mexican 
Border,* in foapkins, CfoasingVilla. p. 229,
m m r n  f, Pershing, «y ExperlenoeB to the, world, war (hew 
forki Fredrick A, Stokes Gwap^, i9PJ, Voi. t# pp.^0*ll,
3%eport of the Secretary of ww, Annual SeBorta l91?, p. 10,
ltd
No where however wee the leak of preparedness more evident than
in, thfi nMMiided by the Air1 Saw la&.
The American oitieen, safe trm war Mad Isolated lay 
oceans from Europe, had not hew. overly concerned with pro* 
parednees in 1915, and did not want to * * . » overload them*' 
selves with taxation for defease. * . .*37 Congress reflected 
this lethargic mood, and its military appropriations remained 
low in 1910 and 1915.
this attitude toward military expenditures was especially 
aotieeahle In the appropriations for the Army Air Service. 
GougpN* s sional sa^ snSSSiKPss $h© machine a %h&% tsijay 
cldered experimental totalled only a soaat 609,009 dollars toy 
the end of 1915*. the Aviation Section, limited in funds aad 
ag* co:ri*traine& |jy legislated porsoanQi pfsos^wss# 
ing pfUJNir equipment, and XlM&lfig; reorga»ia&&tian#
was not a viable air ana in early 1916*
Mexico end its problems were apparent to the American 
public, when the Mexican punitive expedition invaded Mexico, 
the United States* only operational air unit, the- First Aero 
Squadron, was ordered to the field* fhe meager exploits of 
tit* Jii3t$ii0$ | nftiffi by W%& &&v& CELtfcl* til* Aiaeriea j$h&
other avid aviation!sts, captured the American public** eye*
-She activities of the first Aero Squadron gave the nation 
a vivid illustration of the need for a well equipped aerial
3?**ls it Necessary,* raw independent, October 25, 1915* p* 120.
its
term* Its "lack,* la the words of Colonel Samuel W* Dallam, 
seventh Cavalry, was * . * . the greatest deficiency /of the 
expe&ltion/. * 3® as It was the Host time Wat W e  army ea» 
ployed even limited a&r power, its use, although far from 
effeotivo, impressed General Pershing aad other offleors with 
military aviation*a future potential*
M  |0OUtl| fcltfc titfiit'll: *qua&r0» tfSfi SOSti?0SS.if
%© .fn^ sssii mi « o»«
H  . ^ e s t l S S S  p 2 ‘ O l & 4 M i  m i X * & 3 2 g  % & #  ■ e x p f t d i f c l O t l  1 W I #  O Q B U $ a i l &  
and &&&& supplied hiss hie primary
courier aervloe, it is <{ulte doubtful that the value of their 
services or their potential was as great as assumed by W e  
Aero Club of America. These gentlemen were truly aviation 
faddists, nothing would have satisfies them except a sky 
overcast with airplanes. However, W o  impact of their aerial 
campaign, coupled with the rapid collapse of the Pirtt .Aero 
Squadron, convinced the American publia, Congress, and the 
Secretary of bar of the real need for as effective air service, 
W o  immediate reaotion of congress was the urgent Defi*. 
eienoies Mil, Kerch 31, 1916, providing $00,080 dollars for 
aircraft, This was followed ty the actional Defense Act,
June 3, 1916, which authorised aa eventual increase of aviation 
officers frat 60 to 168, and aa increase in enlisted personnel 
from 260 to 6000, it also removed the 1916 restrictions of
38oallam, "The Punitive Expedition of 1916,* p* 396,
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ago, rank, and marital state* Probably the asst important 
provision of this bill was that it granted the authorisation 
for, 'and allocated the asaas to establish, an offloors reserve 
corps -as well as an enlisted reserve corps* within these re­
serve corps was an aviation reserve corps. Through this 
vehicle, the buildup of aviators for world Mar I was achieved*39 
On august 29* 1916, Congress passed an air service appropria­
tion for 13,281,666 dollars; ten times the entire total pre­
viously allocated for army aviation purposes* This bill's 
passage was directly attributed to the impact on congress made 
by the failure of the first Aero Squadron in Bexioo.1*0
The following year, 191?, the flood of expenditures con­
tinued., finally culminating in the great aviation appropriation 
of 660,667,889 dollars, passed July 25, 191?* Although this 
great sum resulted primarily from the pressing’ needs of World 
War X, it is well to remember the Congressional flood gates 
wars opened as a result of the Mexican punitive expedition. ***
39».S,, Statutes,at large. Vol. XXXJX, pt. 1 (December 1915 
to March 191?), “An Act Forasking further and more effectual 
provision for the national defense, aid for other purposes,
June 3, 1916, oh. 136, pp. 166-176*
9©u«S., Statutes at large. Vol. XXXIX pt. 1 (December 1915 
to March 191?), “An Aot Kaklng appropriations for the support 
of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 191?# and for 
other purposes,* August 29, 1916, oh* 618, pp. 619-62?#
bly.g,, war Department, iMMMfcJtinwtiU*...theiMg^tor Of
10. 1918 (Washington. P.C.tGovernment Printing
* $P* 3-9.
9I & f f l t  X
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the course of American air power* The successes and the fail­
ures of the young aviators in tiiclr underpowered aircraft 
alerted the United states to the fast that it did .act possess 
a viable air are* da a grander scads, the notions of the ex­
peditionary force alerted the United states to the condition 
of it* aroy* Mosiioo waa **£& to t* * * » * n* r ' w  a p  ''PVtRMp '-sp- . gptsp-’y s w r:,^ <wsg g ^ ’’gT s* j ia  i ■ ^ * ri -g? sp •’w '' a i r ^ w ^ r g p  P iB '
iaa our in  i9 i5 g  It*  *& t**& !i3r Swwo4 out $ *  $*n *
in disguised
The United states* intervention in Kexioo in 1916 was a 
failure* 2t did not punish Villa! it only alienated the 
Mexican nation* its lack of success can be attributed to too
ubhJ;OS» iiUHNiic Ft rat, united SSsSss a w  %f»g notr
of sustained combat operations on a large scale in 1916* 
Secondly, the Army did not possess those qualities necessary 
$0 $*p$g$|t* ffif* ttlHitHlfl H ftlNNl Sn &%# hbSBini
envirorammt. General Perishirut «m&lo:red oavalfw fttee&Hi* fie&jrch 
and destroy tactics, and district control methods in an attempt 
to capture fanoho Villa* These tactics could have suoceeded if
Iwhitaey, "Why Mexico is A aiorn in Our Side,* Kay 19, 1915,
P» 195.
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the native population had been cooperative; however, it was 
not* She Mexican punitive expedition ie an early example, 
for students of military history, of the necessity of indi­
genous support for successful oonterlasurgenoy operations.
The Mexican punitive expedition provided hath the segular 
Array ton BsSSsnti SussfS wito to# t-r^ n^ g
and combat hardening that prepared them for the United States* 
entrance into world war 1* As such, it marked the end of the 
old horse cavalry and. the creation of the modem mechanized 
army of the present* In addition, the milltaxy requirements 
of the expedition afforded the United States the precious time 
the nation needed to prepare for world war 1 during a period 
when united States public opinion opposed military preparedness.
Throughout the course of the expedition, General Pershing 
was faced with two major support problems: logistical support
fftnfr pps n$!&teiNa& $ntft t Is. an to
achieve the latter, he used his meager observation capability 
of the First Aero Squadron in the dual role of courier and 
reeonnalssanoe. The support furnished the expedition by the 
first Aero Squadron was net great, nor long lived; but its in­
adequacies rapidly drove Congress to provide the appropriations 
needed for the expansion of the Amy Air Service, ' -
Pre-World war z military men recognized the possibilities 
0? #%!» J)0M& jtH y»j»f*f>rynyfcft» **3 SFSSltSIPir tiV&fefc&Ag:* 
defense, ground support, and to a limited degree, stmtegio 
operations, la those' early years, the young army aviation
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service was severely liaised by its* own inefficient organiza­
tion ee well as a Congressional reluetanee bo- finance military 
experimentation. The Mexican situation afforded the military 
with an unplanned combat test of the new air service, and as 
a result,, the united States was alerted to the united states 
Army’s low .aerial capability.
The first operational employment of air power was a fail­
ure*. The inadequacies of airplanes not specifically designed 
for military purposes or severs environmental conditions be- 
tkmmm 01WP&0U## IMMHt f&T fe StrSHjESSPSS
appeared, and hi$* ranking military and civilian leaders began 
to appreciate the full impact of air power if it was available. 
Spurred on by publlo pressure and aviation* a possibilities. 
Congress finally overcame its lethargy and opened the legis­
lative wad appropriation floodgates, in some instances, such 
as cresting a viable aircraft industry, the action came almost 
too late* However, there is no doubt that the resultant effect 
ffcSjASMji of the w&w&t* m i  i.ii
oreating and preparing the United states Amy Air Service for 
World war Z. A s  air leaders of the young Air Service became 
the air leaders of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, as well as 
%ha Do«t World wax* I Air S#nrici&e tsteli* experience© in 
Mexico tempered their future thinking. These experiences pro­
vided As embryo of today's Air Force operations in flight test 
centers, environmental testing, aeronautical chart centers, 
survival training, logistical and maintenance depots, as well
im
as tactics.
The Mexican punitive expedition wee a distinct step in 
the history of military aviation. It heralded the importance 
of air power to A s  American nation*. It focused the attention 
of the amy, Congress, and the general public upon the future 
possibilities of air power, as well as A s  lImitations of the 
past* Congress responded, and the wingless American eagle 
began to grow the war wings ultimately needed 
War. Therefore, it can to said, the Mexican punitive expedi­
tion is a true watershed in the history of the United states 
Air Force as it divides the period of pure aerial experiment- 
tatlon tfo s t $!&$ beginnings of ojparaftl onal aiw povtw employment § 
as well -as establishing the base line posture for world War X
pr6pai*e&nes**
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